I'm guessing you feel the same about "Stop and frisk", right? On Thursday, July 14, 2016 at 2:19:43 PM UTC-4, MJ wrote: > > > 14 July 2016 > > *The Broken Windows Theory of Policing Has Failed *Ryan McMaken > > [*This is Part Three of a three-part series on policing. See Part One > <https://mises.org/blog/too-many-laws-why-police-encounters-escalate> and > Part Two > <https://mises.org/blog/why-we-get-more-policing-we-need-its-free>.*] > > One of the most successful ideological movements waged by government > agencies in recent decades has been the so-called Broken Windows theory > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Broken_windows_theory#cite_note-28>of > policing. Popularized in the 1980s by George Kelling, the theory states > that if minor violations are ignored such as the breaking of a window on > private property then those small infractions will act as a signal to > others in the community that more serious crimes can be committed with > impunity. > > In political and policing circles, this theory became immensely popular > during the 1990s and persists today, although repeated demonstrations of > the forceful and deadly methods used by police to address small-time > infractions has prompted many to ask if coming down hard on every little > thing is really the best way to police a neighborhood. > > While Kelling successfully reinvigorated the idea, the Broken Windows > theory in the 1980s, was not new or novel. It was simply the latest > manifestation of what has also been termed "community policing" and "order > maintenance" policing. > > At their core, these ideas taken together depend on the idea that police > interactions with community members should be expanded well beyond criminal > activities while giving police officers more discretion over what laws to > enforce, and when. > > > > *Two Views: Community Policing vs. Limited Policing *Community policing > and order maintenance policing have long been in tension with competing > views of policing in which the police should be more limited in their role > and focused more on serious and violent crime. > > Not surprisingly, as police agencies took shape for the first time in the > United States in the nineteenth century, many Americans took the view that > policing should be limited in scope. > > In his essay "Community Policing in the United States," Jack Greene notes > <https://books.google.com/books?id=llwVRc9YBYMC&pg=PA55&lpg=PA55&dq=the+American+police+service+was+originally+cast+as+a+reactive+force,+not+as+a+preventive+of+interdicting+force+...+America%27s+police+were+to+provide+assistance+on+request,+not+to+proactively+intervene+in+the+lives+of+the+community&source=bl&ots=wR6ryESz2M&sig=Pt6eVtUerDvNF6qEtpggCclWmjQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi17rTup_PNAhUowYMKHQx5DWAQ6AEIJzAB#v=onepage&q=the%20American%20police%20service%20was%20originally%20cast%20as%20a%20reactive%20force%2C%20not%20as%20a%20preventive%20of%20interdicting%20force%20...%20America%27s%20police%20were%20to%20provide%20assistance%20on%20request%2C%20not%20to%20proactively%20intervene%20in%20the%20lives%20of%20the%20community&f=false> > > that "the American police service was originally cast as a reactive force, > not as a preventive of interdicting force ... America's police were to > provide assistance on request, not to proactively intervene in the lives of > the community." (See more > <https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_3/03g.pdf> from Greene on > four different policing models.) > > It was recognized that more police power and more police discretion to > initiate interactions with the public would lead to corruption. The > coercive and monopolistic power that comes with government policing brings > the ability to demand compliance and resources from the public for personal > advantage, and the advantage of state institutions. The best safeguard, > early skeptics of policing concluded, was to carefully limit police power. > > It did not take long for the skeptics to be proven right. > > Greene continues: > > The police of the late 19th and early 20th century were unlikely to be > seen as extension of "the community." More often, they were viewed by > citizens as extension fo corrupt politicians or as criminal enterprises. > While charged with enforcing the laws, the early American police were not > often lawful the law was neither a means not and ends for the police. > Rather, the law was often selectively invoked for political, administrative > or corrupt purposes. > > Not surprisingly, many reformers attempted to reduce police corruption > then by seeking "to control in detailed ways the actions of the police." > Reformers suspected that police who were given discretion to enforce a wide > variety of laws according to their own judgment were more prone to use the > law enforcement system for personal purposes, whether for outright > extortion, or to improve one's own career prospects. > > The reformers were successful, to a certain extent, at pushing through a > more "professional" model of policing in the twentieth century. The new > model of professionalism put distance between police officers and the > community. The community was engaged for purposes of crime fighting, and > police focused on emphasizing their role in combating dangerous criminals. > It's not a coincidence that this new model of professionalism manifests > itself by the middle of the twentieth century in popular culture through > fictional characters like Joe Friday of the long-running Dragnet franchise > about the Los Angeles police department. Friday is distant from the > community, professional, straitlaced, efficient, and interested only in > facts. > > Reformers sought to professionalize the police as part of an effort to > distance the police from the political machinery of the time, thinking this > would reduce police corruption. This may have been helpful, although the > corrupting nature of law enforcement monopolies continued, as one might > expect. > > The problem of police corruption was hardly solved in the decades > following these initial reforms. Greene continues: > > Early studies of the American police in the 1950s and 1960s did not > necessarily support a benign biew of the public law enforcement or of its > agents. More often, the police were found: to use excessive violence toward > personal ends; to punish non-respect with arrest; to be socially and > politically cynical; and to be rooted in local customs and traditions, > despite years of reform efforts. Later studies in the 1970s suggested that > the preventive capacity of the police was largely mythical, that rapid > response was largely ineffective, and that detective work was largely > overrated, generally by detectives themselves." > > Calls for a more explicit return to "community policing" came in the 1960s > and 1970s with significant increases in street crime and social unrest in > the United States. It was thought that if the police would engage the > community in a variety of ways beyond mere crime fighting, then this would > defuse racial tensions and other socio-economic conflicts apparent within > urban communities. > > Thus, by the early 1980s, when Kelling and James Q. Wilson wrote this > influential essay > <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/> > in The Atlantic explaining the basics of the Broken Windows theory, they > were able to portray community policing as something new that might address > the failures of older models of policing. > > > > *Broken Windows Theory Has Often Been Abused and Misapplied *It's > important to note, though, that the vision of Kelling and Wilson was not > the crude model of policing that is used today under the label or the > Broken Windows theory. (What is used today is often a hybrid of the Broken > Windows model and the "zero-tolerance" model.) > > Kelling had always advocated a soft approach to policing in which arrests > and summonses were only one tool of many employed by the police. In > Kelling's vision, effective community policing had to be done on foot, and > the police officer relied largely on his personality and his relationships > with the community to maintain order. The officer was in no position to use > overwhelming force against community members or retreat into an armored > vehicle. Kelling writes: > > An officer on foot cannot separate himself from the street people; if he > is approached, only his uniform and his personality can help him manage > whatever is about to happen. And he can never be certain what that will be > a request for directions, a plea for help, an angry denunciation, a > teasing remark, a confused babble, a threatening gesture. > > The philosophy of order maintenance employed by Kelling rested on the idea > that frequent use of violence on the part of the officer (i.e., tasing and > arresting members of the community) would be counter to the entire point of > community policing and order maintenance. > > Modern policing done in the name of the Broken Windows theory, however, > relies largely on summonses, citations, arrests, and physical violence to > enforce laws against any number of minor infractions including carrying > knives, selling loose cigarettes, smoking a joint, jaywalking, and other > "offenses" that should be regarded as completely non-criminal. > > In spite of Kelling's original intentions, Broken-Windows-style policing > has come to mean rigid and aggressive enforcement of small-time violations. > > What Kelling might consider "abuse" is now often the norm, when it comes > to the practical application of the theory. In fact, the Broken Windows > theory in many communities has been used to justify legal regimes built > largely on extracting large amounts of resources from working class and > lower class neighborhoods in the form of fines, court fees, and other legal > costs. > > In Ferguson, Missouri, for example, where a jaywalking intervention led to > the shooting death of Michael Brown, it was revealed that the city of > Ferguson was in the habit of issuing unusually large numbers of citations > and fines > <http://www.npr.org/2014/08/25/343143937/in-ferguson-court-fines-and-fees-fuel-anger> > > for non-violent violations. The city then arrested citizens who did not pay > the fines, putting them in what are effectively debtors prisons. > > This tactic has been used elsewhere as well. In a recent > <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-problem-with-broken-windows-policing/> > > Frontline analysis > <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-problem-with-broken-windows-policing/>, > > the author noted similar practices have been employed in Newark, New Jersey > where so-called "blue summonses" have been liberally issued throughout the > community. > > > > *Broken-Windows Theory As an Excuse for More Heavy-Handed Policing *This, > however, is what we would expect from a police force that enjoys immunity, > monopoly powers, and is far more heavily armed than the general population. > Why engage in the Kelling model of community policing when it is far more > lucrative and requires far less patience and risk to simply arrest or > open fire upon anyone who shows "disrespect"? > > In both the Ferguson and Newark caes, the Broken Windows model was been > used to justify more citations and arrests, but, as the Frontline report > notes: "the frequent stops and citations made people mistrust the police, > and much less likely to cooperate when officers were investigating serious > crimes." > > Enforcement of small-times crimes thus may harm police efforts to catch > serious criminals. Nor does enforcement of low-level offenses mean that > people likely to commit serious crime are even being targeted. In the case > of Newark, for example, large percentages of summonses were going to people > who were "in their 50s or 60s or maybe even older." > > People over fifty are not the people committing serious crimes. But, older > residents have been easy targets for police, so it is they who receive the > citations. > > This disconnect between real crime and petty offenses is not sufficient to > dissuade police officers and police departments from continuing to crack > down on small-time offenders. After all, there are career incentives for > making large numbers of arrests and issuing large numbers of citations. In > the case of Newark, "officers who racked up summonses were chosen for plum > assignments" while officers also targeted the easier-to-victimize > populations such as the elderly, disabled, and mentally ill. > > Trends like these have long been shaped by police department policy which > rewards police officers who take a harsh stance against minor offenses, > while police to focus on more serious crime are less often rewarded. Police > Historian David Simon writes > <https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/29/david-simon-on-baltimore-s-anguish#.5XEsoVeev>: > > > > How do you reward cops? Two ways: promotion and cash. That's what rewards > a cop. If you want to pay overtime pay for having police fill the jails > with loitering arrests or simple drug possession or failure to yield, if > you want to spend your municipal treasure rewarding that, well the cop > who’s going to court 7 or 8 days a month and court is always overtime pay > you're going to damn near double your salary every month. On the other > hand, the guy who actually goes to his post and investigates who's > burglarizing the homes, at the end of the month maybe he’s made one arrest. > It may be the right arrest and one that makes his post safer, but he's > going to court one day and he's out in two hours. So you fail to reward the > cop who actually does police work. > > Naturally, local governments also have a lot to gain from demanding fines > and payments for court costs from defendants. > > > > *Does It Reduce Serious Crime? *Politicians have long embraced the Broken > Windows theory and assumed that order-maintenance policing reduces all > types of crime. The evidence does not warrant such an assumption. > > In Policing in America, Larry Gaines and Victor Kappeler conclude flatly > <https://books.google.com/books?id=m1ougd3lwwsC&pg=PA429&dq=there+is+little+proof+that+order+maintenance+policing+impacts+serious+violent+crime&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjyvfnFqvPNAhXl5oMKHV6YDhUQ6AEIHjAA#v=onepage&q=there%20is%20little%20proof%20that%20order%20maintenance%20policing%20impacts%20serious%20violent%20crime&f=false> > > "there is little proof that order maintenance policing impacts serious > violent crime," although there is evidence that it reduces the incidence of > lesser offenses. > > The theory nevertheless remains popular. The poster child for the Broken > Windows theory is usually presented as New York City where many have noted > a significant improvement in crime during the 1990s. This is then credited > to the aggressive enforcement of laws against a variety of minor offenses. > Ignored, of course, is the fact that New York experienced historic levels > of economic growth during this period and that crime nationwide declined > significantly over the same period > <https://mises.org/blog/fbi-us-homicide-rate-51-year-low>. Numerous large > cities throughout the United States during this period experienced similar > trends in the absence of similar police policies. > > In an article > <https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3226951/Sampson_SystematicSocialObservation.pdf?sequence=2> > > in the American Journal of Sociology, Robert Sampson and Stephen Raudenbush > deny there is a proven link between "public disorder" and crime. ("Public > disorder" includes activities such as vagrancy, prostitution, drinking in > public, and drug selling.) The authors conclude socio-demographic issues > and physical neighborhood characteristics are far more important to the > equation: "Attacking public disorder through tough police tactics may thus > be a politically popular but perhaps analytically weak strategy to reduce > crime." > > Some of the confusion over the effectiveness of community policing stems > from inexact use of definitions of crime. If one defines drug selling and > prostitution as "crimes" then harsh penalties against those "crimes" will > tend to lessen them. On the other hand, if one limits the definition of > "crime" to violence, theft, destruction of property and other acts with a > specific identifiable victim as one should then we find it much more > difficult to connect public disorder to real crime. > > In evaluating the success of community policing, one must also evaluate > the side effects of more aggressive enforcement. Police shootings, violent > confrontations and civil unrest must all also be factored into claims that > community policing has improved conditions within a community. There is > also evidence that incarcerating people for small infractions makes them > more likely to commit crimes later. Because incarceration can have long > term affects on one's ability to earn a living through legal means, > researcher Michael Mueller-Smith concluded > <http://www.columbia.edu/%7Emgm2146/incar.pdf> "incarceration led to > increased criminality for inmates after re-entry." > > > > *Community Policing Is More About Politics than Crime Reduction *By > mentioning politics in their conclusions, Sampson and Raudenbush may have > hit on the true reason for the popularity of the Broken Windows theory. > Although it has not been shown to reduce serious crime, the theory remains > politically popular and allows politicians to claim they are being active > in punishing and preventing crime. > > Even Kelling admitted that order maintenance policing often cannot be > shown to reduce crime, but it remains valuable, in Kelling's view, for > other reasons. The key, Kelling notes, lies in the fact that a neighborhood > can be "'safer' when the crime rate has not gone down." This is because > when the Broken Windows theory is employed, people will often feel safer in > spite of the reality. Now, feeling safer is not the same thing as being > safer, but the claim is that order maintenance policing is important > because it improves "quality of life" and perceptions of the community. > > At this point then, Kelling and backers of the Broken Windows theory in > general have been reduced to admitting that when used for order > maintenance, police are really quality-of-life agents and not crime > fighters at all. > > Faced with this, then, we must ask ourselves if the same people who are > trained to capture rapists and murders with deadly weapons need to be the > same people who shoo away aging drunks who engage in public drinking. > > There is good reason to suspect the private sector could easily provide > these services. As Murray Rothbard has noted > <https://mises.org/blog/privatize-police>, order maintenance at the > street level is low-hanging fruit as far as private-sector security goes, > with merchants and other community members highly motivated to pool private > resources to keep the streets clear of people who impede commerce and > restrict use of public spaces. Indeed, this sort of order maintenance can > be and has been accomplished quite easily in privately-owned public > spaces such as common areas of housing developments and multifamily housing > complexes, shopping malls, parking lots, amusement parks, downtown plazas, > outdoor food courts, and similar areas. This sort of security is carried > out daily by private security worldwide. (See Tate Fegley on this topic > <https://mises.org/library/tate-fegley-crime-and-punishment-libertarian-society>, > > as well.) Moreover, these neighborhood-controlled agents would be > answerable to the local owners and residents, and not to centralized > political machines, police chiefs, or other government agents who stand to > benefit personally from aggressive enforcement. > > The reason we see so little of this in practice, though, is the fact that > the public sector has already crowded out the private sector in matters of > order maintenance. Since one can easily access (at least in theory) > taxpayer-subsidized police services via 911, there is an enormous incentive > to rely on "free" police services, even if those services are more likely > to bring the possibility of violence, abuse, or unreliable service. Why > employ private agents to tell drug dealers to find some other street corner > when the police will show up (eventually) and do it for free? > > > > *Community Policing Expands State Power and Discretion*Early critics of > police agencies were right when they immediately identified the downside of > active community policing: It gives police agents wide discretion to take > action against the general population, while increasing opportunities for > coercive intervention in the lives of private citizens. A police force that > is encouraged and empowered to intervene in any number of non-violent > activities by citizens is also a police force that has wide leeway to > extort, threaten, arrest, and assault private citizens over any number of > small-time "transgressions" that don't rise to the level of crime. > > Many "fixes" have been offered for the problem of police corruption and > abuse. As early reformers knew, though, the only truly reliable way to > reduce corruption and needlessly violent police interactions is to reduce > police discretion and to reduce the number and scope of laws that police > are called upon to enforce. "Community policing" or "order maintenance" are > really just another way of describing a large expansion of police power. > > So long as police forces enjoy monopoly powers, and are subject to > political, rather than market control, the only way to minimize the > potential for police abuse is to minimize their legal reach. If Americans > as a society want government police who will be tasked with finding > murderers and rapists, they also need to understand that these tasks do not > necessitate a police force that spends its days citing local residents for > broken tail lights and drinking a beer in public. Giving police wide > latitude to be aggressive against the population in the name of order > maintenance, on the other hand, is likely to breed resentment, suspicion, > and obstacles to enforcing laws against more serious crimes. It's time to > admit that the Broken Windows theory is failed and the answer lies in > limiting police powers, not in expanding them. > > > https://mises.org/blog/broken-windows-theory-policing-has-failed >
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