They are called the principles of war. Specifically, they are: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity. --- 6 Painful Truths About the War on Terrorism <http://www.wakingtimes.com/2015/11/18/6-painful-truths-about-the-war-on-terrorism/> *1.)* The war on terror was never about ensuring the security of Americans at home or abroad *2.)* The war on terror doesn’t stop terror, because it is terror. *3.)* Our worst terrorist enemies are the products of government, the military industrial complex and Western intelligence agencies. *4.)* The mainstream media plays a crucial in perpetuating the war on terrorism. *5.)* State-sponsored False flag attacks <http://www.wakingtimes.com/2015/06/23/a-brief-history-of-false-flag-terror/> still work to achieve political objectives. *6.)* Suicide is more deadly to our soldiers than any terrorist organization.
more truths: *Iran and its Shiite allies are crucial opponents of ISIS* *The major Sunni powers are unreliable allies against ISIS* *Russia will insist on being a player in the Middle East* *The Kurds are a complicating factor* *Western attacks on ISIS strengthen the narrative of Muslim victimization* *a soldier guilt* *https://www.facebook.com/CollectiveEvolutionPage/videos/10151968966863908/* On Thursday, May 5, 2016 at 2:41:14 PM UTC-5, Travis wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > http://nationalinterest.org/feature/its-time-return-the-principles-war-16054 > > > It's Time to Return to the Principles of War > > [image: Description: > http://nationalinterest.org/files/styles/main_image_on_posts/public/main_images/Marines_3.jpg?itok=NTkUVcNM] > > Newfangled theories distract from the unchanging art of war. > > James Jay Carafano > <http://nationalinterest.org/profile/james-jay-carafano> > > May 4, 2016 > > Most modern military doctrine should be scrapped. The Pentagon would be > far better served if our military thinkers got back to the basics and > taught the principles of war—and little more. > > Conflict just keeps getting more complicated. In the modern era, the > general response has been to develop new concepts for the how the armed > forces ought to conduct themselves. “Bold reimaginings” have sprung forth > as quickly as weeds. Getting the “strategic narrative” right > <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-get-war-wrong-the-21st-century-15346> > > is but the latest doctrinal flavor of the month. > > But while explanations of how we should fight keep getting more cerebral, > sophisticated and sensitive to the conditions surrounding contemporary > conflicts, the fighting hasn’t gotten any easier. Occam’s razor suggests > that maybe all that fresh thinking isn’t helping win wars. > > Why do smart, elegant doctrines come up short? The easiest explanation > would simply dismiss modern military theorists as feckless > pseudo-intellectuals. Colin Gray has compared the defense community > <http://amzn.to/1T1RhvB> to the fashion industry. “Expert defense > professionals quite literally follow the fashion in ideas. . . The bigger > the idea, the greater its conceptual reach and hence its organizing > potency, and hence the more compelling the felt need to jump aboard the > intellectual bandwagon.” There may be some truth there, but more is going > on. > > Defense thinkers are not fashion designers. Their debates are about > changing outcomes, not aesthetics. > > Sure, Pentagon brass may be quick to embrace the latest terms of art. But > new terms don’t enter the lexicon unless there’s an original idea that gets > people talking. And, make no mistake, thinking anew is important. Attacking > orthodoxy, convention and unquestioned assumptions in pursuit of a > competitive edge—that’s a good thing. > > What’s wrongheaded, though, is the premise of the modern defense debate. > The presumption seems to be that, just as farmers must plow the fields and > rotate crops every year to get better results, so military thinkers must > turn over fundamental military concepts on a regular basis. The belief that > intellectual advances will inevitably deliver a better understanding of > complex phenomenon is a tenet of faith—and one of the biggest blind > spots—in the modern world. > > As the Western world moved from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, the > Western mind embraced the notion that it had embarked on a sure, steady > march of human progress—one that would ultimately lead to a perfect > understanding of the physical world. This transformation was most > profoundly seen in the scientific revolution. > > In search of absolute dominion, other fields of human enterprise, > including military affairs, began to don the trappings of scientific > thinking. We see it quite plainly in Clausewitz’s magisterial *On War* > <http://amzn.to/26U8uLt>. That nineteenth-century treatise is suffused > with jargon that appealed to the Enlightenment crowd. > > The tradition continues to this day. Western military writers commonly > embrace scientific jargon, symbolic of the faith that there is always a > better way to think about the natural world. But shoehorning thinking about > war into a scientific-sounding narrative is insufficient. > > In an essay on rethinking military concepts, James Dubik invokes an > Enlightenment-sounding answer about progress in military affairs. “A brief > look at scientific revolutions,” he writes > <https://books.google.com/books?id=WHhch-AyYjkC&lpg=PT15&vq=A%20brief%20look%20at%20the%20scientific%20revolutions&dq=%22fundamental%20is%20the%20continuing%20transformation%20in%20the%20profession%22&pg=PT15#v=onepage&q=%22A%20brief%20look%20at%20scientific%20revolutions%22&f=false>, > > “provides a glimpse of how fundamental is the continuing transformation in > the profession of arms.” Yet the comparison is nonsensical. Dubik is trying > to comprehend the changing conditions of contemporary conflict. Physical > science is trying to gain a greater understanding of an unchanging physical > reality. > > Even science has a hard time discovering truth, and war is not a science > experiment. There is no preordained path to military enlightenment. > > More military thinking doesn’t lead inevitably to better thinking. Indeed, > lately it seems to have put more trees in front of the forest. > > When General Mattis took over Joint Forces Command in 2007, he spearheaded > an effort to fight back against overthinking war. At the time, > “effects-based operations” served as favored term of art. Mattis pushed > back > <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/08autumn/mattis.pdf>. > > “We must return clarity to our processes and operational concepts,” he > wrote. Military doctrine had created “unrealistic expectations of > predictability and a counterproductive information appetite. . . requiring > unattainable levels of knowledge about the enemy exercising its independent > will.” > > Mattis argued that a far better approach would be to “re-baseline our > terminology and concepts by returning to time-honored principles.” He was > right. Military minds need to get back to first principles. > > What if military thinking stripped itself of the modern era’s futile > effort to mimic the Enlightenment goal of gaining perfect knowledge and > mastery over the affairs of men? What would be left? > > They are called the principles of war. Specifically, they are: objective, > offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, > surprise and simplicity. > > The origins of these principles are best explained in *The Quest for > Victory* <http://amzn.to/26UaQtI> by military historian John Alger. He > writes that “[a]n examination of some of the more important writings on > war—by Sun Tzu, Vegetius, Machiavelli, the duke of Rohan, Jean Charles de > Folard. . . the marquis de Silva and Henry Lloyd—conveys both the form and > concept of martial principles before Napoleon.” The common thread among > this diverse cohort of thinkers is that they all predate the intellectual > conceits of the Enlightenment. > > The principles of war survived into modernity. While military theory got > more complex, convoluted, and complicated from the age of Napoleon on > forward, “old-fashioned” maxims managed to hang in there. Even Clausewitz, > before he got bogged down in *On War*, paid them heed in his essay, “The > Most Important Principles on the Conduct of War to Complement My > Instruction to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince.” > > Ironically, the broad acceptance of principles as a valid guide to the > study of war was fostered by the military’s growing obsession with the > certainty of science as the basis for truth. The preface to Folard’s *History > of Polybius* affirmed: “Science has made progress only through the > knowledge of its true principles. War is no different. The knowledge of its > principles becomes the foundation on which its study is made.” > > Over the course of the nineteenth century, the principles of war were > codified and refurbished. They stuck around, though they were pushed > further and further into the background as militaries developed more > elegant ways of thinking and planning. > > By the end of the Cold War, the principles were under all-out assault. > They were included in Joint Doctrine > <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf>—although the Joint Staff > tinkered with them by adding three new principles: restraint, perseverance > and legitimacy. > > As Antulio Echevarria observes > <https://books.google.com/books?id=WHhch-AyYjkC&lpg=PT218&dq=%22rethinking%20the%20principles%20of%20war%22&pg=PT66#v=onepage&q&f=false>, > > the additional axioms weren’t really “general rules requiring judgment in > application.” In other words, they weren’t principles at all. Rather, the > additions were “little more than common-sense advice” added to address > post–Cold War concerns for sustaining political will in modern conflict. > Essentially, the military was playing politics with the fundamental > concepts of war. The change illustrates how the principles had drifted from > their original purpose; they were ceasing to serve as a critical conceptual > framework to think about conflict. > > The JCS principles marked the beginning of the end. Military thinkers > looked for more relevant, modern conceptual tools. In 1989, Robert Leonhard > penned a new set of principles: *The Principles of War for the > Information Age* <http://amzn.to/21xzzAc>. Appearing in print right > around the time of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the book garnered a lot > of attention from military minds thirsting for new thinking. “Under > Leonhard’s system,” Echevarria writes, “military leaders would *not* have > to memorize ‘eternal truths’ for later application; instead, they would > learn to weigh the pros and cons of opposing concerns. . . ” Still, > Leonhard tried to remain true to the traditional notion of providing a > simple model to guide strategists’ understanding of the factors that must > be considered in military decisionmaking. > > Under the stress of ambivalent operations in the Balkans and then > intractable conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the effort to sustain the > “simple” completely collapsed. In the modern military mind, modern war > became too hard for old ideas. > > New thinking, however, has not made war any easier. > > It is time to reverse course. *Let’s stop clinging to the notion that the > new generation of thinkers is, axiomatically, smarter than those who > preceded them.* > > At its heart, armed conflict remains a dynamic competition between > adversaries; each conflict is tinged by the unique circumstances under > which it is fought. Why waste time trying to develop complex intellectual > tools that, in the end, deliver no better insights than simple, timeless > constructs? > > There is a case to be made for going simple. For that, the principles > might serve well enough. > > *A Heritage Foundation vice president, James Jay Carafano directs the > think tank’s research on foreign policy and national security issues.* > > > > > __._,_.___ > ------------------------------ > Posted by: "Beowulf" <[email protected] <javascript:>> > ------------------------------ > > > Visit Your Group > <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/grendelreport/info;_ylc=X3oDMTJmNHIyaGg4BF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzIwMTk0ODA2BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTMyMzY2NwRzZWMDdnRsBHNsawN2Z2hwBHN0aW1lAzE0NjI0NjQ3MTM-> > > > > [image: Yahoo! Groups] > <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo;_ylc=X3oDMTJlZWVnZGxtBF9TAzk3NDc2NTkwBGdycElkAzIwMTk0ODA2BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTMyMzY2NwRzZWMDZnRyBHNsawNnZnAEc3RpbWUDMTQ2MjQ2NDcxMw--> > > • Privacy <https://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/groups/details.html> • > Unsubscribe <javascript:> • Terms of Use > <https://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/terms/> > > __,_._,___ > > > -- -- Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups. For options & help see http://groups.google.com/group/PoliticalForum * Visit our other community at http://www.PoliticalForum.com/ * It's active and moderated. Register and vote in our polls. * Read the latest breaking news, and more. --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "PoliticalForum" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
