Thank Allah it didn't happen....
The uprisings of 2011 have transformed the Arab world. Long-standing
regimes – such as those in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya – have fallen or been
radically transformed; elsewhere countries like Yemen, Bahrain and Syria
face profound domestic challenges. For non-Arab regional actors the impact
of these events is less clear. The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are at
a standstill, Israel is more preoccupied with Iran than the Arab world and
for its part Iran’s regional equilibrium has been severely impacted as
events in Syria have altered the relative positions of its key allies.
Whereas Turkey seemed at the heart of events in the region a year earlier,
*[i]* <http://muftah.org/a-turkish-model-for-the-arab-spring/#_edn1> the
events of 2011 have returned the Arab world to centrality, potentially
returning Turkey to the periphery. Yet, as a consequence of Turkey’s
earlier policy of renewed engagement, the country continues to influence
the trajectory of events, although less directly.
Against the backdrop of Turkey’s recently acquired higher profile in the
Middle East, the country’s relevance to the course of the Arab uprisings
has at least two dimensions. First, Turkey has been identified both locally
and internationally as a potential paradigm for democratic change in the
Arab world. In particular, the capacity of the Turkish political system to
conduct democratic elections with the participation of a moderately
Islamist political party has occasioned renewed interest in the country as
a potentially viable local model for democratization.
Second, as a regional actor in its own right, Turkey is actively developing
new policies—sometimes at odds with its Western allies. The much touted
Turkish policy of “zero problems” in the region, its efforts to create a
free trade zone with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, and even its increasingly
strained relationship with Israel have all required adaptation over the
course of 2011. In this short essay, I examine both dimensions of Turkey’s
role—the potential influence of the model represented by the domestic
Turkish political balance, and the country’s response to a changing Arab
context.
*Turkey as Model*
The core agenda of popular uprisings across the region have been demands
for political freedom, accountability, anti-corruption and economic
justice. The popular view of Turkey in the region is that its record on
some of these issues is better than much of the Arab world. What is less
clearly understood, however, is the long process of staggered progress
towards democratization – replete with repression and reversal – that has
produced the contemporary (contingent) Turkish political balance.
The overall trajectory of Turkish policy towards the Arab uprisings has
been centered on four principles: the support of popular demands for
political and economic reform; the condemnation of regime violence; a
preference for non-violent, negotiated transitions; and last, the rejection
of external military intervention. In keeping with this trajectory, the
initial Turkish response to the spread of demonstrations across the region
was supportive of the uprisings. Turkey’s steadfast support for Egyptian
protesters, for instance, went so far as to irk Western allies.*[xv]*
<http://muftah.org/a-turkish-model-for-the-arab-spring/#_edn15> Of course,
the Turkish prime minister’s demand—ahead of other world leaders—that
Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak step down may have reflected, in part, the country’s
regional rivalry with Egypt for influence in the Levant.*[xvi]*
<http://muftah.org/a-turkish-model-for-the-arab-spring/#_edn16> However, it
was also consistent with Ankara’s broader policy in favor of non-violent
democratic opposition movements elsewhere in the region.
In the context of the Arab uprisings, Turkey’s reinterpretation of its
“zero problems” posture has been to shift the focus from building alliances
with neighboring Arab regimes, to seeking good relations with both the
people and the regimes of the region. For instance, in Turkey’s evolving
relations with Egypt and Tunisia, Ankara has sought to identify particular
factions within each country to engage with beyond the transitional
governments now in place.*[xvii]*
<http://muftah.org/a-turkish-model-for-the-arab-spring/#_edn17> Elsewhere,
however, developments have demonstrated the limits of Turkey’s leverage
over erstwhile regional allies. Turkey’s relatively positive relations with
countries like Libya and Syria left the country wrong-footed as these
regimes violently cracked down on domestic opponents. Although Turkey
maintained its stance of supporting indigenous protest movements in
2011—including those against the Qaddafi and Assad regimes—initially, it
was more cautious in issuing public demands for authoritarian leaders to
step down. Fears of the destabilizing consequences of intervention, along
with the conviction that military force rarely serves humanitarian ends,
fueled this cautious approach. On the other hand, the much more aggressive
posture that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took towards the
Syrian regime beginning in the latter half of 2011 suggests that the
caution initially exhibited in the Libyan case may have now been sidelined.
*[xviii]* <http://muftah.org/a-turkish-model-for-the-arab-spring/#_edn18>
Much of Turkey’s influence in the Arab world has been premised on soft
power – particularly its ability to build on long-standing cultural ties to
develop trade and investment relationships with neighbouring states. The
question that the Arab uprisings pose is whether such influence remains
viable or pertinent under the current conditions of regional upheaval. In
response to this question, were Turkey to successfully move beyond trade
and regional diplomacy to a politics of soft power centered on democracy,
human rights and the rule of law, its influence might even be enhanced. But
in the past decade, the strategy of building positive relations based on
economic cooperation with previously hostile regimes meant downplaying
these values, or at most advancing them indirectly. Davutoğlu’s reasoning
was that economic integration would create the conditions for peace and
stability in the Middle East, from which political reform would follow.
*[xix]* <http://muftah.org/a-turkish-model-for-the-arab-spring/#_edn19> The
Arab uprisings have inverted such arguments concerning the sequencing of
reforms, by placing the political reforms ahead of economic ones.
*Conclusion: A Turkish Fall in the Arab Spring?*
Some Western and Arab analysts have concluded that the Arab uprisings
signal the decline of Turkish influence in the region. They argue that
Turkey’s “neo-Ottoman” approach to the region has fallen victim to the
changes driven by Arab publics rather than non-Arab regional actors. In
response to the protest movements across the region, such critics argue,
Turkish diplomacy has been “downright clumsy.”*[xx]*
<http://muftah.org/a-turkish-model-for-the-arab-spring/#_edn20> They accuse
Turkey of having invested in its relationship not with the people of these
countries “but with brutal leaders such as Bashar al-Assad and Muammar
al-Qaddafi.”*[xxi]*
<http://muftah.org/a-turkish-model-for-the-arab-spring/#_edn21>
Most of these claims overlook Turkey’s humanitarian and diplomatic support
to both Libyan and Syrian civil society, whether in the form of hosting
opposition meetings or sheltering refugees and providing humanitarian aid.
In truth, Turkey’s objections to internationalizing the Libyan conflict,
and its current posture towards Syria, reflect an initially
anti-interventionist stance that has given way to an increasing appetite
for more direct forms of protection for civilians. Although this approach
did not always sit well with regional and external actors who immediately
favored the isolation and ouster of these regimes—or even with those who
would prefer restabilizing autocratic rule—the trajectory taken by Turkish
policy has been consistent with the country’s objectives to use soft power
to promote both reform and stability in the region. Once that approach was
visibly exhausted, as in Syria, Turkey has joined – and at times even led –
the regional approach to pressure the Assad regime more directly through
isolation, sanctions and perhaps ultimately other forms of pressure.
The containment strategy that the U.S. and Saudi favor*[xxii]*
<http://muftah.org/a-turkish-model-for-the-arab-spring/#_edn22>—evidenced
by support of counter-revolution in Bahrain and Yemen, intervention in
Libya, the rejection of Palestinian reconciliation and muted confrontation
in Syria—suggests that Turkey’s approach will in some instances remain at
odds with one of its most important allies. But even as the desirability of
Turkey’s role in the region diminishes from the American perspective (and
this, too, experiences reversals, as with U.S. support for Turkey’s Syria
policy), it has been enhanced elsewhere in the region. The Turkish
honeymoon with the Arab world was first apparent following Erdoğan’s 2009
denunciation of the Israeli attack on Gaza,*[xxiii]*
<http://muftah.org/a-turkish-model-for-the-arab-spring/#_edn23> and it was
cemented by Ankara’s tacit support for a humanitarian challenge to the
blockade of Gaza a year later.*[xxiv]*
<http://muftah.org/a-turkish-model-for-the-arab-spring/#_edn24> For a
period of time, opinion surveys in the Arab world consistently ranked
Erdoğan as one of the region’s most popular leaders.*[xxv]*
<http://muftah.org/a-turkish-model-for-the-arab-spring/#_edn25> Turkey’s
position on Syria has had a more distinctly sectarian appearance,
occasioning ambivalence in the region— a departure from this earlier
popularity, but not necessarily a reversal.
In the long run, Turkey’s interests lie in forging relations with
legitimate and stable governments that enjoy indigenous support and are
responsive to the democratic aspirations of their people. Turkey may not
represent a model that Arab protesters should follow in crafting their own
democratic transitions, but it may prove a valuable ally for the
post-authoritarian regimes that will hopefully emerge from the Arab
uprisings.
http://muftah.org/a-turkish-model-for-the-arab-spring/#.WPTQ1k2GOpo
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