Are we proposing "regime change"? On Jan 17, 11:44 am, MJ <[email protected]> wrote: > What’s Going on in Tunisia?A revolution in progressbyJustin Raimondo, January > 17, 2011 > The dethronement of Tunisian strongmanBen Ali, and hisflight to Saudi Arabia, > has our mediaconjuringvisionsof a powerful upsurge of “democratic” populism > in what was previously thought of as a minor backwater, famous for its > beaches and little else. A friend of the West, Ben Ali was the spitting image > of his predecessor,Habib Bourguiba, whom he overthrew in a bloodless coup. > Always tempered by the moderate tone ofTunisian politics, which stresses > continuity and stability over revolutionary change, Bourguiba and his > Destourian (pro-independence) party took decades to negotiate a peaceful > transition from French protectorate to full independence in 1956. > For the next thirty years, Bourguiba managed to tamp down popular discontent > in all its forms, from the leftist trade unions to the Islamist militants – > the latter a very small minority with limited influence. This was done not so > much by outright repression, as in other one-party states during the rise of > Third World nationalism in the 1960s, but through cooptation – and the > strategic gyrations of Bourguiba, a skillful manipulator of competing > interests who never let one faction get the upper hand for very long. > As he got into his late seventies, however, the Tunisian strongman who had > successfully steered his country toward independence without an armed > struggle – as in neighboringAlgeria– went downhill physically and mentally, > and his policies became increasingly erratic. Things reached the point where > his incapacity was obvious even to his most devoted supporters, and so > onNovember 7, 1987, Ben Ali and his supporters invoked an article of the > Tunisian constitution which provides for the transfer of power in case of the > president’s incapacity. > In hismessage to the nationannouncing the succession of power, Ben Ali was > careful to pay tribute to his predecessor, who still enjoyed tremendous > prestige as the veritable father of the nation. In accordance with the > Tunisian temperament, which values moderation and continuity, he stressed his > intent to build on the foundations laid down by the previous regime. In spite > of the renaming of the Destourian party, which was now the Destourian > Socialist Party, the new ruler was determined to keep the country open to > Western development and maintain its official nonaligned stance. > The great problem for the regime, however, was its self-insulating and > self-perpetuating statism, which encouraged – indeed, made inevitable – the > development of a particularly brazen form of crony capitalism, with the > economy in the hands of the state – and the state in the firm grasp of Ben > Ali’s immediate and extended family. As a WikiLeaked USdiplomatic cableput > it:“Whether it’s cash, services, land, property, or yes, even your yacht, > President Ben Ali’s family is rumored to covet it and reportedly gets what it > wants. Beyond the stories of the First Family’s shady dealings, Tunisians > report encountering low-level corruption as well in interactions with the > police, customs, and a variety of government ministries. The economic impact > is clear, with Tunisian investors – fearing the long-arm of “the Family” – > forgoing new investments, keeping domestic investment rates low and > unemployment high. These persistent rumors of corruption, coupled with rising > inflation and continued unemployment, have helped to fuel frustration with > the GOT and have contributed to recent protests in southwestern Tunisia (Ref > A). With those at the top believed to be the worst offenders, and likely to > remain in power, there are no checks in the system.”But of course there is > always the ultimate check on the system – revolution in the streets. Which is > precisely what happened when a young man by the name ofMohamed Bouazizi, a > graduate student forced by poverty to sell fruits and vegetables in the > market, set himself on fire in protest at having been denied a permit. > Apparently he had declined, or could not afford, to pay off the appropriate > party-state officials. His desperate actsparked a series of > demonstrationswhich soon spread beyond his small town in the southwestern > countryside, and in a matter of a few weeks Ben Ali was on a plane and out of > power. > Tunisia had a brief fling with economic liberalization in Bourguiba’s day, > but this was firmly opposed by both Party militants and Islamists, who feared > the social consequences of economic liberty (albeit for different reasons). > The liberalizing era was soon halted, however, when Bourguiba saw the > opposition it was engendering from his most devoted followers, and when Ben > Ali took power there was no similar “liberal” phase. By this time the > Destourian apparatus had become completely distanced from the people, with > party and state effectively merged and all power vested in the person and > family of the President. Elections were held periodically, but there was no > effective competition, and besides the whole process was rigged. > As we go to “press,” as they used to say, the Tunisian revolution is far from > over. A wing of the ruling party has managed, so far, to retain control, and > there is some fighting still going on between Ben Ali loyalists and the New > Gang in Charge, but the differences between these two factions is marginal, > at best, as underscored bythis report:“A state of emergency has now been > declared in Tunisia that bans demonstrations and imposes a strict > dusk-to-dawn curfew, with orders given to security forces to shoot anyone > disobeying orders or fleeing. “Meet the new boss – same as the old boss. > The “Jasmine Revolution” is being held up as a hopeful harbinger of things to > come in the Arab world: for the first time, we are being told, a sclerotic > despotism is being challenged and successfully overthrown by a populist > uprising. This is simplistic, to say the least. > To begin with, the folks in charge are hardly revolutionaries, but partisans > of the old Tunisian establishment – the party of Bourguiba and Ben Ali. > Secondly, the Tunisian temperament is not conducive to revolutionary upsurges > in the sense that we understand the concept: Tunisians are no more likely to > start their own version of the French Revolution than they are likely to > convert en masse to Buddhism. It simply goes against the cultural grain. > Yet there are certain economic imperatives – such as a street vendor’s need > to make a living – that militate against a return to the old normalcy. With > the world economy undergoing a radical contraction, and countries such as > Tunisiaentirely dependenton foreign trade and aid, demands for economic > liberalization are bound to rise – and surely crony corporatism of the > Tunisian or any other variety is going to face increasingly militant > challenges. > What this portends for US foreign policy is not all that clear at the moment, > but one thing is certain: the US is bound to see this turmoil as a wedge to > be used by radical Islamists. This is why we pourbillionsinto regimes such as > Ben Ali’s – with Egypt’sHosni Mubaraka very similar case. It’s too late to > disavow our support for these tyrants: the history of their collaboration > with Washington istoo extensiveto be denied. As the economic screws tighten > worldwide, and these rigid, reflexively repressive regimes come apart at the > seams, the US will be caught between the need to be “pragmatic” (i.e. > preserve stability at all costs) and itsrhetorical stanceas the > standard-bearer of “democracy” and liberalism internationally. > What to do? The only course is to stand aside and let the process work itself > out. Intervention at any level is bound to boomerang and have the opposite > effect from the one intended. Tunisian nationalism, the overriding > ideological force in the nation’s politics and traditions, has a very weak > adversary in the Islamist parties, which are all in exile and wieldminimal if > anyinfluence in the current upsurge. However, that could change if the US > hand becomes too apparent: that is, if Washington creates a problem where > none presently exists. > The ruling party will no doubt try to secure its tenacious grip on power, and > yet that power is being challenged by a secular populist movement. If, if the > interests of promoting “stability,” the US gets too close to Ben Ali’s > successors, then this will give the Islamists the opening they have been > waiting for. I see that our Secretary of State has already made a statement > welcoming the prospect of “democratic reform” in Tunisia and calling for > calm: if only our public officials did not feel the need to comment on > happenings in every country on earth, no matter how far removed from our > shores – if only, in short, they would button their lips, for a change, our > national interests would be very well served. The best policy, at the moment, > is to sit back and watch as the Tunisians take care of business in their own > way, and for their own reasons. > Lots of Westerners fell for the “’Tunisian success story” narrative, which > Christopher Hitchens limned pretty well in a 2007articleforVanity Fair:“Who > wouldn’t want the alternative of an African Titoism, or perhaps an African > Gaullism, where presidential rule keeps a guiding but not tyrannical hand?A > country where people discuss micro-credits for small business instead of > “macro” schemes such as holy war? Mr. Ben Ali does not make lengthy speeches > on TV every night, or appear in gorgeously barbaric uniforms, or live in a > different palace for every day of the week. Tunisia has no grandiose armed > forces, the curse of the rest of the continent, feeding parasitically off the > national income and rewarding their own restlessness with the occasional coup. > “And the country is lucky in other ways as well. … It has been spared the > awful toxicity of ethnic and religious rivalry, which makes it very unusual > in Africa. Its international airport is named Tunis-Carthage, evoking African > roots without Afrocentric demagogy.”For Hitchens, it is enough that the > country is not afflicted with what he regards as the curse of religiosity, > and he goes on to detail the views of a female professor of theology attached > to a Tunis mosque and university who denies the veil is mandated by the > Koran. Hitchens characterizes the Ben Ali regime’s attempts to police the > internet as “crude and old-fashioned” – not repressive. His main concern is > that Islamist radicals who are not “welcome” in Tunisia are given somewhat > freer rein in England, from which they broadcast their message, and he ends > his piece with this warning:“An enclave of development, Tunisia is menaced by > the harsh extremists of a desert religion, and ultimately by the desert > itself. As with everything else in Africa, this is not a contest we can view > with indifference.”The Bourguibas and Ben Alis who created this “enclave of > development” sowed the seeds of their own destruction, and yet as long as no > one was rocking the boat Hitchens and his fellow interventionists were > willing to tolerate their “old fashioned” tyranny. The problem with this kind > of ideological one-dimensionality is that it doesn’t take into account the > Mohamed Bouazizis of this world, who yearn to be > free.http://original.antiwar.com/justin/2011/01/16/whats-going-on-in-tunisia/
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