http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/11/30/isis-after-paris?mbid=rss
ISIS After Paris

Steve Coll

<http://www.newyorker.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/151130_r27382illuweb-1200x618-1448065506.jpg>Illustration
by Tom Bachtell

In the week since the attacks on Paris, there has been a great deal of talk
about waging war on the Islamic State, but scant clarity about how such a
war might succeed. In a season when the improvisations of Vladimir Putin
shape geopolitics, and those of Donald Trump shape American politics (Trump
has remarked that Putin is “getting an A” for leadership), it is perhaps
unsurprising that public discourse about what comes next has been informed
by opportunism and incoherence. Yet even the sober, often stirring rhetoric
of the French President, François Hollande, has often elided the main
problem, which involves aligning aims with realistic means. “France is at
war,” Hollande told his parliament last week, as French jets struck Raqqa,
Syria, the Islamic State’s self-declared capital. He vowed to “eradicate”
the organization. But how, and how long will it take?

In 2004, James D. Fearon, a political scientist at Stanford, published a
study, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?,” in which
he and a colleague analyzed scores of civil wars fought between 1945 and
1999. Some of the findings were intuitive: civil wars end quickly when one
side has a decisive military advantage over the other; poor countries with
natural resources to export often have long internal wars, because whoever
controls the resources also controls the national treasury. Other findings
were novel, such as the fact that wars following coups d’état tend to be
short. In another study, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” Fearon and
the political scientist David D. Laitin discovered that even though in
nations with exceptional ethnic pluralism, like Syria and Iraq, lines of
conflict may be defined by ethnic identity, pluralism itself is not a
notable predictor of civil war; poverty is a much more significant factor.

Rereading these works in light of the infuriating problem of the Islamic
State, two discouraging findings stand out. In 1945, many civil wars were
concluded after about two years. By 1999, they lasted, on average, about
sixteen years. And conflicts in which a guerrilla group could finance
itself—by selling contraband drug crops, or by smuggling oil—might go on
for thirty or forty years. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or
farc, has been around since 1964, sustained in no small part by American
cocaine consumption.

The Islamic State is an oil-funded descendant of Al Qaeda in Iraq, a branch
of the original Al Qaeda, which was formed in 1988. According to the
C.I.A., isis has at least twenty thousand armed fighters; some estimates
put the number much higher. It controls large swaths of territory,
including major cities, such as Mosul. It is unusually barbarous, and good
at Twitter. Its millenarian ideology of hatred and extermination poses a
threat across borders. Yet its army and its sanctuary, in Iraq and Syria,
are not, in a structural sense, exceptional.

>From the American intervention in Somalia, in 1992, through the French
intervention in Mali, in 2013, industrialized countries have been able to
deploy ground forces to take guerrilla-held territory in about sixty days
or less. The problem is that if they don’t then leave, to be replaced by
more locally credible yet militarily able forces, they invite frustration,
and risk unsustainable casualties and political if not military defeat.
This has been true even when the guerrilla forces were weak: the Taliban
possesses neither planes nor significant anti-aircraft missiles, yet it has
fought the United States to a stalemate, and the advantage is now shifting
in its favor.

If President Obama ordered the Marines into urgent action, they could be
waving flags of liberation in Raqqa by New Year’s. But, after taking the
region, killing scores of isis commanders as well as Syrian civilians, and
flushing surviving fighters and international recruits into the broken,
ungoverned cities of Syria and Iraq’s Sunni heartland, then what? Without
political coöperation from Bashar al-Assad, Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, Iraqi
Shiite militias, Turkey, the Al Qaeda ally Al Nusra, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf
States, and others, the Marines (and the French or nato allies that might
assist them) would soon become targets for a mind-bogglingly diverse array
of opponents.

Syrian rebels overwhelmingly regard Assad’s regime as their main enemy, and
for good reason: his forces have killed more Syrians than anyone else has.
In the absence of a political agreement with Assad or his removal from
office, it is impossible to conceive of a Muslim-majority occupation force
that would be able and willing to keep the peace after the Marines
departed. Some may argue that it would be worthwhile, nonetheless, to wipe
out the Islamic State on the ground and deal with the fallout later. After
Paris, such an approach may hold emotional appeal. After Afghanistan and
Iraq, however, it is not a responsible course of action.

Analyses like James Fearon’s suggest that there are perhaps two ways to
end, or at least to contain, long wars. One is to accept that success will
be a long time coming, and to adopt a posture of military and diplomatic
patience and persistence. That may yet lead to the farc’s disarmament. The
other is to negotiate aggressively to form international alliances, which
will allow for a rapid, decisive use of force on the ground. The European
Union activated a mutual-defense compact after the Paris attacks; nato
could broaden the alliance by invoking Article 5 of its treaty, as it did
after 9/11. Such coalitions can be swiftly effective. When Saddam Hussein
invaded Kuwait, George H. W. Bush and James Baker pulled together an
unexpected military alliance to force his retreat. In Afghanistan, George
W. Bush overthrew the Taliban with worldwide support. Both actions
eliminated the immediate threat, but neither resolved the targeted
country’s underlying instability, or assured durable international
security. (On Friday, Islamist terrorists staged a murderous raid on a
hotel in Mali’s capital, Bamako, almost three years after the French-led
intervention in that country.)

Barack Obama has all but ruled out a ground intervention in Syria or Iraq.
Instead, last week he promised “an intensification” of the strategy he is
already pursuing: Special Forces raids, air strikes, and diplomatic
conferences to try to resolve the Syrian war, perhaps by declaring
ceasefires or insuring Putin’s coöperation. “A political solution is the
only way to end the war in Syria and unite the Syrian people and the world”
against the Islamic State, the President said. Unfortunately, right now
that looks no more realistic than a prolonged American occupation of Raqqa.
Obama’s caution in the Middle East since the Arab Spring is a reminder that
there are perhaps as many risks attendant upon inaction as upon action. The
dilemmas suggested by Fearon’s research won’t evaporate; they will be on
the desk of Obama’s successor. ♦






__._,_.___
------------------------------
Posted by: "Beowulf" <[email protected]>
------------------------------


Visit Your Group
<https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/grendelreport/info;_ylc=X3oDMTJmMThwcnY3BF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzIwMTk0ODA2BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTMyMzY2NwRzZWMDdnRsBHNsawN2Z2hwBHN0aW1lAzE0NDgyMDc4NDU->

   - New Members
   
<https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/grendelreport/members/all;_ylc=X3oDMTJnZTJoamQ1BF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzIwMTk0ODA2BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTMyMzY2NwRzZWMDdnRsBHNsawN2bWJycwRzdGltZQMxNDQ4MjA3ODQ1>
   1

[image: Yahoo! Groups]
<https://groups.yahoo.com/neo;_ylc=X3oDMTJlYzM2a24xBF9TAzk3NDc2NTkwBGdycElkAzIwMTk0ODA2BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTMyMzY2NwRzZWMDZnRyBHNsawNnZnAEc3RpbWUDMTQ0ODIwNzg0NQ-->
• Privacy <https://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/groups/details.html> •
Unsubscribe <[email protected]?subject=Unsubscribe>
• Terms of Use <https://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/terms/>

__,_._,___

-- 
-- 
Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups.
For options & help see http://groups.google.com/group/PoliticalForum

* Visit our other community at http://www.PoliticalForum.com/  
* It's active and moderated. Register and vote in our polls. 
* Read the latest breaking news, and more.

--- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"PoliticalForum" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to