Obama and Guantánamo
By Don Knowland
21 November 2008

During his presidential campaign, Barack Obama pledged to close the
infamous prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba and try detainees charged with
crimes in American courts rather than in military commissions. Obama
reiterated his intention to close Guantánamo in an appearance on the
“60 Minutes” television program last Sunday, but he and his
spokespeople have been less than forthcoming about what will be done
with the 250 prisoners still housed at the prison.


Around 80 of them have been deemed eligible for trial under the
military commissions established by the US Congress in the 2006
Military Commissions Act. Some 125 prisoners fall into a no-man’s land—
they are considered too dangerous to release but not guilty enough to
prosecute. The remaining 50 or so have been cleared for release or
transfer, but in many cases returning them to their home countries may
subject them to further incarceration or torture.


An article appearing in the November 14 New York Times reported that
within the Obama camp there is an intense debate on these matters.
According to the Times, “people with ties to the Obama transition team
say [what] is worrying them most: What if some detainees are acquitted
or cannot be prosecuted at all?”


This is a reference to those whose prosecutions are irretrievably
tainted by alleged confessions or testimony obtained through torture
or other coercive means, or regarding whom specific evidence of war
crimes is otherwise sorely lacking.


According to the Times, “even some liberals” are pushing the new
administration to seek congressional authority for preventive
detention of terrorism suspects deemed too dangerous to release, even
if they cannot be successfully prosecuted. The Times quotes Ken Gude,
a national security scholar at the liberal Center for American
Progress, who says that the introduction of preventive detention and
other issues related to the handling of alleged terrorist detainees
and terrorist suspects has inspired “a very hot and serious debate.”


A new law authorizing preventive detentions would be fully in line
with Bush administration policy and practice. In July Bush’s attorney
general, Michael Mukasey, called on Congress to pass a new law
reaffirming that the US remains in a state of “armed conflict,” and
that for the duration of that conflict the president may detain as
enemy combatants those who have “engaged in hostilities or
purposefully supported Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated
organizations.”


In 2004, the US Supreme Court accepted the Bush administration’s
assertion of the power to detain so-called “enemy combatants.” The
ruling, which accepted as legitimate a “war on terror” with no limits
as to time or geography and never formally declared by Congress, cited
international laws of war that uphold the authority to governments to
hold captured enemy fighters until the completion of a conflict. But
the court at that time rejected the Bush administration’s attempt to
deny detainees the right under the Geneva Conventions to appear before
a tribunal to challenge the classification.


The US Congress twice passed laws revoking the authority of American
courts to hear habeas corpus challenges to government detention filed
by alleged enemy combatants. But in 2007 the Supreme Court ruled that
detainees had a constitutional right to a habeas corpus challenge to
an enemy combatant status determination, and that the Combatant Status
Review Tribunals (CSRTs) set up by the US military to make such
determinations were insufficient for due process purposes.


In practice, the CSRTs had prevented detainees from gaining access to
lawyers and deprived them of an opportunity to present evidence or
witnesses in their defense or to see or hear classified evidence
against them. In 2007, US intelligence veteran Lt. Col. Stephen
Abraham, who worked on the tribunals, denounced them as nothing more
than a front to rubber-stamp the military’s prior designation of
detainees as enemy combatants.


The overwhelming majority of detainees had been brought in as a result
of bounties paid by the US military in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many
had no Taliban or Al Qaeda connection at all, or had only tangential
connections.


After several detainees were found not to be enemy combatants, the
military eliminated that innocence option and began requiring the term
“no longer an enemy combatant” for those held for no apparent reason.
Annual Administrative Review Boards (ARBs), the successors to the
CSRTs, whose stated aim was to determine whether the prisoners still
constituted a threat to the US, rapidly dispensed with the claim that
prisoners were “no longer enemy combatants.”


According to British journalist Andy Worthington, who has carefully
followed Guántanamo developments, of 207 prisoners approved to leave
Guantánamo after the first three rounds of the ARBs, only 14 were
regarded as “no longer enemy combatants.” The rest were still
explicitly regarded as “enemy combatants” who were approved only for
transfer from Guantánamo—to continued custody in their home country or
a third country.


In voting against the 2006 Military Commissions Act, Senator Obama
told Congress that it did not allow detainees a fair opportunity to
prove their innocence and did not develop a system of justice to sort
out suspected terrorists from those accidentally accused. He stated at
the time: “We have a bill that gives the terrorist mastermind of 9/11
his day in a [military commission] court, but not the innocent people
we may have accidentally rounded up and mistaken for terrorists—people
who may stay in prison for the rest of their lives.”


But Obama’s transition team is now considering a law to grant
statutory authority to detain persons indefinitely through an
unspecified review process.


The short rejoinder to any attempt to authorize indefinite detention
by law is that after upwards of seven years of detention, if someone
cannot be proven guilty of actual terrorism or other criminal acts by
means consistent with basic due process, there is no legal
justification to detain him further.


In July Attorney General Mukasey also asked Congress for a law that
would funnel detainee habeas corpus challenges into a special court
that would, among other things, bar bringing detainees into US
courtrooms for hearings and shield classified evidence from the
detainee and his counsel. Such an approach could also conceivably
include placing the burden of proving innocence on the detainee rather
than the government, and curtailment of the right to appeal. The
behind-the-scenes discussion in Obama’s transition team is likely
exploring similar approaches.


While the military commissions have been so widely discredited that
Obama may feel impelled to junk them in order to curry favor with
international opinion, it is likely that an alternative special court
is being considered to try such charges. That is an approach Attorney
General Mukasey floated during his Senate confirmation hearings last
year.


Raised here is a serious threat—the establishment of a parallel court
system, a national security court, where normal constitutional
guarantees are denied in the interests of government secrecy and the
so-called “war on terror.”


In practice, military commission prosecutions thus far have proven to
be a fiasco for the government. In the first case brought to trial
this summer, a military jury acquitted Osama Bin Laden’s driver and US
citizen Yaser Salim Hamdi of a conspiracy charge, instead convicting
him of a lesser charge of supporting terrorism. The jury handed out a
five-and-a-half-year sentence rather than the 30 years the government
prosecutor requested, with credit for the five years he has already
been detained. That prompted the Defense Department to threaten to
continue to hold Hamdi as an enemy combatant after his sentence was
served.


The second trial, of alleged Bin Laden bodyguard and video
propagandist Ali Hamza al-Bahlul, resulted in a life sentence in
October. But the entire case rested solely on prosecution evidence,
since al-Bahlul sat silently in protest. His appointed lawyer, Maj.
David Frakt, was bound by ethical requirements to honor his client’s
wishes, so he also refrained from participating at trial. The jury
never heard the defendant’s allegations that he had been tortured, nor
his counsel’s contention that al-Bahlul was not an operational
combatant and had no role in planning or carrying out terrorist
activities.


A year ago, chief prosecutor Colonel Morris Davis resigned because he
concluded that “full, fair and open trials were not possible” under
the deeply politicized system in place. Lt. Col. Darrel Vandeveld, the
prosecutor in the case of Afghani Mohamed Jawad, who claims his
confession to throwing a grenade at two US soldiers when he was a
juvenile was extracted through torture, also recently resigned.
Vandeveld blistered the system as one designed to prevent disclosure
of essential defense evidence.


In Jawad’s case, this included suppression of evidence that Jawad was
drugged before the attack and that two other men had confessed to the
act. To avoid further charges from Vandeveld, the government then
dropped charges against five other prisoners he was prosecuting.


Other incidents have further laid bare the farcical nature of the
military commission proceedings. In the case of Canadian Omar Khadr,
the Pentagon removed the trial judge because he had made rulings
favorable to the defense. Air Force Brig. General Thomas Hartmann, the
legal advisor to Susan Crawford, the Defense Department appointee
overseeing the military commissions, was “reassigned” after three
military judges removed him from any role in the Hamdan, Jawad and
Khadr cases due to his naked pro-prosecution basis.


Hartmann is now subject to investigations by the Air Force and the
Defense Department’s Office of the Inspector General for trying to ram
trials though on absurdly short time frames and for pushing the use of
evidence obtained through torture over objections from prosecutors.


The list could go on.


The procedures Congress enacted in 2006 for conducting the
prosecutions further lay bare the absence of fundamental guarantees of
fairness. These include restrictions on public access to the trial
proceedings and defense access to allegedly sensitive evidence and
witnesses, and the discretionary use of coerced and hearsay testimony.


It is not unlikely that the Obama administration will take steps to
rehabilitate the commission process in the eyes of the world. But
those with illusions that he intends to repeal the Military
Commissions Act outright or to give all the accused the full panoply
of rights accorded criminal defendants in regular American courts are
likely to be badly disappointed

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