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On Monday, March 2, 2015 at 1:52:38 PM UTC-6, Travis wrote: > > > > > > > http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/whats-next-in-government-surveillance/385667/ > > > What's Next in Government Surveillance > > A future awaits where countries share intelligence one minute, and hack > and cyberattack each other the next. > > Bruce Schneier <http://www.theatlantic.com/bruce-schneier/>Mar 2 2015, > 10:30 AM ET > > [image: > http://cdn.theatlantic.com/static/newsroom/img/mt/2015/02/RTR3KEY1/lead.jpg?nklfbw]Edward > > Snowden makes an appearance at a Council of Europe hearing on mass > surveillance via video conference. (Vincent Kessler/Reuters) > > Before the Internet, when surveillance consisted largely of > government-on-government espionage, agencies like the NSA would target > specific communications circuits: that Soviet undersea cable between > Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok, a military communications satellite, a > microwave network. This was for the most part passive, requiring large > antenna farms in nearby countries. > > Modern targeted surveillance is likely to involve actively breaking into > an adversary’s computer network and installing malicious software designed > to take over that network and “exfiltrate” data—that’s NSA talk for > stealing it. To put it more plainly, the easiest way for someone to > eavesdrop on your communications isn’t to intercept them in transit > anymore; it’s to hack your computer. > > And there’s a lot of government hacking going on. > > In 2011, an Iranian hacker broke into the Dutch certificate authority > DigiNotar. This enabled him to impersonate organizations like Google, the > CIA, MI6, Mossad, Microsoft, Yahoo, Skype, Facebook, Twitter, and > Microsoft’s Windows Update service. That, in turn, allowed him to spy on > users of these services. He passed this ability on to others—almost > certainly in the Iranian government—who in turn used it for mass > surveillance on Iranians and probably foreigners as well. Fox-IT estimated > that 300,000 Iranian Gmail accounts were accessed. > ------------------------------ > Related Story > > [image: > http://cdn.theatlantic.com/assets/media/img/posts/2014/01/RTR2Q5DK/fa571bff7.jpg] > > <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/01/lessons-from-the-worlds-most-tech-savvy-government/283341/> > > Lessons from the World's Most Tech-Savvy Government > <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/01/lessons-from-the-worlds-most-tech-savvy-government/283341/> > ------------------------------ > > In 2009, Canadian security researchers discovered a piece of malware > called GhostNet on the Dalai Lama’s computers. It was a sophisticated > surveillance network, controlled by a computer in China. Further research > found it installed on computers of political, economic, and media > organizations in 103 countries—basically a who’s who of Chinese espionage > targets. Flame is a surveillance tool that researchers detected on Iranian > networks in 2012; these experts believe the United States and Israel put it > there and elsewhere. Red October, which hacked and spied on computers > worldwide for five years before it was discovered in 2013, is believed to > be a Russian surveillance system. So is Turla, which targeted Western > government computers and was ferreted out in 2014. The Mask, also > discovered in 2014, is believed to be Spanish. Iranian hackers have > specifically targeted U.S. officials. There are many more known > surveillance tools like these, and presumably others still undiscovered. > > To be fair, we don’t have proof that these countries were behind these > surveillance networks, nor that they were government-sponsored. Governments > almost never admit to hacking each other’s computers. Researchers generally > infer the country of origin from the target list. For example, The Mask > target list included almost all Spanish-speaking countries, and a bunch of > computers in Morocco and Gibraltar. That sounds like Spain. > > In the United States, the group charged with hacking computers is the > Tailored Access Operations group (TAO) inside the NSA. We know that TAO > infiltrates computers remotely, using programs with cool code names like > QUANTUMINSERT and FOXACID. We know that TAO has developed specialized > software to hack into everything from computers to routers to smartphones, > and that its staff installs hardware “implants” into computer and > networking equipment by intercepting and infecting it in transit. One > estimate is that the group has successfully hacked into, and is > exfiltrating information from, 80,000 computers worldwide. > > Of course, most of what we know about TAO and America’s hacking efforts > comes from top-secret NSA documents provided by Edward Snowden. There > haven’t been similar leaks from other countries, so we know much less about > their capabilities. > > We do know a lot about China. China has been reliably identified as the > origin of many high-profile attacks—against Google, against the Canadian > government, against *The New York Times*, against the security company > RSA and other U.S. corporations, and against the U.S. military and its > contractors. In 2013, researchers found presumed Chinese government malware > targeting Tibetan activists’ Android phones. In 2014, Chinese hackers > breached a database of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management that stored > detailed data on up to 5 million U.S. government employees and contractors > with security clearances. > > A lot of this is political and military espionage, but some of it is > commercial espionage. Many countries have a long history of spying on > foreign corporations for their own military and commercial advantage. The > U.S. claims that it does not engage in commercial espionage, meaning that > it does not hack foreign corporate networks and pass that information on to > U.S. competitors for commercial advantage. But it does engage in economic > espionage, by hacking into foreign corporate networks and using that > information in government trade negotiations that directly benefit U.S. > corporate interests. Recent examples are the Brazilian oil company > Petrobras and the European SWIFT international bank-payment system. In > fact, according to a 1996 government report, the NSA claimed that the > economic benefits of one of its programs to U.S. industry “totaled tens of > billions of dollars over the last several years.” You may or may not see a > substantive difference between the two types of espionage. China, without > so clean a separation between its government and its industries, does not. > > Many countries buy software from private companies to facilitate their > hacking. Consider an Italian cyberweapons manufacturer called Hacking Team > that sells hacking systems to governments worldwide for use against > computer and smartphone operating systems. The mobile malware installs > itself remotely and collects e-mails, text messages, call history, address > books, search-history data, and keystrokes. It can take screenshots, record > audio to monitor either calls or ambient noise, snap photos, and monitor > the phone’s GPS coordinates. It then surreptitiously sends all of that back > to its handlers. Ethiopia used this software to sneak onto the computers of > European and American journalists. > > * * * > > When American officials first started getting reports of the Chinese > breaking into U.S. computer networks for espionage purposes, they described > it in very strong language. They labeled the Chinese actions > “cyberattacks,” sometimes invoking the word “cyberwar.” After Snowden > revealed that the NSA had been doing exactly the same thing as the Chinese > to computer networks around the world, the U.S. used much more moderate > language to describe its own actions—terms like “espionage,” or > “intelligence-gathering,” or “spying”—and stressed that these were > peacetime activities. > > When the Chinese company Huawei tried to sell networking equipment to the > United States, many feared that the Chinese government had installed > backdoors into the switches that would allow Beijing to eavesdrop, and > considered the move a “national-security threat.” But, as Snowden's > disclosures eventually revealed, the NSA has been doing exactly the same > thing, both to Huawei’s equipment and to American-made equipment sold in > China. > > The problem is that—as they occur and from the point of view of the > victim—international espionage and attack look pretty much alike. Modern > cyberespionage is a form of cyberattack, and both involve breaking into the > network of another country. The only difference between them is whether > they deliberately disrupt network operations or not. That’s a huge > difference, of course, but the time lag between breaking into a network and > disrupting operations might be months or even years. Because breaking into > a foreign network affects the territory of another country, it is almost > certainly illegal under that country’s laws. Even so, countries are doing > it constantly to one another. > ------------------------------ > > [image: Shifts] <http://www.theatlantic.com/special-report/shifts/> > The elements of a changing world, from technology and business to politics > and culture > Read More <http://www.theatlantic.com/special-report/shifts/> > ------------------------------ > > In 2012, for example, the NSA repeatedly penetrated Syria’s Internet > infrastructure. Its intent was to remotely install eavesdropping code in > one of the country’s core routers, but it accidentally caused a nationwide > Internet blackout. Exfiltrating data and taking out a country’s Internet > involve exactly the same operations. > > Governments, meanwhile, are getting into cyberwar big time. About 30 > countries have cyberwar divisions in their military: the United States, > Russia, China, the major European countries, Israel, India, Brazil, > Australia, New Zealand, and a handful of African countries. In the United > States, this effort is led by U.S. Cyber Command inside the Department of > Defense. Admiral Michael S. Rogers is in charge of both this organization > and the NSA. That’s how close the missions are. > > Few examples have surfaced of cyberattacks that cause actual damage, > either to people or to property. In 2007, Estonia was the victim of a broad > series of cyberattacks—an incident that is often called the first cyberwar > because it coincided with increased tensions with neighboring Russia. The > ex-Soviet republic of Georgia was also the victim of cyberattacks, ones > that preceded a land invasion by Russian troops a year later. In 2009, > South Korea was the victim of a cyberattack. All of these were > denial-of-service attacks, during which selected Internet sites are flooded > with traffic and stop working temporarily. They’re disruptive, but not very > damaging in the long run. > > In all of these cases, we don’t know for sure who the perpetrator was, or > even whether it was a government. In 2009, a pro-Kremlin youth group took > credit for the 2007 Estonian attacks, although the only person convicted of > them was a 22-year-old Russian living in Tallinn. That sort of > identifiability is rare > <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/we-still-dont-know-who-hacked-sony-north-korea/384198/>. > > Like the espionage attacks discussed earlier, cyberattacks are hard to > trace. We’re left to infer the attacker by the list of victims. *Ethnic > tensions with Russia*—of course Russia is to blame*. South Korea gets > attacked*—who else but North Korea would be motivated? > > Stuxnet is the first military-grade cyberweapon known to be deployed by > one country against another. It was launched in 2009 by the United States > and Israel against the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran, and succeeded in > causing significant physical damage. A 2012 attack against Saudi Aramco > that damaged some 30,000 of the national oil company’s computers is > believed to have been retaliation by Iran. > > * * * > > There’s an interesting monopolistic effect that occurs with surveillance. > Espionage basically follows geopolitical lines; a country gets together > with its allies to jointly spy on its adversaries. That’s how we did it > during the Cold War. It’s politics. > > Mass surveillance is different. If you’re truly worried about attacks > coming from anyone anywhere, you need to spy on everyone everywhere. And > since no one country can do that alone, it makes sense to share data with > other countries. > > But whom do you share information with? You could share with your > traditional military allies, but they might not be spying on the countries > you’re most worried about. Or they might not be spying on enough of the > planet to make sharing worthwhile. It makes the best sense to join the most > extensive spying network around. And that’s the United States. > > This is what’s happening right now. U.S. intelligence agencies partner > with many countries as part of an extremely close relationship of wealthy, > English-speaking nations called the Five Eyes: the U.S., U.K., Canada, > Australia, and New Zealand. Other partnerships include the Nine Eyes, which > adds Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Norway; and the Fourteen Eyes, > which adds Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. And the United > States partners with countries that have traditionally been much more > standoffish, like India, and even with brutally repressive regimes like > Saudi Arabia’s. > > The endgame of this isn’t pretty: a global surveillance network where > countries collude to surveil everyone on the planet. > > All of this gives the NSA access to almost everything. In testimony to the > European Parliament in 2014, Snowden said, “The result is a European > bazaar, where an EU member state like Denmark may give the NSA access to a > tapping center on the (unenforceable) condition that NSA doesn’t search it > for Danes, and Germany may give the NSA access to another on the condition > that it doesn’t search for Germans. Yet the two tapping sites may be two > points on the same cable, so the NSA simply captures the communications of > the German citizens as they transit Denmark, and the Danish citizens as > they transit Germany, all the while considering it entirely in accordance > with their agreements.” > > In 2014, we learned that the NSA spies on the Turkish government, and at > the same time partners with the Turkish government to spy on the Kurdish > separatists within Turkey. We also learned that the NSA spies on the > government of one of its much closer surveillance partners: Germany. > Presumably the United States spies on all of its partners, with the > possible exception of the other Five Eyes countries. Even when the NSA > touts its counterterrorism successes, most of them are foreign threats > against foreign countries and have nothing to do with the United States. > > It should come as no surprise that the U.S. shares intelligence data with > Israel. Normally, identities of Americans are removed before this data is > shared with another country to protect our privacy, but Israel seems to be > an exception. The NSA gives Israel’s secretive Unit 8200 “raw > SIGINT”—that’s signals intelligence. > > Even historical enemies are sharing intelligence with the United States., > if only on a limited basis. After 9/11, Russia rebranded the Chechen > separatists as terrorists, and persuaded the United States to help by > sharing information. In 2011, Russia warned the United States about Boston > Marathon bomber Tamerlan Tsarnaev. The United States returned the favor, > watching out for threats at the Sochi Olympics. > > These partnerships make no sense when the primary goal of intelligence is > government vs. government espionage, but are obvious and appropriate when > the primary goal is global surveillance of the population. So while the > German government expresses outrage at the NSA’s surveillance of the > country’s leaders, its BND continues to partner with the NSA to surveil > everyone else. > > The endgame of this isn’t pretty: It’s a global surveillance network where > all countries collude to surveil everyone on the entire planet. It’ll > probably not happen for a while—there will be holdout countries like Russia > that will insist on doing it themselves, and rigid ideological differences > will never let countries like Iran cooperate fully with either Russia or > the United States—but most smaller countries will be motivated to join. > From a very narrow perspective, it’s the rational thing to do. > > > > > __._,_.___ > ------------------------------ > Posted by: "beowulf" <[email protected] <javascript:>> > ------------------------------ > > > Visit Your Group > <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/grendelreport/info;_ylc=X3oDMTJmcDR0dWRoBF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzIwMTk0ODA2BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTMyMzY2NwRzZWMDdnRsBHNsawN2Z2hwBHN0aW1lAzE0MjUzMjE1MzA-> > > > - New Members > > <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/grendelreport/members/all;_ylc=X3oDMTJncDhhc2E5BF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzIwMTk0ODA2BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTMyMzY2NwRzZWMDdnRsBHNsawN2bWJycwRzdGltZQMxNDI1MzIxNTMw> > > 1 > > [image: Yahoo! 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![http://cdn.theatlantic.com/static/newsroom/img/mt/2015/02/RTR3KEY1/lead.jpg?nklfbw]Edward](http://cdn.theatlantic.com/static/newsroom/img/mt/2015/02/RTR3KEY1/lead.jpg?nklfbw]Edward){kind=link}
