What Did Bush Tell Gonzales?
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200809u/gonzales-investigation
In March 2004, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales made a now-famous
late-night visit to the hospital room of Attorney General John
Ashcroft, seeking to get Ashcroft to sign a certification stating that
the Bush administration’s warrantless wiretapping program was legal.
According to people familiar with statements recently made by Gonzales
to federal investigators, Gonzales is now saying that George Bush
personally directed him to make that hospital visit.


The hospital visit is already central to many contemporaneous
historical accounts of the Bush presidency. At the time of the visit,
Ashcroft had been in intensive care for six days, was heavily
medicated, and was recovering from emergency surgery to remove his
gall bladder. Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey has said that he
believes that Gonzales and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, who
accompanied Gonzales to Ashcroft’s hospital room, were trying to take
advantage of Ashcroft’s grievously ill state—pressing him to sign the
certification possibly without even comprehending what he was doing—
and in the process authorize a government surveillance program which
both Ashcroft and the Justice Department had concluded was of
questionable legality.

Gonzales has also told Justice Department investigators that President
Bush played a more central and active role than was previously known
in devising a strategy to have Congress enable the continuation of the
surveillance program when questions about its legality were raised by
the Justice Department, as well as devising other ways to circumvent
the Justice Department’s legal concerns about the program, according
to people who have read Gonzales’s interviews with investigators. The
White House declined to comment for this story. An attorney for
Gonzales, George J. Terwilliger III, himself a former deputy attorney
general, declined to comment as well.

Although this president is famously known for rarely becoming immersed
in the details—even on the issues he cares the most about—Gonzales has
painted a picture of Bush as being very much involved when it came to
his administration’s surveillance program.

In describing Bush as having pressed him to engage in some of the more
controversial actions regarding the warrantless surveillance program,
Gonzales and his legal team are apparently attempting to lessen his
own legal jeopardy. The Justice Department’s inspector general (IG) is
investigating whether Gonzales lied to Congress when he was questioned
under oath about the surveillance program. And the Justice
Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) is separately
investigating whether Gonzales and other Justice Department attorneys
acted within the law in authorizing and overseeing the surveillance
program. Neither the IG nor OPR can bring criminal charges, but if,
during the course of their own investigations, they believe they have
uncovered evidence of a possible crime, they can seek to make a
criminal referral to those who can.

In portraying President Bush as directly involved in making some of
the more controversial decisions about his administration’s
surveillance program, Gonzales may, intentionally or unintentionally,
be drawing greater legal scrutiny to the actions of President Bush and
other White House officials. And what began as investigations narrowly
focused on Gonzales’s conduct could easily morph into broader
investigations leading into the White House, and possibly leading to
the appointment of a special prosecutor.

Dan Richman, a former federal prosecutor in Manhattan and professor at
Columbia Law School, told me that Gonzales appears to be attempting to
walk the thin line of taking himself out of harm’s way while at the
same time protecting the president, a strategy that very well could
work: “I think he is serving his own purposes and the White House’s
purposes,” Richman says.

According to Richman, by invoking Bush’s name and authority, Gonzales
and his legal team are making it more difficult for investigators to
seek a criminal investigation of his actions, or for other
investigators to later bring criminal charges against him: “The
clearer it is that Gonzales did what he did at the behest of the
president of the United States, the safer that he [Gonzales] is
legally,” says Richman. At the same time, by saying that he is
advising the president, Gonzales also makes it easier for those at the
White House to claim executive privilege if they do indeed become
embroiled in the probe.

Moreover, according to one senior Justice Department official,
Gonzales, his legal team, and the White House also know that Justice’s
IG and OPR are unlikely to press senior White House officials, let
alone the president, to answer their questions.

But this legal strategy could also backfire.

One scenario feared by the White House is that the IG or OPR could
send a public report to Congress concluding that Gonzales or some
other official may have committed a crime. At a minimum, that would
make the conduct of Gonzales, or of any other official deemed to be
under suspicion, the subject of a criminal investigation.

If the report also raised unanswered questions about possible
misconduct by other senior administration officials, or even the
president, that could lead to the appointment of a special prosecutor.
Some consider this unlikely; Attorney General Mike Mukasey has said
that he is not an advocate of special prosecutors, and his critics in
Congress have said that Mukasey tends to use his position for the
political benefit of the White House. But in the hands of
congressional Democrats, a public report accusing Gonzales and other
administration officials of misconduct could make it difficult for
Mukasey to resist their calls for the appointment of a special
prosecutor.

Inside the White House, this is what is called the “nightmare
scenario.” White House Counsel Fred Fielding, who served in the Nixon
White House during Watergate and as a White House counsel during the
Reagan administration, has told others in the White House that
although he does not consider this a likelihood, it should not be
ruled out, and Bush and his staff should be ready for such a
contingency. In addition to the Justice Department’s IG and OPR
investigations regarding the surveillance program, Gonzales is also
under investigation by the IG as to whether he lied to Congress about
the politicized firings of nine U.S. attorneys. Fielding has told
White House colleagues that there is an outside possibility that a
special prosecutor could be appointed to conduct a broader
investigation.

In the meantime, however, it will be increasingly difficult for the
president to claim he was detached from the major decisions regarding
his surveillance program. One fiction that has been set aside is that
the regrettable incident in Ashcroft’s hospital room was the work of
overzealous or insensitive staff.

The narrative of a detached Bush delegating to his staff and to his
vice president continues to be the predominant one. Gonzales and Vice
President Cheney have been only too happy to serve as lightning rods
for criticism of the administration, drawing fire away from many of
President Bush’s most controversial decisions on national-security
policy.

Washington Post reporter Barton Gellman’s recently published book on
Cheney, The Angler, once again implies that it was Cheney who was
running the show. An excerpt published in The Washington Post about
the president’s role in pressing for the surveillance program was
headlined “Cheney Shielded Bush From Crisis.” The article was also
summarized as follows on the newspaper’s Web site: “President was
nowhere in the picture as Cheney fought to keep surveillance program
on track.”

But seemingly contrary to the book’s broader conclusions was a story
corroborating Gonzales’s account to investigators that Bush ordered
him and Card to go visit Ashcroft in the hospital. Indeed, if Gellman
is correct, Gonzales and Card would never have been admitted to
Ashcroft’s hospital room without the president’s intercession in the
first place. Gellman wrote:


The phone started ringing in the makeshift command center next to John
Ashcroft’s hospital room. Janet Ashcroft had been at her husband’s
side for six days. He was in intensive care, sedated, recovering from
emergency surgery to remove his gallbladder. Mrs. Ashcroft’s orders
were unequivocal: no calls, from anyone, for any reason. According to
two people who saw the FBI’s handwritten logs, the White House operator
—on behalf of Gonzales or Card, it was unclear which—asked to be
connected to the attorney general. The hospital switchboard, following
orders, declined.

That evening, the FBI logged a call from the president of the United
States. No one had the nerve to refuse him. The phone rang at
Ashcroft’s bedside. Bush told his ailing cabinet chief that Alberto
Gonzales and Andy Card were on their way.

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