July 21, 2016
The ’28 Pages’ Explained
by Larisa Alexandrovna Horton
The classified
<http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/declasspart4.pdf>28
Pages of the
<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-107hrpt792/pdf/CRPT-107hrpt792.pdf>Congressional
Joint Inquiry into 9/11 report have finally been
made public, although in redacted form. It took
fourteen years for the public to see this
document, which was classified by the Bush Administration.
The 28 Pages make it clear that the hijackers had
handlers who were reporting to, funded by and
taking directions from figures at the highest
levels of the Saudi government. But to understand
why that conclusion follows inescapably from the
revelations in these pages, it is essential to
know how these lines of control work, both in
intelligence agencies in general and within the
Saudi royal family in particular.
Together with what is already known, this document is explosive.
Reports related to the 28 Pages – as well as all
US and foreign government talking points – have
focused on two claims in order to discredit or minimize the document:
* The information contained within the 28
page document is “raw” and unvetted.
* There is no new information in the document.
Neither of these talking points is true. The 28
Pages document has been classified for 14 years.
In that time, many of the allegations contained
within it have been leaked to the press,
including FBI investigations of the allegations,
the context of the allegations, as well as the
confirmation of the allegations. The CIA has also
leaked additional information related to this
document. So while this document and the
allegations within it may have been “raw” data in
2002, that is no longer the case.
The arguments that the 28 Pages provides no new
information does not account for the new pieces
of information that it does include as well as the context it provides.
Background
Intelligence Stations and Operations
Intelligence organizations function via a strict
chain of information delivery and also a firewall of information sequestering.
In order to fully grasp the connections of the
people named in the 28 Pages, it is imperative
that readers have a good grasp of how
intelligence agencies work and are structured. By
understanding how the people named relate to one
another and their particular functions, people
will come to the inescapable conclusion that
these relationships cannot be written off as mere coincidence.
The basic questions the 28 Pages (and other
related documents) raise are all related to how
certain Saudi nationals could function in the
United States and be supported by the Saudi
government without the Saudi government knowing
what it was supporting. The 28 Pages document
does not answer these questions, but the pattern
that emerges suggests that at the very least the
Saudi government was actively involved in
supporting the handlers of the hijackers.
Because most intelligent agencies are structured
like the Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA
will be used as a model for the purposes of this
discussion. The CIA has its headquarters in its
home country, specifically at Langley.
Foreign stations are “officially” located within
the embassy of the home country. For example, the
US embassy in Rome houses the CIA Rome station.
These stations are known to the host country (for
example, Italy), hence they are official. The
host country usually does not know which
employees are diplomats, embassy/consulate
employees and which are spies, as all employees
have official cover (meaning, they work for the
embassy or consulate in some capacity). There are
other “unofficial” stations. Those are unknown to the host country.
Regardless of status as ally or enemy,
intelligence surveillance covers all foreign
territory and activity. The emphasis on priority
and the type of intelligence collected might
change if the target is an ally, but intelligence
gathering in general continues. This is an
important point that will later be discussed in the 28 Pages section.
Each station has a leader, called a Station
Chief. That person reports directly to
headquarters and their direct supervisor. For
example, the CIA chief of station for Beirut
reports directly to the head of the Middle East
and Near East division of the Department of
Operations at the CIA. That person in turn
reports directly to the the Director of the CIA.
In many cases, the Ambassador of the embassy
where the station is located is read into
relevant reports. All important information would
be related by the Director of the CIA to the
White House and the National Security Council.
There are only two, in some cases maybe three,
direct channels by which information flows into the leadership.
In addition, all satellite embassy/consulate
offices would report directly to the main embassy head – the ambassador.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s intelligence and
military agencies are structured much like this.
In fact,
<https://www.amazon.com/Ghost-Wars-Afghanistan-Invasion-September/dp/0143034669/antiwarbookstore>they
are modeled after the CIA. But as the key posts
are held by members of the same family, the
sequestrating of information is likely not as
stringent. That is important, because it goes to
the question of who inside the Saudi Government
would know what and when they would know it.
Saudi Royals/Government Officials Mentioned in the 28 Pages
In the years since the classification of the 28
page document, a good portion of what was
included has been investigated and leaked to the
public. As a result, we know who most of the
people mentioned directly as well as those whose
identity is merely hinted at. Below is a list of
the people already known to be discussed or
hinted at in the 28 Pages as well as the historical information about them.
Prince Bandar
Bandar bin Sultan first came to public attention
in Craig Unger's seminal work
<https://www.amazon.com/House-Bush-Saud-Relationship-Dynasties/dp/0743253396/antiwarbookstore>House
of Bush, House of Saud. Bandar was so close with
the Bush family, that Barbara Bush dubbed him
"<https://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/2004/jul/25/politics>Bandar Bush."
Bandar is the highest Saudi government official
mentioned in the 28 Pages document. While at the
time of the 9/11 attacks he was the Saudi
Ambassador to the United States, his position in
the Saudi Royal Family is much higher.
Unlike ambassadorships appointed in the US –
which are strictly political or token gestures –
Bandar’s background is much more complex and strategic.
Within the Saudi Royal Family, which is also the
Saudi Government, there exists a family faction
that is more powerful then the larger family.
This group is called the Sudari Seven, which is
made up of seven full brothers fathered by the
Saudi Kingdom’s founding monarch and his favorite
wife Hussa. The Sudari Seven are the full
brothers who, along with their sons and
grandsons, control the key posts in the Saudi
Government, including the throne. Prince Sultan
is one of the Sudari Seven and he is also the father of Prince Bandar.
Sultan was head of the Ministry of Defense and
Aviation and later became Crown Prince – second
to the throne – in 2005. Some of the Saudi
nationals mentioned in the 28 Pages appear to be
receiving funding directly through the Ministry
of Defense or through its front companies.
Father and son (Sultan and Bandar) both held key
positions in the Saudi Government at the same
time and received promotions at the same time. It
is valid to ask if Sultan knew what Bandar was
doing and if Bandar knew what Sultan was doing.
Since they are father and son, one would assume
they likely knew. On the other hand, as they held
different government positions with specific
channels of intelligence flow, their mutual
knowledge about these key events remains unclear.
From 1983 – 2005, Bandar served as the Saudi
Ambassador to the United States. In this
position, he reported directly to the King. In
2005, he was promoted to head of GID (Saudi
Intelligence, like the CIA). This is the same
year that his father, Prince Sultan, becomes Crown Prince.
The 28 Pages strongly implicate Bandar and his
wife (his half cousin) in funding Saudi nationals
who provided support for the 9/11 hijackers.
While the 28 page document does not implicate
Bandar in any direct contact or support for the
hijackers themselves, it does show that without
Bandar’s assistance to certain other Saudi
nationals, the hijackers could not have completed their mission.
Bandar was also the person who organized the now
infamous departure of all Saudi nationals in the
US within days of 9/11, including members of the bin Laden family.
The King
The official King of Saudi Arabia at the time of
the 9/11 attacks was King Fahd, who after having
suffered a stroke in the 1980s, was a ruler in
name only. The technical, de facto, ruler of the
Kingdom in 2001 was actually his half brother,
Abdullah. After the death of Fahd in 2005,
Abdullah became the official King. So all
references in this discussion to the King as
related to the 2001 attacks are strictly about Abdullah, not Fahd.
GID – Prince Turki
The Saudi General Intelligence Directorate (GID)
was headed by Prince Turki up until
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/turki-bin-faisal.htm>10
days before the September 11 attacks. He resigned
abruptly. No public explanation has been given.
Prince Turki is the full brother of Princess Haifa, the wife of Prince Bandar.
That means that the top three government
positions under the King were filled by a family
within a larger family: Sultan as head of the
Ministry of Defense; his son Bandar as the key
face of Saudi Arabia in the United States; and
Bandar’s brother-in-law/half cousin, Turki, who was head of intelligence.
In 1998, Prince Turki
<http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/08/9-11-2011-201108>allegedly
made a deal with Osama bin Laden. The latter
would stay out of Saudi Arabia and not attack
targets inside the Kingdom. In exchange, bin
Laden would get funding for the Taliban, al Qaeda
training camps and would not face extradition.
Businesses of Saudi origin would also provide bin
Laden with direct monetary support. The US
learned of this deal after the September 11 attacks.
In 2005, Turki would replace Bandar as the Saudi
Ambassador to the United States. He abruptly
<http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1570315,00.html>resigned
the position in 2006. Bandar took Turki’s place in 2005 as the head of the GID.
Although Turki is not named in the documents as
having any connection to the handlers of the
hijackers, his department is referenced quite a
bit, as several of the Saudi nationals are
identified as Saudi intelligence officers.
Other Saudi Nationals/Government Employees as Related to the 28 Pages
Omar al-Bayoumi
Bayoumi is the key to the September 11 attacks.
Most intelligence community experts and officers
have concluded that Bayoumi was a non-official
cover (NOC) officer for either the GID or the
Saudi Military of Defense and Aviation, if not
both. That means he worked for departments of
Prince Turki and/or Prince Sultan.
Per the background above on intelligence stations
and operations, Bayoumi would likely report to an
intermediary (handler) who would then report to
the GID Chief of Station in the Saudi Embassy.
That person, in turn, would report either
directly to Sultan and/or Turki or to a division
head in charge of the US stations. That person
would most certainly report to either Sultan or
Turki. There are maybe three channels that
separate Bayoumi from two of the highest officials in the Saudi government.
Bayoumi’s cover was collecting a paycheck as a
ghost employee of a Saudi defense company called
Dallah Avco, as well as other Saudi fronts which
were all run by the Saudi Ministry of Defense and
Aviation – the head of which was Prince Sultan,
Bandar's father.
<http://www.rawstory.com/news/2008/FBI_documents_contradict_Sept._11_Commission_0228.html>FBI
surveillance documents revealed in 2008 include
evidence of Bayoumi helping the San Diego 9/11
hijacker cell. This information was whitewashed
in the 9/11 Commission Report and any reference
to Bayoumi's role with the hijackers was
re-written (including initial meetings dates and locations).
Bayoumi met the San Diego cell in a restaurant
and brought them to his own apartment. Later he
co-signed for an apartment for them and paid
their rent. He drove them to and from the Social
Security offices and he helped them obtain
driver's licenses. He also helped them locate
flight schools in the US. None of this help to
the hijackers could have been accomplished
without outside funding, which there is evidence
to show came from the Saudi government and also separately from Prince Bandar.
The hijackers were later moved to a friend of
Bayoumi's house. The friend,
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdussattar_Shaikh>Abdussattar
Shaikh, was an FBI informant (something Bayoumi
was unaware of). The FBI later learned that
<https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2838281/2553-001-1.pdf>Bayoumi
had ties to terrorist activity.
Bayoumi moved to England two months before the
attacks of September 11. He was arrested by
British authorities at the behest of the FBI.
After a search of his flat in England, the FBI
<http://www.sandiegomagazine.com/San-Diego-Magazine/September-2003/Terror-Two-Years-After/index.php?cparticle=2&siarticle=1#artanc>found
two numbers belonging to two Saudi embassy
employees (their names remain unknown). Again,
the Saudi Embassy at the time was lead by Prince
Bandar. The FBI investigated Bayoumi and
discounted him as a suspect (despite his
terrorist ties and his obvious connection to the
hijackers). This lack of action by the FBI
against Bayoumi has been widely criticized in the
years since this information has come to light.
Fahad al Thumairy
Thumiary was employed by the Saudi Consulate in
Los Angeles. He traveled under diplomatic
passports while also acting as an imam of a local
mosque in L.A. (which suggests that he may have
been an agent of the GID, per how case officers
of official cover are documented and placed). As
a high level Consulate employee, Thumiary fell
under the administration of the Saudi Embassy,
again headed by Bandar in 2001. Thumairy was also
prayer group leader at a local Mosque. Thumairy
had extensive phone calls with Bayoumi and the
two hijackers, but lied to the FBI about ever
meeting Bayoumi or knowing the San Diego cell.
When shown the phone records of his calls related
to the men by investigators, he said the records
were fabricated. The San Diego cell hijackers
attended his mosque and he had assigned someone
to look after them upon their arrival in L.A., but denied this to the FBI.
As a Saudi consulate satellite employee, Thumairy
would have reported directly to Prince Bandar. If
his work at the consulate was a cover – which
many believe – then he would have also reported
directly to the Saudi GID Chief of Station, who
in turn, would have reported to Prince Turki.
It was later learned by investigators and is now
believed to be the case that in January of 2000,
Bayoumi met with Thumiary at the Saudi consulate.
Directly after this meeting, Bayoumi went to the
restaurant at which he met the San Diego cell.
The assumption is that Thumiary instructed
Bayoumi to handle the two hijackers just arriving
in the US. It may be assumed that Thumiary was Bayoumi’s handler.
There is a considerable amount of additional
information on Thumairy and his involvement with
terrorism. Here is
<https://vault.fbi.gov/9-11%20Commission%20Report/9-11-investigation-2002-09-sep>one
example.
Saleh al-Hussayen
Hussayen was a Saudi government official working
for the Saudi Ministry of the Interior. He
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/1443191/Hijackers-in-same-hotel-as-Saudi-minister.html>stayed
at the same hotel as three of the hijackers on
the night prior to the 9/11 attacks: Hani
Hanjour, Khalid Almihdhar, and Nawaf Alhazmi. The
last two men were the San Diego cell and the ones
that Bayoumi handled. Hanjour arrived almost a
full year later and the three then moved to
Arizona. Hussayen was later questioned by federal
investigators about his stay at the same hotel as
the hijackers on the same night, but faked a
seizure during the FBI interview. Upon arriving
at the hospital, his seizures mysteriously ended
and he was discharged. Hussayen then left for
Saudi Arabia, where he got a significant
promotion as the President of the Holy
Sites/Mosques. The FBI was never able to interview or question him again.
Hussayen is believed by many in the intelligence
community to have been a Saudi government
intelligence operative with his cover as an
official of the Ministry of the Interior. If he
was indeed an intelligence operative, he would
have reported directly to the GID Chief of
Station at the Saudi Embassy in DC, who in turn
would have reported to Prince Turki.
Osama Bassnan
Bassnan was an expatriate Saudi living in
California. He was an associate of al-Bayoumi. He
attended the mosque where Thumairy was imam.
Bassnan was close with the two San Diego
hijackers. One of his associates was found to be
a contact of admitted 9/11 co-conspirator Ramzi
Binalshibh. He was a very vocal supporter of
Osama bin Laden and publicly bragged about doing
more for the San Diego hijackers than Bayoumi.
<http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/doc/167421019.html?FMT=CITE&FMTS=CITE%3AAI&type=historic&date=Jan+12%2C+1959&author&pub=Los+Angeles+Times&edition&startpage&desc=Faisal%27s+Mother+Sails>In
1998, Bassnan wrote a letter to Princess Haifa,
Prince Bandar’s wife, asking for money, saying
his wife, Majeda Dweikat, needed thyroid surgery.
Haifa in turn, wrote a check for roughly $15,000
and sent it to Dweikat. The latter, however, did
not have any surgery until 2000.
Haifa, however, continued to send money to
Dweikat, who in turn, signed her checks over to
Bayoumi’s wife. The total amount reported in the
news has varied from $75,0000 to upwards of
$130,000. All of the checks from Haifa were
cashier’s checks, originating from Riggs Bank.
Bassnan and his wife were found to have forged
all of their travel documents, including
passports.
<http://www.sandiegomagazine.com/San-Diego-Magazine/September-2003/Terror-Two-Years-After/index.php?cparticle=2&siarticle=1#artanc>At
one point, Bassnan’s passport was reported stolen
when he was in Houston, Texas. The dates of his
travel to Houston line up with when King Abdullah
was in Houston meeting with George W. Bush. While
Bassnan was in Houston, April 24 2002, he also
met with an unidentified Saudi royal who provided him with extensive funds.
It is widely believed by those in the
intelligence community that Bassnan (and possibly
his wife) was a Saudi intelligence operative. If
Bassnan was indeed an intelligence operative, he
would have reported via a handler to the GID
Chief of Station in the Saudi Embassy, who in
turn would have reported to Prince Turki.
This is the information we had prior to the
release of the 28 Pages. Over a 14 year period,
this information has been vetted and leaked to
the press by those in the intelligence community.
Any argument that claims the 28 Pages data is
“raw” in reference to what is known is misinformed.
The 28 Pages document refers to most of this and
years of continued investigation have added
additional information. There is also new
information in the 28 Pages that, when examined
against the backdrop of what is already known,
paints a damning picture of Saudi government
complicity in providing the handlers of the 9/11
hijackers with everything possible including funding and cover.
28 Pages:
FBI/CIA Saudi Funding Issues
The
<http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/declasspart4.pdf>document
states that the FBI and CIA both did not
investigate the Saudis in the United States nor
their activities outside of the United States
because the Saudis are an ally of the US.
“In their testimony, neither the CIA nor the FBI
witnesses were able to identify definitively the
extent of Saudi support for terrorist activity
globally or within the United States and the
extent to which such support, if it exists, is
knowing or inadvertent in nature.
<snip>
“One reason for the limited understanding is that
it was only after September 11 that the US
government began to aggressively investigate the
issue. Prior to September, the FBI apparently did
not focus investigative resources on [REDACTED]
…Saudi nationals in the United Slates due to
Saudi Arabia’s status as an American ‘ally.'”
Analysis: An intelligence organization is tasked
with investigating all foreign presence and
activities as related to the home country. It
would be unusual for an intelligence body to
simply avoid investigating an ally. The
surveillance, information gathering, etc., might
be limited and the methods might be different,
but all foreign governments with a presence in
the United States are investigated. Most every
embassy has an intelligence operation (see
background above). At the very least, those
players would be monitored to some extent.
So what is the real reason that the FBI and the
CIA both managed to avoid looking into Saudi
Arabia and its relationship to terrorism? What we
have learned in the 14 years since this document
was classified is that they were told not to
investigate the Saudis by consecutive Presidents of the US.
Context: What we do know is that the FBI was
always a bit constrained when it came to
investigating members of the bin Laden family.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/07/afghanistan.september11>According
to FBI sources, this policy of “hands off the
Saudis,” became much worse and more broad after
the Bush administration took office. The FBI was
told to “back off” investigating any of the Saudi
royals as well as the bin Laden family.
The question is why? The answer may be related to
the alleged deal that Prince Turki made with bin
Laden (see background above). How likely is it,
however, Saudi protection money would be paid to
operatives in the US directly linked to the
hijackers rather than paid through Middle Eastern
channels and directly to bin Laden and the Taliban?
Saudi Refusal to Cooperate with the US
The 28 Pages makes several references to the
Saudi government refusing to cooperate prior to
the September 11 attacks as well as after. Here is an example:
"When a high-level [REDACTED] officer was asked
how the September 11 attacks might have been
prevented, he cited greater Saudi cooperation,
pointing to an example from the summer of 2001,
when the U.S. Government requested Saudi
assistance, with no success. In May 2001, the
U.S. Government became aware that an individual
in Saudi Arabia was in contact with Abu Zubaida
and was most likely aware of an upcoming
al-Qa’ida operation. The U.S. Government
pressured the Saudi Government to locate him. The
Saudis informed the U.S. Government that they
required additional information to do so. The
U.S. Government agency that had originally
learned of this individuals’ knowledge refused to
provide the Saudis with additional information
because it would reveal sources and methods. The
National Security Council also tried to pressure
the Saudis, but the Saudis would not cooperate without additional information."
Context: This again could be related to the
alleged deal that Prince Turki made with Osama
bin Laden (see background above). But it is still
important because it underscores how the US
Government refused to collect intelligence on an
ally while that very ally refused to share
important information related directly to our national security.
Bayoumi
According to the document, Bayoumi was working
for a company that was affiliated with the Saudi
Ministry of Defense and Aviation. The company is
not named. It is either Dallah Avco or one of the
other front companies that have been uncovered to be Saudi intelligence fronts.
Although we already knew a great deal about
Bayoumi, here is what is new, however, in the documents:
“According to FBI files [REDACTED] at the company
said that al-Bayoumi received a monthly salary
even though he had been there only one occasion.
The support increased substantially in April
2000, two months after the hijackers arrived in
San Diego, decreased slightly in December of
2000, and stayed at the same level until August 2001.”
Analysis: The 28 Pages document further confirms
the connection between Bayoumi and the Ministry
of Defense and Aviation. Something we already
knew. It further confirms that Bayoumi was being
paid via the Saudi government. The head of the
Ministry of Defense and Aviation was Prince Sultan, Bandar’s father.
Do we know for certain that Bayoumi was a known
entity to Prince Sultan? No. But we do know that
Bayoumi was getting additional funds via Prince
Bandar. What are the odds that two different
government departments, headed by a father and
son, are both paying the same man but are unaware
of those payments or that man?
But most intriguing is the new information
related to the increase in payments. Why did the
payments to Bayoumi increase and then decrease?
The 28 Pages tell us that the increase appears to
coincide with the arrival of the San Diego cell.
But what happened in December of 2000 to warrant
the decrease in Bayoumi’s payments from the Saudi
government? We now know that in December of 2000,
the San Diego cell, recently joined by Hani
Hanjour, had moved to Arizona. Why did the
payments again change in August of 2001? The report does not tell us.
What this shows however, is a definite connection
between not only Bayoumi and the Saudi
government, but also a direct link in payments as
related to the 9/11 hijackers.
Context: We also know from FBI documents that the
San Diego cell had
<http://www.rawstory.com/news/2008/FBI_documents_contradict_Sept._11_Commission_0228.html>purchased
tickets to return abroad after 9/11. Was the
August 2001 payment to Bayoumi possibly used to
buy these tickets in order to create a false
paper trail – an attempt to hide the identities of the hijackers?
The document goes on to provide additional
information. The company that Bayoumi worked for
had ties to terrorism and al Qaeda. The company
in question may or may not be one we are already aware of.
If the company is a front for the Ministry of
Defense and Aviation and the company has ties to
al Qaeda, would it not be accurate to state that
the Ministry of Defense and Aviation has ties to
al Qaeda either knowingly or unknowingly?
Bayoumi also tasked another Saudi national to
help with the San Diego cell by the name of Modhar Abdullah:
"When al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar moved to San Diego,
al-Bayoumi provided them with considerable
assistance. Before the hijackers moved in with
the long-time FBI informant, they stayed at
al-Bayoumi’s apartment for several days until
al-Bayoumi was able to find them an apartment.
Al-Bayoumi then co-signed their lease and may
have paid their first month’s rent and security
deposit. After al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar moved into
their own apartment, al-Bayoumi threw a party to
welcome them to the San Diego community. He also
tasked Modhar Abdullah, another individual from
the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), to help
them get acclimated to the United States.
Abdullah served as their translator, helped them
get drivers’ licenses, and assisted them in locating flight schools."
Here are all of the connections listed in the 28
Pages that Bayoumi has with the Saudi government:
"During the post September 11 investigation, the:
FBI discovered that al-Bayoumi had far more:
extensive ties to the Saudi Government than
previously realized. In fact, according to an
Octobcr 14, 2002 FBI document, al-Bayoumi has
‘extensive ties to the Saudi Government.’ The
connection identified by the FBI are:
– Al-Bayoumi had been an accountant at the Saudi
Civil Aviation Administration from 1976 to 1993,
when he relocated to the United States;
– According to the FBI, al-Bayoumi was in
frequent contact with the Emir at the Saudi
Ministry of Defense responsible for traffic control;
– The FBI has also located records, indicating
that al-Bayoumi received $20.000 from the Saudi
Ministry of Finance at one point;
– When al-Bayoumi applied to schools in the
United States in 1998, he had a letter from the
Saudi Embassy, which stated that he was getting a
full scholarship from the Government of Saudi Arabia, and;
– While in San Diego, al-Bayoumi was receiving
money from tho Saudi Ministry of Defense through
a Saudi company called ‘Ercan.’ [REDACTED] of
that company informed the FBI after September
2001 that, although al-Bayoumi only showed up at
the company on one occasion, he received a salary and allowances.
[REDACTED]stated that at first, he attempted to
refuse to pay al-Bayoumi a monthly salary, but he
was told that his company would lose their
contract if he did not pay him. [REDACTED]
informed the FBI that at the time, he attributed this to Saudi corruption.
[A]l-Bayoumi also had frequent contacts with
Saudi establishments in the United States. In a
review of telephone toll record,. the FBI learned
that al-Bayoumi called Saudi Government
establishments in the United Status almost 100
times between January and May 2000. According to
the FBI, al-Bayoumi was in contact with at least
three individuals at the Saudi Embassy in
Washington DC; two individuals at the Saudi
Cultural Mission in Washington DC; and three
individuals at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles."
Context: We know that one of the three Saudi
individuals at the L.A. Consulate with whom
Bayoumi was in contact was Thumiary.
Analysis: This makes it quite clear that Bayoumi
was not a low government official. Rather, he was
a highly placed intelligence operative of the
Saudi government. He collected money from the
Saudi Ministry of Defense (headed by Prince
Sultan, Bandar’s father). He collected money for
the Saudi Embassy in DC (Bandar), etc. He was
vouched for by the Saudi Embassy in his school
application. A company was pressured to pay him
money by someone important enough to threaten the
company. All of this – all of it – makes clear,
that Bayoumi was incredibly well protected by the Saudi government.
What do we know about Ercan? Why was this small company threatened and by whom?
Apparently, Ercan was a subcontractor of Dallah
Avco, which was a company under the umbrella of
Avco Dallah Trans Arab, which is a subsidiary of
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Barakat>Al
Barakat Investment and Development company. Al
Barakat was shut down after the September 11
attacks. Numerous investigations found no
connection to terrorism, however. It was relaunched in 2012.
Analysis: But the question of
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dallah_Avco>Dallah
Avco remains. It has extensive contracts with the
Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation (Prince
Sultan). No investigation was done on Dallah
Avco, despite Al Barakat nearly being destroyed.
Was Al Barakat pressured (in the same way that
Ercan was to pay Bayoumi) into buying Dallah Avco
and later, after the terrorist attacks, took the
fall while Dallah Avco remained in the clear? Who
has the kind of money and ability to pressure
companies into acquiring other companies for cover?
Osama Bassnan
The section related to Bassnan is fascinating. It
mentions an associate of the San Diego cell who
had helped them learn English and also took over
their first San Diego apartment when they moved
out. His name is Omar Bakarbashat. He was briefly
mentioned in reports in relation to the
hijackers. But the document now also connects him to Bassnan.
The report goes on to confirm that Bassnan was
introduced to the hijackers by Bayoumi.
What is new and incredibly important are the
allegations from the FBI that Bassnan was also
employed by the Saudi government as an
intelligence officer. The document goes on to
cite the CIA with regards to Bassnan:
“Bassnan has many ties to the Saudi Government,
including past employment by the Saudi Arabia Education Mission.”
<snip>
“According to a CIA memo, Bassnan reportedly
received funding and possibly a fake passport
from Saudi Government officials.”
Analysis: We now know that Bassnan was
interviewed by the FBI and admitted to having
false documents (see Background above). We knew
that Bassnan was suspected of being a Saudi
intelligence operative. We did not know that he
was employed directly for the Saudi Arabia Education Mission.
It was known that Bassnan had forged documents.
But what we now know is that those documents may
have been provided by the Saudi Government.
This seems to confirm that two Saudi nationals
(Bayoumi and Bassnan) were employed by the Saudi
government as cover but who were actually
intelligence operatives. In this latter capacity,
they would have reported directly to the GID
Chief of Station at Saudi Embassy, who in turn
would have reported to Prince Turki.
We also know that Prince Bandar’s wife, Haifa,
sent money to Bassnan’s wife, who then signed it
over to Bayoumi’s wife. That is two channels of
financing that both men received from the Saudi
Government as they helped the San Diego cell with
everything they needed to carry out the September 11 attacks.
"The [REDACTED] memorandum dated July 2, 2002,
incorrectly noted that al-Bayoumi’s wife, while
living in San Diego, was receiving $1200 a month
from Princess Haifa Bin Sultan, the wife of
Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to the United
States. The FBI has now confirmed that only Osama
Bassnan’s wife received money directly from
Prince Bandar’s wife, but that al-Bayoumi’s wife
attempted to deposit three of the checks from
Prince Bandar’s wife, which were payable to Bassnan’s wife, into her accounts."
Context: In addition to 15 of the hijackers being
Saudi nationals as well as the suspected role of
Saleh al-Hussayen (see background above), this
makes 18 Saudi nationals either directly involved
in the attacks of 9/11 or in helping those
involved. Three of these men are now confirmed
employees of the Saudi Government.
While US Government officials have gone to great
lengths in stating that the 28 Pages document
only incriminates low level Saudi Government
officials, it is clear from this information that
their role in the Saudi Government was merely
cover provided by the Saudi Government. Low level
government officials cannot create covers for themselves.
But here is the bombshell:
“He and his wife also received financial support
from the Saudi Ambassador to the United States and his wife.”
We knew that Bassnan’s wife had requested money
from Princess Haifa (see background above). We
did not, however, know the amounts and dates of
the checks. This is also the first time Prince
Bandar is mentioned as being involved in financial transactions with Bassnan.
If the above excerpt seems vague, then the below
excerpt leaves little doubt that Prince Bandar
also provided money directly from his account at
Riggs Bank. It also confirms that Princess Haifa
made a lot of payments to someone she did not
know over a period of several years, which began
a year prior to the arrival of the hijackers and
ended a year after the 9/11 attacks:
"Bassnan also has other ties to the Saudi
Government. Bassnan’s wife received a monthly
stipend from Princess Haifa. In a recent search
of Bassnan’s residence, the FBI located copies of
31 cashier checks totaling $74, 000 during a
period of February 22, 1999 to May 30, 2002.
"The FBI has determined that there has been a
standing order on Princess Haifa’s account since
January 1999 to send $2000 a month to Bassnan’s
wife. Bassnan’s wife was allegedly receiving the
funding for “nursing services,” but according to
the [REDACTED] document, there is no evidence of
Bassnan’s wife providing nursing services. [REDACTED].
"On at least one occasion, Bassnan received a
check directly from Prince Bandar’s account.
According to the FBI, on May 14, 1998, Bassman
cashed a check from Bandar in the amount of
$15,000. Bassnan’s wife also received at least one check from Bandar."
As noted in the background above, in 2002,
Bassnan traveled to Houston, Texas. While there,
he reported that his documents were stolen to the
Houston police department. Here is more on that trip from the 28 Pages:
“A CIA report also that Bassnan traveled to
Houston in 2002 and met with individual who was
[REDACTED] …The report states that during the
trip a member of the Saudi Royal Family provided
Bassnan with a significant amount of cash.”
Context: We knew that Bassnan was in Houston on
April 24 2002. What we did not know is that he
actually met with someone of note and that a
member of the Saudi Royal family provided him
with money. Since the document refers to Bandar
as the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, the
person Bassnan met with was someone other than
Bandar, but a royal nonetheless and someone in the circle of the King.
The news at the time describes
<http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a042502houston#a042502houston>the
incident:
"Crown Prince Abdullah, the de facto ruler of
Saudi Arabia, is due to arrive in Houston, Texas,
to meet with President Bush at his ranch in
nearby Crawford, Texas. Abdullah’s entourage is
so large that it fills eight airplanes. As these
planes land, US intelligence learns that one
person on the flight manifests is wanted by US
law enforcement, and two more are on a terrorist
watch list. An informed source will later claim
that the FBI is ready to “storm the plane and
pull those guys off.” However, the State
Department fears an international incident. An
interagency conflict erupts over what to do. The
Wall Street Journal will report in 2003, “Details
about what happened to the three men in the end
are not entirely clear, and no one at [the State
Department] was willing to provide any facts
about the incident. What is clear, though, is
that the three didn’t get anywhere near Crawford,
but were also spared the ’embarrassment’ of
arrest. And the House of Saud was spared an
‘international incident.'”
[<http://opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110004154>Wall
Street Journal, 10/13/2003] The next day, Osama
Basnan, an alleged associate of 9/11 hijackers
Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, reports his
passport stolen to Houston police.
[<http://www.truthout.org/docs_02/11.26A.newswk.911.htm>Newsweek,
11/24/2002] This confirms that Basnan is in
Houston on the same day that Crown Prince
Abdullah, Prince Saud al-Faisal, and Saudi US
Ambassador Prince Bandar meet with President
Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State
Powell, and National Security Adviser Rice at
Bush’s Crawford ranch.
[<http://www.us-saudi-business.org/Press%20Releases/press02.htm#Crown%20Prince%20Abdullah%20Meets%20with%20President%20Bush>US-Saudi
Arabian Business Council, 4/25/2002]."
Analysis: This Houston meeting is a red flag. The
US State Department keeps an online roster of all
visits by foreign dignitaries. Here is the
<https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/visits/2002>list
for 2002. This visit from the King of Saudi
Arabia is not listed. Moreover, everyone who is
listed at Houston meeting is a high level Saudi
as they are all traveling with the King. It is
unclear if the Saudi royal who Bassnan met with
is also the same person who later gave him cash
in Houston as the 28 Pages make it appear as
though these may be two different people.
What we do know is that Bassnan is receiving
money from Bandar, Bandar’s wife and another
Saudi royal who traveled with the King to Houston
in 2002. He also had a Saudi Government job as cover.
Watch Lists Were Ignored
As per the above visit to Houston by the Saudi
Royals and the attempted raid by the FBI that was
stopped by the State Department, it appears that
no fly lists and watch lists were ignored in
relation to the Saudi Royal Family:
"Although his name was on the State Departments’
watchlist, [REDACTED] was apparently able to
circumvent the Customs Service and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service because he
was traveling with the Saudi prince. The FBI only
learned of the trip after the fact. Agents in the
FBI’s Portland Field Office expressed their
concern that [REDACTED] and others were using
their status as Saudi Arabian Airlines employees
as a cover to enable them to transport weapons in
and out of the United States."
Analysis: Just how many Saudi nationals either
traveling for a royal or fronting with Saudi
Arabian Airlines were engaged in criminal
activity as well as possible terrorist activity?
Is this related to the “back off” orders given to
US authorities to stay away from the Saudi Royal
Family? (see background above).
Saleh al-Hussayen
The portion of the 28 Pages that deals with
Hussayen tells us nothing new. The public had
actually learned a great deal more about Hussayen
prior to the release of the 28 pages. For
example, while the 28 Page document notes that
Hussayen stayed at the same hotel as the
hijackers, it does not mention the date of this
incident. We know that Hussayen stayed at the
same hotel as the hijackers on September 10,
2001. We also know that he got a significant
promotion after he returned to Saudi Arabia:
President of the Holy Sites/Mosques (See background above).
"Saleh al-Hussayen. In September 2001, Saleh
al-Hussayen, reportedly a Saudi Interior Ministry
official, stayed at the same hotel in Herndon.
Virginia where al-Hazmi was staying. While
al-Hussayen claimed after September 11 not to
know the hijackers. FBI agents believed he was
being deceptive. He was able to depart the United
States despite FBI efforts to locate and re-interview him;"
Abdullah bin Laden
This section discusses the half brother of Osama
bin Laden. On it’s face, the familial connection
means very little. The bin Laden’s are a
prominent Saudi family with hundreds of members.
They are close to the House of Saud. Here is how the 28 pages describes him:
"Abdullah bin Laden. Abdullah Ladin claims to
work for the Saudi Embassy Washington, DC. as an
administrative officer. He is identified by the
FBI as Osama bin Ladin's half brother."
But, Abdullah bin Laden has connections that raise red flags:
"He is a close friend Quadir-Harumani, a possible
associate of Mohammed Atta and [Marwan]al-Shehhi prior to September 1, 2001."
Context: It is unclear if the above Abdullah is
the
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/12/afghanistan>same
brother discussed here as a sympathetic American
immigrant. This particular reference could be
called the “raw” data that needs additional vetting.
Thumairy
The 28 Pages do not provide any new information
in relation to Thumairy. As with Hussayen, the
public has learned a great deal about Thumairy
outside of the 28 Pages document (see background
above). In context, however, he is the fourth
Saudi government official (Bayoumi, Bassnan and
Hussayen are the other three) to be directly tied
to the hijackers and the Saudi Embassy.
Unnamed Saudi National
According to the 28 Pages, there is an unnamed
person with ties to the Saudi Royal family
(although not mentioned as having ties to the
Saudi government) who was scouting security around the US in 1999:
"Another Saudi national with close ties to the
Saudi Royal Family [REDACTED], is the subject of
FBI counterterrorism investigations and
reportedly was checking security at the United
States southwest border in 1999 and discussing
the possibility of infiltrating individuals into the United States."
Bandar and the Safe House in Pakistan
The below excerpt with regards to Prince Bandar is entirely new information:
"The U.S. Government also located another
Virginia number at Usama Bin Ladin’s safe house
in Pakistan. The number is subscribed to by an
individual named [REDACTED] was interviewed by
the FBI in June, 2002. He could not explain why
his number ended up a safe house in Pakistan, but
stated that he regularly provides services to a
couple who are personal assistants to Prince
Bandar. This couple’s driver is an individual
named [REDACTED], who is assigned to the Saudi
Embassy in DC. According to [REDACTED] regularly
called businesses and frequently travels back and forth to Pakistan."
Analysis: Although the implications are unclear
and do not on their own prove Bandar’s
involvement in terrorism, this revelation adds to
the larger picture of Bandar seeming to have a
very extensive network of relationships connected
to terrorism or suspicious activity.
Abu Zubaydah Connections
Abu Zubaydah is an alleged member of al Qaeda. He
has been held at Gitmo for years and tortured.
There is debate as to his role, if any, in al
Qaeda. You can read more about him
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Zubaydah>here.
The following information is also entirely new
with regard to Bandar. In 2002 Zubaydah was
apprehended in Pakistan, US officials obtained a
phone-book that belonged to him. In that
phone-book were several interesting US numbers.
The excerpt is so striking that it has to be provided in full:
"On March 28, 2002 U.S. and coalition forces
retrieved the telephone book of Abu Zubaida, whom
the US. Government has identified as senior
al-Qa'ida operational coordinator. According to
an FBI document, ‘a review of the telephone troll
records has linked several of the numbers found
in Zubaida's phonebook with U.S. phone numbers.’
"One of the numbers is unlisted and subscribed to
by the ASPCOL Corporation in Aspen, Colorado.
According to the FBI's Denver Office, ASPCOL is
the umbrella corporation that manages the affairs
of the Colorado residence of Prince Bandar. the
Saudi ambassador to the United States.
"The facility is protected by Scimitar Security.
Agents of Denver Field Office noted that neither
ASPCOL nor Scimitar Security is listed in the
phone book or is easily locatable.
"In addition, tho Colorado Secretory of State's
office has no record of ASPCOL."
Analysis: A phone number for a ghost property
management company in Colorado, protected by a
ghost security company in Colorado, is found on a
terrorism suspect/alleged high level al Qaeda
operative in Pakistan. The ghost property
management company manages the private property
of the Saudi Ambassador to the United States.
Again, this on its face proves nothing, but it
once again raises questions about Bandar’s
extensive network of connections to terrorists and suspected terrorists.
The document continues:
“A November 18, 2002 FBI response to the Joint
Inquiry states that “CIA traces have revealed no
direct links between numbers found in Zubaida’s
phone book and numbers in the United States."
Analysis: It is unclear what “traces” means in
this context as Zubaydah was already in US
custody and his capture was already known to
anyone he was in contact with. But assuming that
there is no connection, how is it possible that
this type of coincidence could exist?
What does this number and the “traces” that
discount it have to do with the 9/11 attacks, if
anything? Is there a connection? If not, why is
this information included? If there is a
connection, why is that information not elaborated on?
Another number found in Zubaydah’s phone book is
that of an unnamed bodyguard at the Saudi Embassy
in DC. The document goes onto say that “some
allege” something about the bodyguard, but that
information is entirely redacted. However, later
in the document, the bodyguard is described as
showing up on the FBI radar because of the size
and cost of his home in Virginia and his attempts
to approach US intelligence officials.
A pattern is emerging implicating the Saudi
Embassy in a great deal of activity involving
possible terror suspects and Saudi intelligence
officers. Moreover, that pattern continues to
focus almost exclusively around Bandar and his inner circle.
Dry Run
Another Saudi national named Mohammed
al-Qudhaeein is alleged to have made a possible
“dry run” of entering the cockpit of a US plane.
This is entirely new information and it is striking:
"According to an FBI agent in Phoenix, the FBI
suspects Mohammed al-Qudhaeein of being
[REDACTED]. Al Qudhaeein was involved in a 1999
incident aboard an America West flight, which the
FBI’s Phoenix office now suspects may have been a
‘dry run’ to test airline security. During the
flight, al-Qudhaeein and his associate asked the
flight attendants a variety of suspicious questions.
"Al-Qudhaeein then attempted to enter the cockpit on two occasions.
"Al-Qudhaeein and his associate were flying to
Washington, D.C. to attend a party at the Saudi
Embassy, and both claimed their tickets were paid
for by the Saudi Embassy. During the course of
the investigations, the FBI has discovered that
both al-Qudhaeein and the other individuals
involved in this incident had connections to terrorism."
Analysis: Did the FBI ever finally confirm if the
tickets were indeed paid for by the Saudi Embassy
in the US? What party was this and who was
determined to have invited al-Qudhaeein? What
connections does this man have to terrorism in
general and al Qaeda in particular?
Money Laundering
The 28 Pages document refers to numerous
instances of Saudi government money laundering
through various religious and community
organizations as well as business fronts. It
directly references Al Barakar Trading company.
In this instance, however, the 28 Pages document
misidentifies what is clearly supposed to be Al
Barakat, the same company connected to the Dallah
Avco scandal (see Bayoumi above). But in this
section, there is an interesting tid-bit that was
missing in the earlier Dallah Avco discussion:
"In approximately 1998, the FBI became aware of
millions of dollars in wire transfers from the
Somali community in San Diego to Al Barakaar
Trading Company and other businesses affiliated
with Usama Bin Laden. At the time, the funding
appeared to be originating from the local Somali
community in the form of donations to various
Somali non-profits. However, the FBI now believes
that the some of the funding actually originated
from Saudi Arabia and that both the Ibn Tamiyah
Mosque in Los Angeles and the Islamic Center of
San Diego were involved in laundering the money."
Analysis: This would support the earlier theory
(see Bayoumi above) that Al Barakat was somehow
pressured into acquiring Dallah Avco in order to
provide cover for a front company. This section
of the document makes clear, that the actual
money laundered came from Saudi Arabia and was
laundered not through Al Barakat, but through
local religious organizations in San Diego.
Dallah Avco is entirely written out of this part of the document.
Conclusion
The 28 Pages report is primarily focused on the
San Diego cell of the 9/11 plot, with a few
exceptions. There is no such in depth examination
of Saudi government connections to the other 9/11
hijackers. Consider the case of the
<http://nypost.com/2015/04/12/saudi-role-in-911-being-whitewashed-by-fbi/>al-Hijji
couple.
Yet even just based on the San Diego cell
connections alone, there is concrete proof of
Saudi government funding to the handlers of 9/11
hijackers – handlers who also happen to be Saudi intelligence officers.
1. Prince Bandar is implicated through financial
support and through phone records to the handlers
of the San Diego cell as well as other terrorist
activity in Pakistan and Afghanistan. While some
have argued that his financial support may be
part of the alleged deal that Prince Turki made
with Osama bin Laden (see background), the
channels of funding do not match the alleged
agreement and appear to be operation based rather
than organization based – meaning the funding was
provided toward a specific group of people all
working together on something rather than the broader ideological movement.
Many in the media have said there is no "smoking
gun" in the 28 Pages document. If by smoking gun
they mean the type of evidence that would put
Prince Bandar and Mohammad Atta in the same room
together, then no such smoking gun will ever be
discovered. That is not how intelligence
operatives work. There are middlemen and the US
government has identified five of them by name:
Bayoumi, Bassnan, Hussayen, Thumiary, and
al-Qudhaeein. Four out of the five have Saudi
Government jobs as well as ties to 9/11
hijackers. Four of them also appear to be Saudi
intelligence officers using Saudi Government jobs
as their cover. Two of them received direct
funding from Prince Bandar and Princess Haifa as
well the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation
(run by Prince Bandar’s father). As intelligence
officers of the Saudi Government, they likely got
funding from the GID (run by Prince Bandar’s
brother-in-law/half cousin). One of them got
additional funding by an unidentified Saudi
Prince within the circle of the King. One of them
reported directly to Bandar in his capacity as a
Saudi Consulate employee. Three of them are tied
through phone calls to the Saudi Embassy and
other Saudi Government departments. All of them
were protected by the Saudi Government. Add to
this the several unnamed individuals who are
linked to both the Saudi Embassy and the
hijackers. Moreover, connections to Bandar appear
in several terrorist suspect’s phonebooks.
Finally, Bandar’s promotion to the head of the
GID in the three years after the 9/11 attacks
also adds context. All of this together is a
smoking gun that links one of the key Saudi
Government officials and one of the highest
ranking members of the Saudi Royal Family to
terrorist activity. While this evidence does not
prove that Bandar was involved in the 9/11 plot
or even aware of it, it is enough evidence to warrant naming him a suspect.
2. Bayoumi, Bassnan, Hussayen, Thumiary and
Qudhaeein as well as Abdullah (see Bayoumi in 28
Pages section above) should all be named as
suspects and co-conspirators in the attacks of
the 9/11. Along with the 15 hijackers of Saudi
nationality, these six men make a total of 21
Saudi nationals involved either knowingly or
unknowingly in the largest attack on US soil.
3. The Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation is
implicated in supporting the handlers of the 9/11
hijackers financially and structurally. While
some may argue that the funding from the Ministry
of Defense is part of protection money paid by
Saudi Arabia via Prince Turki’s agreement (see
background above), the financials are outside of
the perimeters of the alleged agreement.
Moreover, all of the human resources, covers,
documents, etc., provided for the 9/11 hijackers
show support for a specific operation rather than
a larger, ideological movement.
4. Prince Sultan as head of the Ministry of
Defense and Aviation may have not know what
Bayoumi was up to, but he certainly had to have
known who Bayoumi was. Moreover, since Sultan was
not only head of the a Saudi Government agency
that financed Bayoumi, but is also the father of
Bandar – who in turn also financed Bayoumi – it
defies logic that the two men had never discussed
Bayoumi or questioned his activities. Sultan’s
promotion as the Crown Prince in 2005 also
appears to provide context. There is enough
evidence to warrant naming Prince Sultan a person
of interest in the attacks of 9/11.
5. The Saudi GID is implicated in supporting the
9/11 plot financially and structurally. Four
Saudi intelligence officers have been identified
as part of the plot to fund, train, and acclimate
the hijackers to American society. All four were
provided with Saudi Government cover jobs. Two
were allegedly provided with falsified documents
by the Saudi Government Two additional suspected
Saudi intelligence officers were tied to two
different incidents of casing/dry run. In
addition, there is the matter of al-Hajjii, not
named in the 28 Pages (or referenced, but
redacted). That brings the total of known and
suspected Saudi intelligence operatives to seven,
in addition to the Saudi hijackers. All of these
men were paid by the Saudi intelligence
apparatus, which reported directly to Prince
Turki. While not named directly in the 28 page
report, the role of the GID is clear. There is
enough evidence to warrant naming Prince Turki a
suspect in the attacks of 9/11.
5. An unnamed Saudi Royal provided funding to
Bassnan. This person should be named a person of interest.
6. The Saudi Government’s refusal to share
intelligence before 9/11 as well makes them a
questionable ally. But their refusal to make
available all of the suspects as well as protect
the highest members of the Saudi Royal Family who
may or may not be involved (although should be
named suspects), makes them conspirators after
the fact. The Saudi Government’s refusal to allow
civil action against key suspects by the victims
of the 9/11 attacks and their families
demonstrates that Saudi Arabia is not an ally of
the American people. The Saudi Government’s
threats of undermining of US currency should the
victims of 9/11 be allowed to take civil action
further underscore that they are no friend or ally to the United States.
US Coverup and Protection of the Saudi Government – Why?
1. The FBI continues to
<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/05/12/the-fbi-is-keeping-80-000-secret-files-on-the-saudis-and-9-11.html>withhold
more than 80,000 classified pages relating to the
Saudis and the attacks of 9/11. Why?
2. The Bush administration allowed for the
unprecedented evacuation of Saudi nationals,
including persons of interest to investigators, in the days after 9/11. Why?
3.
<http://nypost.com/2016/04/17/how-us-covered-up-saudi-role-in-911/>All
attempts to detain, question or investigate (and
in some cases, attempts to charge) Saudi
nationals with connections to the 9/11 attacks
were shut down by the White House of the Bush Administration. Why?
4. All attempts to conduct a formal public
investigation into the 9/11 attacks were thwarted
by the Bush administration, who finally conceded
after public pressure and even then, would only
alot a pittance for the funding. See
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RmHPfXemf10>this documentary. Why?
5. All attempts to bury the Saudi role and the
<https://28pages.org/2016/07/14/cheney-advisor-led-effort-to-kill-gop-platform-plank-on-28-pages/>documents
related to it as well as to whitewash the
findings by the Bush and Obama administration. Why?
6. The US naming the government of Saudi Arabia
as an ally on the war on terror and then
attacking Iraq, which had no ties to 9/11 or al
Qaeda, was diabolical given what we now know. Why did this happen?
Larisa Alexandrovna Horton is an award-winning
investigative reporter, formerly with RawStory.com and the Huffington Post.
http://original.antiwar.com/larisa-alexandrovna/2016/07/20/28-pages-explained/
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