assured mutual destruction is still a deterrent. On Tuesday, March 22, 2016 at 10:00:28 AM UTC-5, Travis wrote: > > > > > > > > > *The Case for a 21st Century Deterrent* > > > *by Peter Huessy > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/author/Peter+Huessy>March 22, 2016 at > 4:00 am* > > *http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent>* > > Deterrence is not about guaranteeing to one's adversaries that one will > only spend what the adversary deems acceptable to enable a "fair fight." > > - If one is to believe the advocates of minimum deterrence, Russia has > plans to attack 400 U.S. nuclear missile silos and nearly 50 associated > launch control centers, using two warheads for each target to assure > success. But a Russia that had at least 900 nuclear warheads would not be > "balanced" by the United States that had only 250 warheads. > - Many nations have not been deterred from aggression, even by the > prospect of losing millions of their own people. > - The U.S. requires a survivable deterrent force; not one subject to > being eliminated by an enemy's first strike because the U.S. deterrent was > so small that it was no deterrent at all. > > In discussing the nuclear deterrent required by the U.S., former commander > of U.S. strategic nuclear forces General C. Robert Kehler said, "The whole > purpose of deterrence is to bind the other guy's behavior," requiring > robust military and vigorous statecraft. > > The breakdown in international order recently described by retired General > James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, (DNI), however, calls > into question the very effectiveness of America's deterrent capability.[1] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftn1> > > In light of recent geostrategic developments, some former U.S. defense > experts are calling for the United States dramatically to curtail its > nuclear deterrent. > > These experts assume that the deterrent value of nuclear weapons is waning > and that since the it spends far more on overall defense than do other > nations, the U.S. can afford to cut back in this area.[2] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftn2> > > But are such recommendations unwise? Absolutely. > > A former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations produced a chart some years ago > showing annual deaths per capita prior to the nuclear age, in an era when > only conventional deterrence existed. Surprisingly, after the atomic bombs > were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the worldwide per capita death toll > from armed conflict during the next half-century dropped 80%, and during > the next seventy years, by more than 90%.[3] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftn3> > > In the half-century before 1945, two conventional world wars were fought, > which included the use of chemical weapons and the fire-bombing of cities. > Add to that devastation the deaths from the Nazi Holocaust and the mass > murders committed in the USSR by Stalin and his successors, and it is clear > that hostile behavior by states was the norm even before the nuclear age. > > Retired General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to two U.S. > Presidents, once remarked that the two world wars were a testament to the > fragility of traditional conventional deterrence.[4] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftn4> > > Since 1945, however, large-scale war between nuclear-armed powers has been > avoided. That is not to say that there have been no conflicts between > states. The fight between totalitarianism and freedom took the form of a > cross-border war in Korea, subversion and guerilla warfare in Vietnam, and > state-sponsored terrorism in Africa, Central America and the Middle East, > to name just a few. The fight continues today, in the post-Cold War era, > despite the "end of history" narrative that promised armed conflict would > pretty much end.[5] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftn5> > > Potential major conflicts, however, still are prevented by the U.S. > nuclear deterrent: on the Korean peninsula; between China and Taiwan; in > the Middle East and in Eastern Europe. > > Conflict continues, of course, in the form of Iranian and North Korean > terrorist activity, Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, continued > Russian subversion in Ukraine and elsewhere, and in various terrorist > activities in Africa and the Middle East. Those conflicts have not been > prevented even by conventional capabilities, let alone U.S. nuclear > deterrent forces. Nevertheless, is the prudent response to jettison a > significant portion of U.S. nuclear capability? > > The new post-Cold War era still requires the prevention of any number of > possible crises from escalating into armed conflict between any of the nine > nuclear-armed nations. The era also requires stopping existing conflicts > from becoming wholesale nuclear wars. > > It is always important to avoid what Israeli missile defense expert Uzi > Rubin calls "fortune cookie analysis" -- the claim that the need for > nuclear deterrence is over because "it didn't stop 9-11" or today's > conflicts.[6] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftn6> > > Terrorist attacks, such as 9-11, were also not prevented by non-nuclear > capabilities such as the FBI, Coast Guard, Border Patrol, the military, or > intelligence agencies. But the U.S. nuclear deterrent is not there just for > today. Any future deterrent needs to be robust and flexible enough to > anticipate technological surprise. There can also be sudden changes in > regimes and regimes' intentions; these must also be taken into account. > > In addition, emerging technological threats such as cyber-attacks, the > advanced capabilities of long-range conventional strikes, and the threat of > electromagnetic > pulse (EMP) attacks > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7214/electro-magnetic-pulse-emp> are > changing the pattern of deterrence among various countries, according to > Andrew Krepinevich, president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary > Assessments (CSBA).[7] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftn7> > Even so, as he underscores the need for new deterrent capabilities, he does > not minimize the need for a continued powerful nuclear deterrent. > > It is not enough to claim that a much smaller, even minimalist, nuclear > deterrent, will suffice for today. "Less" does not automatically mean > "better." Nor is it enough simply to add up what other countries spend on > defense, compare it to what the United States spends, and declare that the > two sides need only be relatively equal in defense expenditure for > deterrence to be effective. > > Deterrence is not about guaranteeing to your adversaries that you will > only spend what the adversary deems acceptable to enable a "fair fight." It > is important to spend whatever is needed to ensure a credible, capable > force. It would be reckless to adopt some arbitrary figure based on what > others might spend, or unilaterally to accept sentimental notions about > what is "fair." > > Unfortunately, there have been a number of recent calls > <http://csbaonline.org/2016/03/01/rethinking-the-apocalypse-time-for-bold-thinking-about-the-second-nuclear-age/> > > for the U.S. to reduce its nuclear arsenal unilaterally by 85% and to keep > no more than 250 nuclear warheads. This low number would roughly equal the > warheads fielded by Pakistan and India combined. > > What is the basis for such a proposal? Apparently such advocates start > with the assumption that a U.S. president will be deterred from taking > military action if, in a conflict, upward of 250 enemy warheads were > targeted in retaliation on American cities. This logic assumes that one's > enemies think the same way as oneself, and consequently, that a small > American arsenal of 250 nuclear warheads would suffice to deter would-be > adversaries. > > But do adversaries really think this way? Ironically, even the advocates > of such a minimal nuclear deterrent do not appear to believe their own > rhetorical assumptions. Most of the advocates of a minimal nuclear > deterrent claim that 400 Minuteman silo-based missiles, spread out over > tens of thousands of square miles in five U.S. western states, would be > vulnerable to attack by the same enemies who are supposedly interested in > attacking only cities. Why would Russia or China target U.S. missile silos > and other military assets when presumably all they would need to do to > maintain deterrence against the U.S. is hold a few dozen American cities > for ransom? > > If one is to believe the advocates of minimum deterrence, Russia has plans > to attack 400 U.S. missile silos and nearly 50 associated launch control > centers. This assault would require Russia to maintain at least 900 > warheads, attacking each American ICBM with at least two warheads to ensure > a high chance of destroying all of those targets. > > But a Russia that had at least 900 warheads would not be balanced by the > United States that had only 250. > > Deterrence simply does not work the way advocates of minimum deterrent > assert. > > When a U.S. president orders military commanders to provide deterrence > against the country's enemies, this strategy must be measured against what > it takes to implement deterrence, and not against a nice round number of > nuclear warheads that appears "reasonable." > > Further, is a U.S. president comfortable with only the option of striking > back at an adversary's cities? Would threatening to incinerate millions > even be a moral or workable deterrent strategy? With 250 warheads in total, > and perhaps just half of them available for retaliation, the only targets a > U.S. president could sufficiently threaten would be an adversary's cities, > but not an adversary's military assets -- not to mention if other countries > were to pile on, such as Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. > > The minimalists argue that destroying a nation's cities would certainly > deter any sane national leader. Yet, as Keith Payne, president of the > National Institute of Public Policy, explains, many nations have not been > deterred from aggression, even by the prospect of losing millions of their > own citizens.[8] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftn8> > In efforts to achieve their political objectives, the Soviet Union, Iran, > Cambodia, China and North Korea, to mention the most obvious, have > slaughtered tens of millions of their own people. In communist nations > alone, the number exceeds 95 million.[9] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftn9> > Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan killed and maimed millions of their own > people by going to war and continuing the conflict even when their defeat > was clearly imminent. > > Would the U.S. seek to deter ISIS and Hezbollah this way? Or Iran or North > Korea, for that matter? > > The weapons or military assets of one's adversaries -- the weapons one > would need to hold at risk or target -- are precisely the instruments of > state power on which these enemies rely for their status as global or > regional powers and prestige. Holding such assets at risk gives the U.S. > president the ultimate "stick" with which to threaten to take away the > adversary's power: his military assets. > > Today, non-state terrorist organizations also have such assets, as seen > from fighting ISIS, Al Qaeda, Hamas Hezbollah, the FMLN and FARC. > > Thus, holding at risk, or being able to destroy a significant number of, > say, Russian submarines, missile silos, bomber bases, and other instruments > of military power, thereby leaving Russia unable to act as a major power, > is not an attempt to "go first" in a crisis or "get the jump" on one's > enemies. Instead, it merely places at risk all the instruments of state > power -- consisting of hundreds of militarily critical targets -- upon > which, for instance, a Russian or Chinese head of state relies for world > power status. > > This plan requires a nuclear deterrent capable of striking back at an > enemy with sufficient surviving nuclear warheads, even after absorbing an > enemy's initial strike against one's own military assets. > > A deterrent strategy such as the U.S. has today leaves nuclear-armed > adversaries with only one sound choice in a crisis. Either they risk > "Armageddon" and use all their nuclear weapons early in a crisis, to avoid > seeing any of their military assets destroyed by the U.S. in a subsequent > retaliatory strike; or they stand down, not launching their nuclear > weaponry, and instead seek to end any crisis through diplomatically. This > is the essence of deterrence. It is one that the late American diplomat > Paul Nitze described as the "Not Today, Comrade" option.[10] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftn10> > Today it would be, "Not Today, Jihadi." > > Such a deterrent strategy, as advocated here and reflected in America's > current nuclear modernization plans, stands the test of logic. If an > adversary used all its nuclear forces against the U.S. in a first strike, > such an attack would invite a massive retaliatory strike from the U.S. that > would leave an attacker completely destroyed. > > But that, of course, requires a survivable U.S. deterrent force to begin > with; not one subject to being eliminated by an enemy's first strike > because the U.S. deterrent was so small that it was no deterrent at all. > > According to the Obama administration, to guarantee maximum flexibility in > a crisis so that a president can be confident he has a survivable > deterrent, a robust deployment of 1550 warheads is required, on a mixture > of 12 submarines, 400 ICBMs and 40-60 bombers. Fortunately, this is the > number the U.S. can field under the 2010 New Start Treaty with Russia. > > Having a nuclear deterrent strategically dispersed among over 500 nuclear > assets -- submarines, land-based missiles, and bombers -- means that any > enemy attempt to destroy the U.S. nuclear arsenal before the U.S. could use > it, would require an unambiguous attack. If an adversary, such as Russia, > were to deploy its entire arsenal against the United States, the attack > would involve over fifteen hundred warheads. > > The U.S. would know from where most of the warheads would be coming: ICBMs > flying over the North Pole could easily be seen by U.S. early-warning > satellites. > > U.S. allies also would see preparations, such as weapons platforms moved, > for such a strike. Enemy forces would have to be moved from a day-to-day > alert status to heightened alert if there were plans to destroy U.S. > nuclear forces in their entirety. That is why the U.S. has, and is planning > to keep, more than 500 nuclear assets, including submarines, bombers, and > silo-based missiles capable of surviving even the most massive strike. > > Deploying only 250 warheads, however -- all of them on submarines, as many > minimal deterrent advocates have proposed -- would make such a secure > retaliatory force impossible to maintain. It would also so minimize the > size of the U.S. deterrent forces -- to fewer than 10 targets -- as > possibly to invite an attack. > > By contrast, a flexible U.S. nuclear deterrent policy, based on keeping a > large deployment of day-to-day survivable forces -- numbering over 500 > missiles, submarines and bombers -- leaves the president options. There is > no need to act rashly. An enemy could then be informed that any attack, no > matter how large, would invite such a massive retaliation that no benefit > whatsoever would accrue to the attacker. Such a force also would allow the > president, during a crisis, to make the U.S. deterrent even more survivable > over time, by putting more U.S. submarines to sea and placing U.S. bombers > on alert or in the air. > > Such a new nuclear force of submarines, bombers and ICBMs, which the U.S. > is now beginning to produce (albeit after much delay), would allow the U.S. > to threaten the entire range of an adversary's military assets, and not be > limited only to striking back at an enemy's cities. These twin capabilities > -- having a survivable force day-to-day and an even more highly survivable > force over time -- would avoid putting all one's nuclear eggs in one > minimalist leaky basket. > > [image: Description: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/pics/794.jpg] > > The U.S. nuclear "Triad" consists of nuclear warheads mounted on platforms > based at sea, in the air and on land. > > The strategy is called "crisis stability": giving no nuclear power the > incentive to strike first, and providing the world with the stability it > needs to avoid Armageddon. > > For 70 years, this strategy has kept the nuclear peace. This strategy even > allowed the U.S. and the USSR, (subsequently Russia) carefully and > logically to reduce the number of strategic, long-range nuclear weapons by > nearly 90%, while maintaining strategic stability. > > In short, nuclear deterrence still matters. If the U.S. deterrent is even > more survivable, flexible, and robust, while maintained at lower levels > than during the Cold War, such modernization as the U.S. is now planning > provides America's leaders with the leverage in a crisis to keep a major > armed conflict from breaking out. And it keeps the United States and its > allies safe. > > Certainly, other elements of deterrence matter as well, such as a strong > conventional deterrent, space-based assets for top-notch situational > awareness, prompt conventional precision-strike weaponry, missile defenses > -- both national and regional and those deployed with U.S. allies -- and a > strong diplomatic will to use such instruments of state power in the > defense of liberty. > > In particular, missile defense can avoid limited strikes from small > nuclear powers, as well as significantly complicating the strike options of > larger nuclear powers, thus making such potential attacks less likely. In > addition, a surreptitious missile strike from a freighter or submarine in > the off-shore maritime regions adjacent to the United States could be > intercepted, but a retaliatory strike would be pure guesswork, as the > identity of the state or terror group responsible would in all probability > remain a mystery. > > Unfortunately, what critics miss is that, for nearly a quarter of a > century, the U.S. paid little attention to its nuclear deterrent and > avoided addressing the topic. Apparently, the U.S. was simply relying on > past policy. However, such a lack of original thought and analysis does not > mean nuclear deterrent requirements must come to an end or be changed > dramatically. Far from it. Congress, the Administration and U.S. citizens > have looked at the nuclear deterrent and decided, wisely, that the current > nuclear deterrent modernization plan of building 12 new submarines, 400 > Minuteman ICBMs and 100 new bombers -- some of which will be nuclear > capable -- is the right one, even as the U.S. adopts a new post-Cold War > policy and framework for keeping the United States and the free world safe. > > *Peter Huessy is President of Geostrategic Analysis, Senior Defense > Consultant to the Mitchell Institute of the Air Force Association, and > teaches nuclear deterrent policy at the US Naval Academy.* > ------------------------------ > > [1] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftnref1> > Remarks as delivered by The Honorable James R. Clapper, Director of > National Intelligence, Opening Statement to the Worldwide Threat Assessment > Hearing, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Thursday, Feb 9, 2016 > > [2] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftnref2> > "Former Pentagon Chief, Other Experts: Get Rid of ICBMs > <http://duluthreader.com/articles/2016/01/22/6597_former_pentagon_chief_other_experts_get_rid_of>" > > by John LaForge, Duluth Reader, January 21, 2016. > > [3] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftnref3> > Admiral Richard Mies, "The Strategic Deterrent Mission: Ensuring a Strong > Foundation for America's Security" in Journal of Undersea Warfare, Summer > 2012. See also for a version of the Admiral's chart Max Roser (2015)—"War > and Peace after 1945," *Published online at OurWorldInData.org > <http://ourworldindata.org/data/war-peace/war-and-peace-after-1945>.* > > [4] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftnref4> > Retired General Scowcroft is reported to have said this at a dinner event > at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2009. > > [5] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftnref5> > Summer, 1989, The National Interest, "The End of History" by Francis > Fukuyama, who declared the 20th century ended with "An unabashed victory of > economic and political liberalism." > > [6] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftnref6> > Uzi Rubin, personal communication to the author. > > [7] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftnref7> > The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence, by Ward Wilson in Nonproliferation Review, > Vol. 15, No. 3, November 2008. > > [8] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftnref8> > March 19, 2013, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed > Services, statement of General (ret) Eugene Habiger, in "The U.S. Nuclear > Deterrent: What Are the Requirements for a Strong Deterrent in an Era of > Defense Sequester?" > > [9] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftnref9> > Keith Payne, Georgetown University, "Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age," > University Press of Kentucky, 1996. > > [10] > <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent#_ftnref10> > "The Black Book of Communism," Harvard University Press, October 1999. > ...
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