Interesting article and perspective. This guy Khan could be "Spot On"; or it could be that McCain and Abdel Bary are just to malcontents who are dysfunctional within society in general.
On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Travis <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/08/al-qaedas-new-front-jihadi-rap-110481_full.html#.VAPivUuBuDU > > > > Al Qaeda’s New Front: Jihadi Rap > > > > > > Abdel Majed Abdel Bary, the rapper suspected of murdering American > journalist James Foley somewhere between Syria and Iraq, is the product of > a British youth culture that has managed to merge two seemingly > contradictory lifestyles: gangsta rap and jihad. Like Douglas McAuthur > McCain—an American hip-hop fan who was recently killed fighting for the > Islamic State—Abdel Bary represents a new and very scary evolution in > modern jihadi history. > > > > U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel recently described the Islamic State > as a threat “beyond anything we’ve ever seen.” Yet we are only just > beginning to grasp what is different about this group. One reason is that > it includes men in its ranks whom you might expect to see in a nightclub > rather than fighting in the desert for an organization that would, > traditionally, whip you for listening to music. > > > > As a result of this cultural elasticity, the Islamic State has succeeded > in attracting supporters outside its natural recruiting pool. Both McCain > and another Westerner, Denis Mamadou Cuspert, a German citizen who died > fighting with the Islamic State—and had a previous life as rapper Deso Dogg > with three albums to his name—became converts as part of this broader > appeal. > > > > I first began to look into this hybrid phenomenon in 2008 when I was a > journalist researching a subculture that had fused the extremism and > violence of gangsta rap with that of al Qaeda—or at least a version of it. > During a months-long investigation for British television station Channel > 4, I met dozens of young men across London who tended to have three things > in common: a history of criminal activity, an ambition to be a gangsta > rapper and a fixation with the terrorist group begun by Osama bin Laden. > > > > In a fried chicken shop in the south London district of Brixton—which saw > mass riots against the police in the 1980s—I met with several young men who > were walking examples of the powerful effect of al Qaeda’s ideology. None > came from Muslim backgrounds. Aged between 16 and 20, they were members of > a gang that identified itself around their local postal code, SW16. Their > activities revolved around crime and self promotion. So, when they were not > carrying out muggings, extortion rackets, or dealing drugs, they were > targeting rivals perceived to be encroaching on their area for beatings and > “tagging” — using graffiti to stamp the name of their gang on local > landmarks. As a gang or “crew,” as they called themselves, they produced > rap songs and videos about their exploits. By linking actions and > communications– making their criminal exploits the focus of their rap songs > – they were extremely effective in the way they projected their power to > rivals and authorities. There are similarities with the way IS seamlessly > integrates its media efforts and its military activities. > > > > But what the gang was missing was a big vision beyond local turf wars. A > few weeks before I met them, they had decided to convert as a whole to > “Islam,” which they were drawn to because they understood it to be the > enemy of the “system,” as they also saw themselves to be. Crucially, they > were attracted to the idea that this “Islam” would allow them to continue > carrying out street robberies, break-ins and extortion of other local gangs > with the added benefit of association with a movement that was fighting > Western forces on the world stage. The money their activities brought in > was used to buy time in recording studios to further their ambitions to > become rap artists. > > > > Their worldview was a mashup of what they called “thug life,” gleaned from > the music of their U.S. gangsta-rap heroes along with selective borrowings > from classic left wing and race-based conspiracy theories. It promoted a > do-anything approach to accumulating money and getting ahead, with a focus > on violence and intimidation. The title of rapper 50 Cent’s debut album > “Get Rich, or Die Tryin’” was regarded as an article of faith. Al Qaeda > offered a bridge that allowed this intensely local worldview to connect > with the grand narratives of global war. They already saw themselves as > soldiers in an endless urban conflict. Now, they could become warriors in > an epic, global struggle. Bin Laden would have struggled to recognize their > views as Islamic, even accordingly to his own warped definition. But the > twisted genius of his ideological creation was that they did not need his > approval to sign up. > > > > On the face of it, it’s difficult to imagine two lifestyles more > diametrically opposed than rap and Islamism. On one side is the “bling” > culture of ostentatious consumption, alcohol, drugs and easy sex. On the > other is an austere and unforgiving worldview that seeks to recreate > seventh-century Arabia. What is frightening is that the Islamic State has > been able to bridge these two very different worlds because of the ideology > it inherited from al Qaeda, which is uses to attract young men motivated by > a vague sense of injustice and anger at the West. > > > > In many ways, the world of hip hop runs parallel to and mirrors the place > of Islam in many urban communities in the Western world. Hip hop provides a > cultural frame of reference that allows followers to share social > experiences they feel are not appreciated by wider society—whether that is > poverty, racism, discrimination or dysfunction within their own community. > It is, in some ways, the most significant social-protest music of our era. > At the same time, followers develop and appropriate language, interactions > and dress codes – whether traditional Pakistani tribal attire or low-riding > jeans and bandanas of urban East Coast America — that they feel are more in > keeping with an “authentic” expression of their identities. Both are often > forces for good. But at the same time, both have extremes. Hip hop and > genuine Islam can help people find community and direction in a confusing > world; in some ways hip hop is the modern descendent of the social protest > music of the past. Gangsta rap and Islamist extremism, on the other hand, > are both a dark reflection of their respective mainstream expressions. > > > > The most obvious similarity between them is a sense of grievance towards > wider society. Both focus on vengeance and fetishize violence as a way of > redressing the balance. Both also take their audiences on similar journeys. > Followers and listeners are made to feel they are at the center of an > unfolding, dangerous epic that will require guts and determination to > survive. But if they do, they will achieve some sort of everlasting > fulfilment. Among the albums of Tupac Shakur, who was killed in a feud in > 1996 but remains a huge influence among many of the young men I met, are > such jihadi-inspiring titles as “Me Against the World” and “Until the End > of Time.” > > > > While taking their adherents on similar, almost parallel, journeys. > Gangsta rap and Islamist extremism also feed off each other. So while > gangsta rap might celebrate violence, the ideology of al Qaeda provides the > intellectual justification to undertake those actions. > > > > Abdel Bary, or L Jinny and Lyricist Jinn as he called himself in his > Youtube videos, is part of a subsection of a subsection of British youth > culture in which Islamist extremism and gangsta rap do not just run in > parallel, but fuse together. In my 2008 investigation, I met several other > young men like him who also lived in west London. Some had family > connections to Algeria, others Morocco, Iraq or the Gulf. Without exception > all their families had Islamist political leanings. Abdel Bary’s father, > who was extradited by British authorities to stand trial in the US for al > Qaeda’s 1998 bombings of embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, would be the most > extreme. Others had family members who were members of non-violent > political groups while some had fathers who fought the Soviets in > Afghanistan in the 1980s, but opposed al Qaeda’s targeting of civilians. > > > > The young men I met — who would have been Abdel Bary’s neighbors — used > the currency of East Coast gangsta rap, the language, clothes and > mannerisms, to give themselves personas that allowed them to fit into west > London street life. All – like Abdel Bary – spent time in a local recording > studio making videos of themselves rapping, or “spitting rhymes.” Also like > Abdel Bary they drew their material from their experience struggling to > adjust to inner city London while still surrounded by the battles “back > home” that their parents were still fighting. Circumstances were difficult > for them all. Like the Brixton gang, some resorted to crime. > > > > Abdel Bary’s lyrics echo 50 Cent and Tupac Shakur’s progression from > victimhood and violence to redemption. “I’m trying to change my ways but > there’s blood on my hands and I can’t change my ways until there’s funds in > the bank,” he raps in a track from 2012. > > > > In later videos he refers to his anger at his father’s treatment: “I swear > the day they came and took my dad, I could have killed a cop or two.” > > > > It was the ideology of al Qaeda and the opportunity created by IS in Iraq > and Syria that provided him an outlet for the grievances that he faced in > London. > > > > Abdel Bary came from a family that was already somewhat familiar with the > idea of violence for Islamist causes. McCain and Cuspert, however, did not. > All three found in the ideology of al Qaeda a path offering the vengeance > and redemption that they were looking for. And the latest and most arguably > violent incarnation of al Qaeda, the Islamic State, provided the > opportunity. > > > > IS’s ability to attract these men to its cause means that the ideological > wheels set in motion by bin Laden are reaching new audiences and converting > sympathy into participation—a dangerous development in the world of > Islamist extremism. > > > > We should not forget that the presence of young men from Western countries > in foreign wars is a long-established tradition that includes British > volunteers in the Spanish civil war—George Orwell, for one—and American > pilots fighting in the Battle of Britain. In these and other conflicts, the > volunteers were motivated by what they saw as injustice happening to > others. And now, the Islamic State is using al Qaeda’s ideology to link > injustice abroad with the potential recruit’s own sense of grievance—in > essence, uniting personal and collective suffering under one worldview. At > the same time, it has managed to bestow on its struggle a counter-culture > sense of subversive “cool” that mainstream political parties and even > commercial brands might envy. > > > > I have spent most of my career living and working in the Middle East and > until June, I was a British adviser to the Syrian Coalition, the > internationally recognised and supported Syrian opposition still fighting > for the goals of the original popular uprising against the Assad regime. It > is clear to me that one of the main reasons that al Qaeda’s ideology is so > powerful is that there is little else to counteract it. The majority of the > Syrian opposition, activists and sympathisers as well as fighters, are > still moderates seeking a state that respects the rule of law, protects the > rights of its people and does not differentiate on the basis of ethnicity > or beliefs. But these principles have not yet been developed into an > ideology that can inspire, motivate and mobilise. Until there is an > ideological alternative, military action will be limited in what it can > achieve against IS. > > The only time I have seen al Qaeda’s messages fall flat was when the Arab > uprisings of 2011 first broke out. It was clear from its hesitant, > defensive statements that the group felt challenged by the idea of young > people in Muslim countries rising up against dictators and demanding > freedom and good governance. But that moment was all too brief; now the > Arab Spring has given way to a battle between autocrats and Islamist > militias—much more comfortable terrain for radical extremist groups like > the Islamic State. > > > > True, al Qaeda’s actions, and the reactions of its enemies, have so far > failed to create a global popular uprising. The organisation itself is > being eclipsed. But al Qaeda was always about bin Laden’s ideology of > cosmic war rather than allegiance to the group itself. The Islamic State > still very much follows “al-Qaeda-inspired” ideology, even though the two > groups have fallen out over tactics and strategy. Bin Laden’s most > significant achievement was establishing his brand of Islamist extremism as > an overarching narrative of suffering and redemption that a wide array of > Muslim grievances could latch on to. > > > > Today, we see in Iraq and Syria an insurgent organisation that can > mobilize people from vastly different backgrounds—people held together not > just by old grievances but by a very modern, and scary, sensibility. > > > > Amil Khan is a former journalist for Reuters and the BBC. He now works as > a communications consultant. 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