http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/10/the-law-and-policy-of-ebola-interdiction/


The Law and Policy of Ebola Interdiction
<http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/10/the-law-and-policy-of-ebola-interdiction/>

By Paul Rosenzweig <http://www.lawfareblog.com/author/paul/>
Thursday, October 9, 2014 at 7:00 AM

A few days ago President Obama announced his intention to do greater
screening of passengers arriving in the United States, as a way of
interdicting the spread of the Ebola virus. According to the Washington Post
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/us-will-augment-ebola-screenings-for-airline-passengers-in-us-and-africa/2014/10/06/2e14a1c0-4d7d-11e4-babe-e91da079cb8a_story.html?wp_login_redirect=0>,
the new procedures will include “entry” screening – that is screening upon
arrival in the United States – layered on top of the already existing
“exit” screening that is being conducted at airports in West Africa. “The
new screening possibilities being considered by the administration include
taking the temperature of travelers from affected countries upon their
arrival at major U.S. airports and more-closely tracking travel histories
for international travelers arriving in the United States.” According to an
NPR story today, the new screening will happen at the top 5 airports in the
US (including Dulles) and will at least in part also involve CBP officers
“looking at patients for signs of distress.”   [Traffic to the US from West
Africa typically transits Europe. Given the current African focus of Ebola the
other 4
<http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-check-temperatures-of-west-africa-passengers-at-five-airports-1412788163>
airports being covered are also European-focused: JFK, Atlanta, O’Hare and
Newark. Note that this still leaves large transit hubs like Miami and
Dallas uncovered for now.]

It is useful, as this plan moves forward, to consider both some of the
legal issues involved in such screening and some of the practical/policy
considerations that are likely driving the discussion. Herewith a short
synopsis [with the caveat that my own experience is exclusively in the
DHS/homeland security law space – there are applicable public health laws,
with which I’m generally familiar, but I lack expertise and may misstate
slightly – corrections welcome]:

*Legal Authority*

In dealing with a pandemic from overseas, HHS has, pursuant to the Public
Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 201 et seq., statutory and regulatory
responsibility for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of
communicable disease from foreign countries into the United States.
Applicable HHS regulations are found in 42 C.F.R. Parts 34 and 71. These
responsibilities are delegated to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), National Center for Infectious Diseases, Division of
Quarantine.

HHS also has primary statutory authority, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 269, to
designate and post medical officers overseas, to require that conveyances
produce a clean bill of health before being permitted to depart from a
foreign port for the United States, and to prescribe additional regulations
for preventing the introduction of communicable disease into the United
States.

Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) is “responsible for security in all modes of
transportation. . . .” 49 U.S.C. 114(d). Specific authorities to carry out
this responsibility include “coordinating countermeasures with appropriate
departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the United States,” 49
U.S.C. 114(f)(4), and issuing and revising security-related regulations and
requirements, “including issuing regulations and security directives
without notice or comment . . . as are necessary to carry out TSA
functions.” 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(1) and (2). Accordingly, (assuming we
characterize disease as a security risk), TSA may assist in preventing the
introduction or spread of quarantinable disease through the transportation
system. Finally, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 268(b), “[i]t shall be the duty of
the customs officers and of Coast Guard officers to aid in the enforcement
of quarantine rules and regulations.” Personnel of both CBP and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) exercise customs authorities and
therefore qualify as “customs officers” under this provision, as do most
Coast Guard officers under 19 U.S.C. 1401.

In practice, for arriving passengers at American airports, this means that
DHS will work with HHS to ensure that aliens carrying a quarantinable
disease such as pandemic influenza are found inadmissible to the United
States – and therefore returned to their point of origin on the next
flight. DHS has general authority under Section 212(a)(1) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(1)) to find
inadmissible any alien “who is determined (in accordance with the
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services) to
have a communicable disease of public health significance.” One gap is that
Ebola is not (at least as I understand it) on the current regulatory
prescribed list – though I imagine that is changing rapidly.

A more difficult issue is with regard to U.S. citizens carrying a
quarantinable disease. There is no legal authority to turn back a U.S.
citizen determined to have such a disease. HHS regulations, however, do
provide for the isolation, quarantine, or surveillance of a person,
regardless of citizenship, suspected of having a quarantinable disease.
Note that this authority is limited to the CDC, but one suspects that were
such a person to arrive at a port of entry where there are no officials
from CDC, the courts would uphold a reasonable temporary detention of
possibly ill individuals by CBP officers until a health determination could
be made.

*Policy*

Buried in this challenge are dozens of difficult
policy/practicality/implementation questions and issues. One could (and,
indeed, I’m sure someone at DHS and/or CDS is busy as we speak) write reams
on the various topics. Here are just a few to highlight as matters that
must be going through the minds of decision-makers:

   - How reliable is exit screening in origin countries? To date roughly
   100 boarding passengers have reportedly been denied the right to leave West
   Africa. We have no real data on how many more might have been permitted to
   travel but should not have (as with the Texas victim who passed away this
   week). In the absence of pre-negotiated screening agreements with foreign
   nations and training of their public health staff we are, essentially
   relying on their assurances.
   - How effective will entry screening be? For one thing, one of the
   reasons that the initial deployment is limited to 5 major airports is that
   there aren’t that many trained CDC officers available to conduct
   screening.  Though CDC has more than 6,500 officers, they are shared and
   spread among nearly two dozen agencies – and not all have the relevant
   medical experience. Pre-crisis, their work load at airports is generally
   “one-off” cases, not systematic screening of all arriving passengers. More
   importantly, do we have any models or experience with assessing how
   successful a combination of observation, questioning and testing will be.
   We will, I think, be fortunate, if the trained screening identifies 90% of
   those who should be identified. Lower success rates are highly likely.
   - Can CBP be a force multiplier? CBP officers are now screening arrivals
   for “obvious signs” of Ebola. I don’t know what these are, myself. Even
   with training, however, well-meaning CBP officers are not trained health
   professionals. They can follow checklists, but they will inevitably make
   mistakes in judgment. Whatever their effectiveness, we know it will be less
   than that of their CDC colleagues.
   - Given these efficacy concerns, can we improve our success in screening
   by funneling air traffic to major airports with a robust CDC presence? It
   would seem so – but only at some significant economic cost. There are,
   right now, as I said, no direct flights from West Africa to the US. Thus,
   almost all arrivals from infected areas have transited Europe.   The
   US-Europe air bridge is the largest single component of our air traffic –
   thinking about re-routing those flights (and therefore, say, prohibiting
   flights from Amsterdam to DFW) is pretty disrupting.
   - Can we do more than screening by limiting or conditioning travel from
   West Africa? Maybe. For non-resident aliens traveling from affected areas,
   options could include a series of escalating measures from voluntary travel
   restrictions to health certification requirements at exit ports, to
   mandatory travel restrictions and exclusion from the United States. For
   U.S. citizens/legal permanent residents, however, we can’t eliminate their
   right to return. For them we might require predicate screening, quarantine,
   treatment, and other prophylaxis measures to reduce the risk of
   transmission of to the domestic United States population – but we cannot
   reject them altogether.
   - Can we even identify all the passengers arriving from West Africa?
   Probably not. If a passenger purchases a through ticket (from, say Liberia
   to Paris to JFK) the entire itinerary is visible to CBP in its automated
   arrival system. If, however, the tickets were purchased separately, or
   there was a break in travel, then only the Paris to JFK leg will appear.
   Only with much deeper and more detailed information on arriving passengers
   (information to which the US is not generally entitled under existing rules
   governing flights from Europe) could the broader travel pattern be
   discovered. I’ve seen estimates that 150 passengers arrive each day in the
   US, having recently been in West Africa. My guess is that something like ¼
   are on itineraries that don’t reflect the country of origin. How likely
   they are to disclose that origin in response to questioning is anybody’s
   guess – but if I were trying to get to the US for treatment, I wouldn’t
   risk being turned back.
   - What do we do with flights carrying an infected individual? Imagine
   that a plane arrives and an Ebola-infected passenger is found to be on
   board. What do we do with all the =other= people on the plane. Do we impose
   mandatory quarantine on them all at the airport? Do we allow them to go
   home and assume they will abide by a home quarantine order? Do we apply
   these rules to all the passengers or only those seated within some distance
   (3 rows? 5?) of the infected individual?
   - Can we even implement a mandatory quarantine at an airport if we
   wanted to? Most airports have room for a few (less than a dozen) people to
   be isolated. They aren’t hospital wards. Some of the challenges of
   mandatory isolation and quarantine of travelers at this stage would include
   the following: limited HHS presence at U.S. international airports; limited
   number of quarantine stations; training requirements for DHS and other
   airport personnel; and the logistical support required for quarantined
   travelers (e.g., food, shelter, medical care, communications, etc.).
   - What are the costs? The costs of screening are potentially large, but
   essentially unmeasurable. Initially they will be limited to the costs of
   delay at airports. Consider it this way – in 2011 (the last year for
   which the Department of Commerce has statistics
   
<http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_45.html>)
   nearly 72 million passengers arrived in the US from other countries
   (excluding Canada). If the additional screening we are contemplating adds
   only 10 seconds to each interaction between CBP and the arriving public,
   the law of large number quickly overwhelms you. A good rule of thumb is
   that 10 more seconds/person is an extra hour of screening for each large
   arriving airliner. Either things slow down, or we incur a lot of overtime
   for CBP officers to handle the delay in throughput. Either way, travel
   disruption can grow to become a significant factor. Of course, to the
   extent we wind up having large quarantine costs or hospital-based treatment
   costs on the public health side, those will probably outweigh travel delay
   costs – but I know much less about those and can’t really even begin to
   estimate them.
   - Will cargo be effected? It probably shouldn’t be (given my limited
   knowledge of Ebola’s transmission methods, cargo does not seem to be a
   vector of contamination).   But if it is, then the costs of additional
   screening just increased substantially. Granted, we probably get little
   cargo from West Africa – but, as I said, most of it transits Europe. And if
   European cargo is generally subject to more scrutiny, now we are talking
   about significant business disruption. The domestic macroeconomic impact is
   potentially an economy-breaker – and the ripple effect globally would also
   be notable.
   - Here’s another chestnut: What about diplomats from West Africa? Can
   they be interdicted? One suspects their governments would object.
   - Don’t even get me started on the land border …. The difficulty of
   screening there is immensely greater than at airports.
   - Is the game even worth the candle? Back when I was at DHS some public
   health professionals did models of the effectiveness of screening and
   interdiction on the spread of pandemic influenza – like avian flu. Now,
   granted, there are =huge= differences between Ebola and avian flu.
   Different diseases; different infectious pathways etc. I have no idea if
   the modelling results are even relevant within an order of magnitude.
   Still, for the flu the results back then were sobering.   If I recall
   correctly (and I may not be exact but on this I =am= in the right order of
   magnitude), screening that was 90% effective (which would probably be a
   huge success in most contexts) delayed arrival of the pandemic in the US by
   1-2 weeks. Nothing more. Maybe Ebola’s different – maybe 90% effective
   screening can, for the most part, keep it off shore. But I wonder.




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