From: Travis
Subject: Too Tasty to Fail
Date: Wednesday, October 1, 2008,

  Too Tasty to Fail

*Daily Article* by D.W.
MacKenzie<http://mises.org/articles.aspx?AuthorId=1006>| Posted on
10/1/2008
 While the current financial crisis has received much attention, another
crisis has led to calls for government intervention. The Maryland blue crab
population has dropped sharply in recent years.
The annual catch is now thirty percent of its previous level of 140 million
crabs. Some people blame pollution, overharvesting, and development of
nesting areas for the decline in the crab population. The Virginia Marine
Resources Commission has failed to remedy this situation. Twenty-two
regulatory measures (enacted in 1994) have failed to stem the decline in the
crab population. New regulations and licensing requirements have been
proposed to limit the ability to catch crabs.
Some senators are urging that the crab crisis be declared a federal
disaster, so that Chesapeake crabbers can receive $20 million in aid. This
is not the first time that there have been calls for subsidies for the
Maryland crab industry.
While politicians think in terms of subsidies and production limits as
solutions to the crab crisis, economics points to different solutions. The
root cause of the crab crisis is that nobody owns the breeding grounds
(which of course are water) for crabs or crabs themselves. Fishing areas and
swamps are not generally private property, and crabs themselves for the most
part roam freely and are not the property of any individuals. Lack of
private-property rights leads to particular problems. The tragedy of the
commons exists because nobody has an incentive to invest in communal
property. In a true fishing commons, anyone can draw fish or crabs, simply
by having access (by boat) and the necessary equipment. Private owners of
cattle capture the gain from breeding and caring for their livestock, but
anyone investing in breeding and maintaining crabs shares any gain with all
other (noncontributing) fisherman.
Government regulations and licensing requirements set limits on the ability
to harvest crabs, but these limits are arbitrary. Since the crab population
is itself commonly owned, there is no price on any market for the crab
population as an asset. So government restrictions on crab harvesting are
not economically rational. A government-regulated crab industry will
therefore not be coordinated with other lines of production. The ability to
invest rationally in preserving or breeding crabs requires some estimate of
the associated capital costs.
Of course, one could argue that there is no way to establish property rights
for schools of crabs. But this is not true. There are many examples where
people have established self-governing, self-organized associations to solve
the type of problems that plague the Maryland crab industry. People all over
the world have established "common pools resource" (CPR) associations that
regulate access to water-related resources that are difficult to define in
terms of normal property rights. The specific terms of CPRs vary according
to local circumstances and problems, but the general idea behind a CPR is
that the people who are directly involved in using resources where property
boundaries are hard to define construct a set of rules for exploiting the
resource in question. For example, fishermen in Alanya, Turkey established a
CPR organization that defined rights to fishing areas. Central officials in
government could not have crafted such rules, as only the local people
understood the economic value of fishing areas (Ostrom, p. 20).

<http://www.mises.org/store/Economics-and-Ethics-of-Private-Property-P288.aspx>
While CPR organizations do not produce property rights in exactly the same
way as we are accustomed to, such arrangements do function very much like
normal property-rights systems. CPR systems also have a good track record in
comparison to overt government regulation. CPRs are in fact
quasi-governmental arrangements that emerge to deal with tragedies of the
commons.
Those who have publicized their concerns about the Maryland crab crisis have
turned to governmental regulation and subsidies too quickly. CPR
organizations can emerge out of individual trading and negotiating, and such
arrangements are more likely to lead to economically efficient results. In
fact, the government has already tried and failed to alleviate the Maryland
crab crisis. Perhaps we should let capitalism have a crack at this problem.
[VIEW THIS ARTICLE ONLINE] <http://mises.org/story/3125>
 _________________________
D.W. MacKenzie teaches economics at SUNY Plattsburgh. Comment on the
blog<http://blog.mises.org/archives/008665.asp>
.
Sources

   - Ostrom, Elinor. *Governing the
Commons<http://books.google.com/books?id=v4A39158MUQC>
   *.
   - "Solution to Crab Crisis Requires Immediate and Fair Action, Long-term
   
Commitment,"<http://www.cbf.org/site/News2?abbr=SB_News_&page=NewsArticle&id=33012>Chesapeake
Bay Foundation. September 25, 2008.
   - "Disaster status urged for
crabs,"<http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bal-md.crabs26jun26,0,3336807.story>TheBaltimoreSun.com.
June 26, 2008.
   - "Another Crisis for the
Bay,"<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/14/AR2008031403193.html>WashingtonPost.com.
September 25, 2008.

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