http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/24/is-a-nuclear-iran-a-threat-or-a-distraction/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2AMideast%20Brief&utm_campaign=2014_The%20Middle%20East%20Daily#
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Is a Nuclear Iran a Threat or a Distraction?



Is a Nuclear Iran a Threat or a Distraction?
Why the Obama administration’s focus on negotiations to stop Tehran’s nuke
program overlooks the real problems in the Middle East.

• BY DAVID ROTHKOPF

• MARCH 24, 2015
Once upon a time, no term evoked modernity like “the Atomic Age.” It
contained the promise of harnessing the power of the atom for good and for
ill. Unleashing the secrets of the atom was what separated the world’s most
advanced and powerful nations from the rest.

This Damoclean era was ushered in 70 years ago, on July 16, 1945, with
the Trinity nuclear test in New Mexico’s Jornada del Muerto desert. The
name translates to “Dead Man’s Journey” — fitting, because the detonation
triggered a nuclear arms race that made palpable the dark threat of
planetary Armageddon. As is the case with others who grew up in the 1960s,
some of my most acute, enduring memories are of a childhood shaped by
nuclear fears. I was 6 years old during the Cuban missile crisis and
remember going to bed at night unsettled by the air-raid drills we
rehearsed at school and by the worry I saw in my parents eyes as they
watched the evening news. A next-door neighbor built a fallout shelter, and
I remember being deeply disturbed by my parents’ speculation that we
wouldn’t be invited into it, in the event of a disaster, because we were
Jewish. Seeing civil-defense posters and sirens atop telephone poles left
me daily with a knot in my stomach. The famous Lyndon B. Johnson campaign
ad suggesting that electing Barry Goldwater would bring America closer to
nuclear war — the one in which a little girl plays in the flowers,
oblivious to the imminent bloom of a mushroom cloud — was politically
effective because it captured the gestalt of the era so perfectly. It only
ran once, but it lingered in many people’s minds for years to come.

Decades of the Cold War kept these anxieties alive but also somehow
allayed them. Deterrence, it turned out, worked. The United States and the
Soviet Union never embarked on World War III because the cost of a
potential conflict was so high. Fear kept the peace, a perverse bargain.
When push came to shove it was in proxy wars. But even then, the prospect
of nuclear escalation created an incentive to maintain conflicts within
limits and to seek solutions to disputes that threatened to get out of hand.

With the end of the Cold War, there was hope that the world might consign
such bleak strategies to history and negotiate away its weapons. But
instead, a different reality has emerged. Nuclear issues remain as urgent
as ever. In the past few years, the world has been shaken by the Fukushima
disaster, disturbed by nuclear saber rattling in North Korea, unnerved by
weapons security in Pakistan, and stirred by the promise of a then-new U.S.
President Barack Obama during a speech in Prague that he would make the
elimination of nukes a central goal of his administration. And few things
have dominated 2015 thus far like efforts to keep Iran from acquiring the
bomb.


The debate around Iran, in particular, reveals much about the current phase
of the nuclear age, underscoring that lofty ambitions, such as those
Obama sketched out in Prague, are nowhere near realization and may never
be.The debate around Iran, in particular, reveals much about the current
phase of the nuclear age, underscoring that lofty ambitions, such as those
Obama sketched out in Prague, are nowhere near realization and may never
be. Although deterrence still works in certain circumstances — India and
Pakistan have avoided major conflict, for instance, and Israel’s neighbors
are less inclined to attack it — a new set of problems has emerged. Ukraine
illustrates one of them. If a nuclear power is willing to be bolder
than another, it can take limited, conventional actions without fear of
major pushback. In other words, Russia, a struggling shadow of a former
superpower, can maintain influence in its near abroad that would be
impossible were it not for Moscow’s nuclear arsenal.
But there is also the threat of a country breaking out from the
Nuclear Non- Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), which attempts to keep weapons in the hands of the original
five nuclear nations (the United States, Britain, China, Russia, and
France). Aspirant nuclear powers, such as North Korea, have found that
ignoring this international treaty can pay off: Being willing, or seen as
willing, to flaunt such agreements grants negotiating leverage. As former
U.S. President Bill Clinton said — in an era when the West regularly cut
deals by offering aid to North Korea in order to forestall Pyongyang’s
bomb-building efforts — “North Korea is a country whose cash crop has been
missiles and weapons.” But, of course, the Hermit Kingdom’s regime also
learned another important lesson: Once a country has nuclear weapons, there
is very little the rest of the world can do about it. (The greatest flaw in
the NPT is that it lacks any effective enforcement mechanism against
violators.) Thus, Kim Jong Un’s government, like those of Pakistan, India,
and Israel, arguably has gained influence from having an arsenal.

While Iran’s foray toward joining the nuclear club undoubtedly has been
inspired by these other countries’ experiences, it is a special case, full
of apparent contradictions. On the one hand, some national security experts
argue that a nuclear Iran would be contained by nuclear forces — the United
States and Israel — poised to deliver deathblows within minutes of a first
strike. In other words, any nuclear action by Tehran would be suicidal.

On the other hand, many observers worry that a nuclear Iran could take the
world to a proliferation tipping point. Given the tensions and rivalries in
the Middle East, Iran getting the bomb might trigger an arms race in the
region. And with each new player in the nuclear game, risks mount that
weapons will fall into the wrong hands, perhaps those of terrorists. The
Middle East is the kind of place where roiling instability could open the
door to nuclear miscalculations or misadventures, and the notion of a
suicide-embracing terrorist group having any sort of nuclear capability is
especially chilling. Put simply, a nuclear Tehran could fundamentally alter
the calculus of the nuclear age and usher in a world where the danger of
the intentional or accidental use of nukes would be substantially
higher than at any time in the past 70 years.

But in a further twist, of all the threats associated with Iran’s nuclear
program, perhaps one of the greatest is distraction. At the end of the day,
the long-tail risk of a low-probability, high-cost event draws down the
world’s diplomatic and security bandwidth heavily.

With a country like Iran, this can be especially dangerous. Tehran has been
doing pretty well causing trouble in the Middle East for the past three and
a half decades without the bomb — and no nuclear deal will address this
problem. In fact, were a deal to produce a rapprochement with Iran and a
dropping of all or some of the sanctions that have burdened its economy, in
a practical sense Tehran might become considerably more dangerous than it
has been: It would have more money for its state sponsorship of terrorism,
for example, and gain more stature in the international community.

Already, Washington has devoted so much effort to pursuing a nuclear deal
that it has incidentally empowered Tehran in the Middle East. In Iraq, the
United States has effectively been flying air support for Iranian-led or
-assisted missions against the Islamic State; Tehran gets credit, and the
government in Baghdad, which appears to be more beholden to Iran than ever,
is strengthened too. Washington has softened its stance on Iran’s client
and friend, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, ensuring that Tehran
maintains a foothold in Syria (where the United States is also working to
destroy Assad’s enemies). And in Yemen, America did not attempt to push
back in a meaningful way against the Houthi coup that has left a Shiite
group, with ties to Iran, in a position of enhanced power.
These geopolitical gains will have long-lasting consequences for the United
States and may present greater risks, day in and day out, than those posed
by Iranian nukes.

Of course, Washington isn’t alone in being guilty of distraction:
Iran’s government is too. Iranian leaders could be doing more for their
people, in the face of nationwide economic troubles, if precious resources
were not directed toward a nuclear program. Meanwhile, Israeli officials
have made a great show of declaring the threat of an Iranian bomb as
“existential” — partly, it seems, to distract from their inability to deal
with the more imminent peril caused by the changing demographics within
their claimed borders.

Other risky technologies are also being neglected. Unlike nukes, for
instance, cyberweapons are so low cost that constant, web-based conflict
seems a real and destabilizing possibility.

At the dawn of the nuclear age, national security officials could not win
top jobs without knowing the language of nukes. In contrast, today the vast
majority of these officials are cyber-illiterate. The world thus finds
itself ill-prepared to deal with both the morphing threats of old
technology and the emerging threats of new ones.

The right nuclear deal with Iran, if honored, monitored, and effectively
enforced, might reduce the real risk of a dangerous turn for the worse in
the nuclear age. It is a worthy goal and should be pursued, as should the
establishment of a new nonproliferation regime with much greater
enforcement capabilities. The costs of failure on such efforts are clearly
enormous. But one lesson of the past 70 years has been what happens when
the Atomic Age has a country looking and devoting its precious resources
too heavily in one direction. I worry that, in making a deal with Iran on
nuclear weapons its No. 1 national security priority, the
Obama administration may be overlooking or exacerbating other problems that
will haunt America and the Middle East for years to come. As was the case
in 1945, and as it has been ever thus, the Jornada del Muerto is paved with
good intentions.

Illustration by Matthew Hollister






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