http://www.realclearpolitics.com/2017/03/20/out_of_time_in_n
orth_korea_405513.html



Out of time in North Korea

20 Mar 2017|Richard N. Haass
<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/author/richard-n-haass/>

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There is a growing consensus that the first genuine crisis of Donald
Trump’s presidency could involve North Korea and, more specifically, its
ability to place a nuclear warhead on one or more ballistic missiles
possessing sufficient range and accuracy to reach the continental United
States. A crisis could stem from other factors as well: a large increase in
the number of nuclear warheads that North Korea produces, evidence that it
is selling nuclear materials to terrorist groups, or some use of its
conventional military forces against South Korea or US forces stationed
there.

There is no time to lose: any of these developments could occur in a matter
of months or at most years. Strategic patience, the approach toward North
Korea that has characterised successive US administrations since the early
1990s, has run its course.

One option would be simply to accept as inevitable continued increases in
the quantity and quality of North Korea’s nuclear and missile inventories.
The US, South Korea, and Japan would fall back on a combination of missile
defence and deterrence.

The problem is that missile defence is imperfect, and deterrence is
uncertain. The only certainty is that the failure of either would result in
unimaginable costs. In these circumstances, Japan and South Korea might
reconsider whether they, too, require nuclear weapons, raising the risk of
a new and potentially destabilising arms race in the region.

A second set of options would employ military force, either against a
gathering North Korean threat or one judged to be imminent. One problem
with this approach is uncertainty as to whether military strikes could
destroy all of the North’s missiles and warheads. But even if they could,
North Korea would probably retaliate with conventional military forces
against South Korea. Given that Seoul and US troops stationed in South
Korea are well within range of thousands of artillery pieces, the toll in
lives and physical damage would be immense. The new South Korean government
(which will take office in two months) is sure to resist any action that
could trigger such a scenario.

Some therefore opt for regime change, hoping that a different North Korean
leadership might prove to be more reasonable. It probably would; but, given
how closed North Korea is, bringing about such an outcome remains more wish
than serious policy.

This brings us to diplomacy. The US could offer (following close
consultations with the governments in South Korea and Japan, and ideally
against the backdrop of additional United Nations resolutions and economic
sanctions) direct negotiations with North Korea. Once talks commenced, the
US side could advance a deal: North Korea would have to agree to freeze its
nuclear and missile capabilities, which would require cessation of all
testing of both warheads and missiles, along with access to international
inspectors to verify compliance. The North would also have to commit not to
sell any nuclear materials to any other country or organisation.

In exchange, the US and its partners would offer, besides direct talks, the
easing of sanctions. The US and others could also agree to sign—more than
60 years after the end of the Korean War—a peace agreement with the North.

North Korea (in some ways like Iran) could keep its nuclear option but be
barred from translating it into a reality. Concerns over North Korea’s many
human-rights violations would not be pressed at this time, although the
country’s leaders would understand that there could be no normalisation of
relations (or end of sanctions) so long as repression remained the norm.
Full normalisation of ties would also require North Korea giving up its
nuclear weapons program.

At the same time, the US should limit how far it is willing to go. There
can be no end to regular US-South Korean military exercises, which are a
necessary component of deterrence and potential defence, given the military
threat posed by the North. For the same reason, any limits on US forces in
the country or region would be unacceptable. And any negotiation must take
place within a fixed time period, lest North Korea use that time to create
new military facts.

Could such an approach succeed? The short answer is ‘maybe.’ China’s stance
would likely prove critical. Chinese leaders have no love for Kim Jong-un’s
regime or its nuclear weapons, but it dislikes even more the prospect of
North Korea’s collapse and the unification of the Korean Peninsula with
Seoul as the capital.

The question is whether China (the conduit by which goods enter and leave
North Korea) could be persuaded to use its considerable influence with its
neighbor. The US should offer some reassurances that it would not exploit
Korea’s reunification for strategic advantage, while warning China of the
dangers North Korea’s current path poses to its own interests. Continued
conversations with China about how best to respond to possible scenarios on
the peninsula clearly make sense.

Again, there is no guarantee that diplomacy would succeed. But it might.
And even if it failed, demonstrating that a good-faith effort had been made
would make it less difficult to contemplate, carry out, and subsequently
explain to domestic and international audiences why an alternative policy,
one that included the use of military force, was embraced.




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