From: *Travis*
Date: Fri, May 22, 2009
Subject: The Terrorist Recognition Handbook - TERRORIST CELLS
The Terrorist Recognition Handbook
Published January 17th, 2008
Malcolm Nance
Can you spot a terrorist? Do you know the signs of a bomb plot in the
making? *The Terrorist Recognition Handbook*, by Malcom Nance, a 20-year
veteran of the U.S. intelligence community, gives answers.
It is truly a manual for predicting and identifying terrorist activities.
Scheduled to be published by Taylor & Francis/CRC Press of Boca Raton, FL,
in April, 2008, the book provides professionals and interested parties with
an invaluable training tool on how to identify an attack; how to mitigate
damage from successful attacks; and how to recognize the various stages of
developing terrorist plots.
Nance writes from experience. He has spent 17 years deploying on
anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism intelligence operations in the Balkans,
Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa in direct support to the Special
Operations Command as well as assignments at the principle agencies of the
Intelligence Community.
*GSN: Government Security News* obtained an advanced copy of *The Terrorist
Recognition Handbook* from Taylor & Francis, which generously granted
permission to publish the following excerpt.
*“A TERRORIST CELL”*
Terrorist cells are secret, small teams of terrorists who operate as a group
on orders of a commander or independently. The cell is the fundamental unit
of a terrorist group. Cell operations and their members are the least
identifiable part of terrorism. Their operations are always in secret and
never seen, until they attack.
Cells are often referred to by other names in a terrorist organization’s
communications and statements. Depending on the group and its national
origin, cells may be referred to as “Fronts,” “Commandos,” “Groupos,” and
“Wings.” The Irish Republican Army called cells “Active Service Units” and
in Sri Lanka the Tamil Tigers call their cells “Cadres.” Many terrorist
groups will name their cells after slain members; for example, Germany’s Red
Army Faction.”Gudrun Essenlin Commando.”
*TYPES OF TERRORIST CELLS*
*Command and Control Cell* – Comprise external or internal supervisors who
make final decisions and supervise execution of attack. They may be the
leader of or participant in one of the below listed cells.
*Tactical Operations Cell *– The team or person that actually carries out
the act of terrorism. Also known as combat cells, attack cell, action teams
or operational cells.
*Intelligence Cell *– Collects data, makes recommendations, selects targets
and provides information to hit the target.
*Logistics Cell* – People who are organized to provide supplies or support
to the other cells. May include bomb-makers, black marketers, doctors,
lawyers, bankers, couriers and others needed in an emergency. Also referred
to as the auxiliary cell, support cell or assistance cell. (Note that
terrorist groups don’t refer to themselves using the above listed terms.
NATO military chain-of-command terms are used to standardize the levels of
involvement by terrorists.)
*OTHER TYPES OF CELLS *
*Combined Cell *– A combined cell is a team of terrorists so small it must
perform all the functions of the four cells named above. The Al Qaeda
organization often uses combined cells to maximize its manpower.
*Sleeper Cell *– Any one of the above types of cells that infiltrates a
geographical region and lays dormant until activated for a mission. Sleeper
cells are distinguished by their ability to blend into their surroundings
until given orders to carry out their mission. Once activated, of course,
the cell is no longer a “sleeper.”
Cells may operate independently or in coordination with each other,
depending upon their mission.
*OPERATIVE MEMBERSHIP POOLS*
Terrorist groups must draw operatives from a body of manpower known as a
pool. Pools of manpower come in two forms: open and closed pools.
Closed Pools of operatives are professional or dedicated terrorists that are
consistently used by the leadership. These members are active cadre and
supporters chosen for skills and reliability. They are generally a known
number of personnel and may be the heart of the terrorist group. Smaller
groups have used this system successfully and were only degraded through
arrest or death of the operatives. The German terrorist group Red Army
Faction lost its last two closed pool operatives in 1999 with the arrest of
Andreas Klumpf and death of Horst-Ludwig Meyer in a SWAT raid. The group is
now considered defunct.
Open Pools of operatives rely on active cadre and field leadership to
recruit lower level operatives and train them to support their missions.
These core personnel do not have to risk themselves completely and can form
new cells as necessary. Al Qaeda uses this system.
*TERRORIST CELL SIZE *
The number of cells, the number of operatives per cell and the group’s
overall structure depend upon several factors:
*• Group Skill *– Better groups use small cells of three to five people.
Unskilled groups use larger numbers of people. Al Qaeda, a professional
group, prefers to use large cells of four to 10 men, but independent to
create their own cells. Blood connected groups such as criminally-bent
families also tend to use larger cells. The larger the group, the greater
the chance of compromise.
*• Mission Risk *– If the mission is high-risk, smaller numbers of
operatives may be more effective. The more permissive the environment --
that is, the easier it is for operatives to move around and carry out their
tasks -- the more people may be involved without jeopardizing an operation.
*• Manpower* – Some groups make deliberate decisions to limit the cell size
for reasons mentioned above; others simply don’t have enough manpower and
are forced to work with the few people they have.
*• Money *– Limited resources may also limit the number of operatives
carrying out a mission. Well-funded groups like Al Qaeda may be able to
finance dozens of terrorists simultaneously.
*HOW CELLS AND LEADERSHIP COMMUNICATE*
Cells communicate with leadership and/or with each other in two methods:
Direct and Indirect.
*Direct communications* offer surety that the message is received and
mistakes are minimized. The liabilities are that it is the least secure and
can be compromised through arrest or infiltration by agents. The methods of
direct communications are:
*• Face-to-Face Meeting with Known Persons* – A dangerous but often
necessary method of communication. Newer groups, who are just beginning to
establish communications, or groups whose loyalties can be assured by
members, use face-to-face meetings as a way of definitively confirming a
person’s identity and the authenticity of the communication. If an
illegitimate infiltrator is discovered, the group can hold, interrogate and
even eliminate him or her. Groups without blood ties or extremely strong
ideological ties are more susceptible to infiltration, defection and arrest
of members, which could compromise the entire organization.
*• Face-to-Face Meetings using Anonymous Names* – This method of
communication involves face-to-face meetings between strangers, identified
to each other only by code names or noms de guerre. Some groups, including
Al Qaeda and Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), use this system in training
schools and during operations. Their members are identified only by code
names such as Abu Jihad or Abu Saif, not their real names.
*Indirect Communications* offer maximum security and difficulty to
intercept, but increased opportunity for errors. Messages can be lost,
misinterpreted or broken if a member or system is destroyed or lost. The
indirect method requires an elaborate “lost communications” procedure and
follow-in security checks.
*• “Cut-out” Communications *– Communication through cut-out is an age-old
form of indirect communications and security technique that allows the
leadership to deliver orders to the operative securely. A cut-out is a
courier or a trusted agent who serves as a courier between two people who
may not know one another. In recruiting, the cell member is typically
recruited by a reliable supporter of the organization, who places him or her
in indirect communication with the commander generally through secure
messages. The recruiter never sees the operative again, and the cell member
receives orders from an unknown commander appointed above him. These orders
are delivered to the operative via various secretive methods. Often,
messages are in code and may be concealed by embedding in books, newspapers
and other written documents. This system generally goes undetected, but the
terrorist operative must follow orders from people whose legitimacy he
cannot confirm. The main strength of a cut-out system is the inability of
operatives, if they are arrested, to identify other group members. This
minimizes the damage caused to the organization by the compromise of one
individual or one cell.
*• Cut-out through Electronic Systems *– The same indirect communications
principle described above is used, but electronic media serve as the
channels of communication -- such as secure Internet chat rooms or telephone
conversations.
*• Mail Drop* – This is a method where the postal system or electronic mail
delivery is used to send and receive communications. Regular post or
delivery services can be used to deliver written mail, floppy disks, memory
chips or SIM cards, all of which may or may not be encrypted in order to
send or receive orders. Authentication may be done by code-words or
passwords that are sent via separate secret communications.
*• Dead Drop* – This is a method where information is left at a pre-arranged
location known only to the group members.
*TERRORIST COMMAND AND CONTROL *C2) CELLS*
Some groups may use a supervisory team that operates and commands its
subordinate cells. Other groups go so far as to dispatch field leadership
officers to check up on the status of the operation and provide the other
cell leaders with mission support. Both are called a Command and Control
(C2) Cell. The C2 cell generally contains two to three terrorists in the
following roles:
*Operative in Charge (OIC)* – Serves as the overall mission commander as
well as the tactical operations cell leader. May be near the target during
the attack or observe from a distance.
*Assistant Operative in Charge (AOIC)* – A deputy assisting the OIC in
executing the mission. Driver/Messenger - Supports the OIC and AOIC in
movement and communications with leaders and other cells.
*TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CELL*
This cell provides the eyes and ears of the terrorist organization. It is
extremely important because its members conduct target selection -- they
decide who or what will be attacked; when an attack will be carried out; and
the most effective means for doing so.
Typically, “Intel” cell members are the most experienced members of the
organization. Once surveillance has been conducted and tactical decisions
made, the cell creates a briefing package for both the senior and field
terrorist leadership. When the decision to strike is made, it is then passed
on to the tactical operations cell. The package describes the plans and
feasibility of the attack to the terrorist leadership and is usually
delivered via courier.
The intelligence cell rarely participates in an attack because its members
would risk being identified -- that is, if counter-surveillance efforts
picked up their repeated presence at a given location. Occasionally, they do
participate; Al Qaeda used a combined cell in the bombing of the American
embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, in which an intelligence cell member helped carry
out the attack. His involvement later helped to identify one of the
surviving terrorists and to break the rest of the cell.
*Cell Leader*
• An experienced terrorist
• Highly trusted, “leads from the front”
• Actively participates in collecting information
• Responsible for security of the cell
• Reports only to a designated superior or directly to the organization’s
leadership
*Surveillance Team*
The surveillance team observes and reports on targets they may wish to
attack. Skilled groups use dedicated, highly-trained people for this task.
• Combined groups may use logistics cell personnel or non-terrorist
supporters for surveillance.
• May be a single individual.
• Unlikely to use handheld radios to communicate with other members when
actively conducting surveillance. More likely to use cell phones or report
verbally after surveillance is completed.
• Identifiable by position and behavior.
• Look for the “four sames”: same type of people, in the same place, at the
same time of day, doing the same activity.
• Look for behaviors that, at first glance, might appear normal, but may be
out of context. For example, a couple picnicking near a lake next to a
nuclear power plant may appear normal, but picnicking every day for a week,
or an absence of food, makes this activity suspicious.
*Photography Team*
• Usually one or two people, male or female.
• Identifiable by behavior; people using still or video cameras, overtly or
discreetly.
• Films subjects not typically photographed by tourists, such as embassies,
building entrances and exits, security personnel, and so on.
*Penetration Team *
• This may be an intelligence cell or tactical operations cell member who
has received the proper penetration information. Therefore, all penetration
attempts need to be evaluated as the start of a real attack.
• Enters target area for surveillance purposes.
• Usually one or two people, male or female.
• No radio communications until mission is complete. (Cell phone, hand
signals or other non-verbal methods may be used.)
• May walk the attack pattern they intend to use (called a “walk-down”.)
• Will attempt to enter a facility using ruses, false IDs or false stories.
• May try to use unusual entrances or exits; may be seen pacing or
undertaking close observation of a facility.
• Will dress in an attempt to look like facility staff, tourists, etc.
*Security/Driver *
• Usually one person, male or female.
• Stands off to the side to watch the team’s flank.
• May double as an escape driver.
• Uses pre-determined signals for the team to leave.
• Identifiable by behavior. Single person sitting in running vehicle,
vehicle that circles the area repeatedly, horn-honking that brings other
people back to the vehicle.
*TERRORIST TACTICAL OPERATIONS CELLS*
*Cell Leader *– This person is usually the overall mission commander, as
well as the head of the attack arm. The tactical operations cell leader
personally leads attack operations.
*Tactical Operatives* – The number of operatives depends largely upon the
mission at stake. The operative’s job is to carry out the actual attack
according to plan. This might involve assassinating a target, dropping
(leaving behind) bombs, carrying out a suicide mission or any other type of
attack.
*Rear/Flank Security *– The cell may require a final security check of the
target before the attack, covering routes of approach that police or
security force may use when they arrive. This team member may be armed or
serve just act as a lookout.
*Insertion/Extraction Driver* – This driver may be the same driver from the
logistic cell or a specially designated person with evasive driving skills.
Teams that arrive by vehicle and expect to depart in the same vehicle
designate an insertion/extraction driver. This driver may stand off from the
operations area and act as a look-out. He or she may also be on the ready to
provide more firepower or drop off weapons and supplies.
*TERRORIST LOGISTICS CELLS *
*Cell Leader*– Supervises all cell members’ duties and is responsible for
acquiring the supplies necessary for an attack. May fulfill duties of
another cell member as well.
*Supply Officer* – Obtains needed weapons, equipment and supplies, through
either legal or criminal methods. Driver – Provides transportation for
tactical operations and intelligence cells and moves the group’s supplies
and personnel.
*Bomb Master* – Conducts all phases of assembling bombs, with the exception
of delivery. Rarely takes part in the attack unless the arming procedure is
complex or the device is a “special” weapon (e.g. dirty radioactive bomb,
nuclear fission bomb.)
*Arms Handler* – Expert in acquiring and preparing weapons and explosive
components.
*Courier *– Receives and delivers written communications, passes voice
messages, makes and receives money transfers. May also locate supporters
outside of the organization, when necessary for funding and additional
assistance.
*Emergency Support Teams* – Not de facto members, but active supporters of
the organization:
• Emergency Medical Support – Doctors, nurses, surgeons and specialists who
will provide services and treatment to injured terrorists.
• Emergency Legal Support - Lawyers and other legal professionals that will
represent members of the group if arrested and work toward their release
from jail.
• Emergency Financial Support - Supporters that can provide money and
supplies in emergency, with no questions asked.
If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we
are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the
intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them.
… We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to
tolerate the intolerant. –Sir Karl Popper
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