Why Are Taxpayers Subsidizing Facebook, and the Next Bubble?

By SIMON JOHNSON <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/author/simon-johnson/> 

Simon Johnson
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/03/business/economy/simonjohnson.ready.html>
, the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/i/interna
tional_monetary_fund/index.html?inline=nyt-org> , is the co-author of "13
Bankers <http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0307379051?tag=apture-20> ."

 
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/goldman_sachs_group_i
nc/index.html?inline=nyt-org> Goldman Sachs is investing $450 million of its
own money
<http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/goldman-invests-in-facebook-at-50-bi
llion-valuation/>  in
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/facebook_inc/index.ht
ml?inline=nyt-org> Facebook, at a valuation that implies the
social-networking company is now worth $50 billion. Goldman is also creating
a fund that will offer its high-net-worth clients an opportunity to invest
in Facebook.

On the face of it, this might seem just like what the financial sector is
supposed to be doing - channeling money into productive enterprise. The
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/s/securit
ies_and_exchange_commission/index.html?inline=nyt-org> Securities and
Exchange Commission is reportedly looking
<http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/the-500-investor-threshold-debated-f
or-its-47-year-history/>  at the way private investors will be involved, but
there are more deeply unsettling factors at work here.

Remember that Goldman Sachs is now a bank-holding company - a status it
received in September 2008, at the height of the financial crisis, in order
to avoid collapse (see Andrew Ross Sorkin's blow-by-blow account in "Too Big
to Fail
<http://us.penguingroup.com/nf/Book/BookDisplay/0,,9780670021253,00.html> "
for the details.) 

This means that it has essentially unfettered access to the
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/f/federal
_reserve_system/index.html?inline=nyt-org> Federal Reserve's discount window
- that is, it can borrow against all kinds of assets in its portfolio,
effectively ensuring it has government-provided liquidity at any time.

Any financial institution with such access to such government support is
likely to take on excessive risk - this is the heart of what is commonly
referred to as the problem of "moral hazard." If you are fully insured
against adverse events, you will be less careful.

Goldman Sachs is undoubtedly too big to fail - in the sense that if it were
on the brink of failure now or in the near future, it would receive
extraordinary government support and its creditors (at the very least) would
be fully protected. 

In all likelihood, under the current administration and its foreseeable
successors, shareholders, executives, and traders would also receive
generous help at the moment of duress. No one wants to experience another "
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/lehman_brothers_holdi
ngs_inc/index.html?inline=nyt-org> Lehman moment."

This means that Goldman Sachs's cost of financing is cheaper than it would
be otherwise - because creditors feel that they have substantial "downside
protection" from the government. 

How much cheaper is a matter of some debate, but estimates by my colleague
James Kwak (in a paper presented at a Fordham Law School conference
<http://law.fordham.edu/corporate-law-center/16927.htm>  last February) put
this at around 50 basis points (0.5 percentage points), for banks with more
than $100 billion in total assets.

In private, I have suggested to leading members of the Obama administration
and Congress that the "too big to fail" subsidy be studied and measured more
officially and in a transparent manner that is open to public scrutiny - for
example, as a key parameter to be monitored by the newly established
Financial Stability Oversight Council. 

Unfortunately, so far no one has taken up this approach.

However, there is consensus that the implicit government backing afforded to
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/fannie_mae/index.html
?inline=nyt-org> Fannie Mae and
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/freddie_mac/index.htm
l?inline=nyt-org> Freddie Mac in recent decades allowed them to borrow at
least 25 basis points (0.25 percent) below what they would otherwise have
had to pay - a significant difference in modern financial markets. 

In "13 Bankers <http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0307379051?tag=apture-20>
," Mr. Kwak and I refuted the view that these government sponsored
enterprises were the primary drivers of subprime lending and the 2007-8
financial crisis - that debacle was much more about extreme deregulation and
private-sector financial institutions seeking to take on crazy risks. 

Nonetheless, Fannie and Freddie were badly mismanaged - and followed the
market in 2005-7 with bad bets based on excessive leverage - in large part
because they had an implicit government subsidy. Those institutions should
be euthanized as soon as possible.

Goldman Sachs now enjoys exactly the same kind of unfair, nontransparent and
dangerous subsidy: it has effectively become a new form of
government-sponsored enterprise. Goldman is not a
<http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/v/venture_c
apital/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier> venture capital fund or primarily
an equity-financed investment fund. It is a highly leveraged bank, meaning
that it borrows through the capital markets most of the money that it puts
to work. 

As Anat Admati of
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/s/stanfor
d_university/index.html?inline=nyt-org> Stanford University and her
colleagues tirelessly point out
<http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/Admati.etal.html> , the central
vulnerability in our modern financial system is excessive reliance on
borrowed money, particularly by the biggest players.

Goldman Sachs is a perfect example. Most of its operations could be funded
with equity - after all, it is not in the retail deposit business. But
issuing debt is attractive to shareholders because of the subsidies
associated with debt financing for banks and to bank executives because
their compensation is based on return on equity - as measured, that
increases with leverage. 

If banks have more debt relative to equity, this increases the potential
upside for investors. It also increases the probability that the firm could
fail - unless you believe, as the market does, that Goldman is too big to
fail.

Social-networking companies should be able to attract risk capital and
compete intensely. They do not need subsidies in the form of cheaper
financing, or in any other form.

Social networking is a bubble in the sense that e-mail was a bubble. The
technology will without doubt change forever how we communicate with each
other, and this may have profound effects on the nature of our society. But
investors will get carried away, valuations will become too high and some
people will lose a lot of money.

If those losses are entirely equity-financed, there may be negative effects,
but they are likely be small - in the revised data after the 2001 dot-com
crash, there isn't even a
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/r/recession_an
d_depression/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier> recession (there were not two
consecutive negative quarters for gross domestic product).

But if the losses follow the broader Goldman Sachs structure and are largely
debt-financed, then the American taxpayer will have helped create another
major financial crisis.

And if you think that sophisticated investors at the heart of our financial
system can't get carried away and lose money on Internet-related
investments, remember Webvan
<http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/why-facebook-is-such-an-important-fr
iend-for-goldman-sachs/> : "During the dot-com bubble, Goldman invested
about $100 million in Webvan, the online grocer that never got off the
ground and eventually collapsed in bankruptcy." 

http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/06/why-are-taxpayers-subsidizing-f
acebook-and-the-next-bubble/?pagemode=print

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