** ** Jihad 2020: Assessing Al-Qaida's 20-Year Plan****
By Aaron Y. Zelin, on 11 Sep 2013, Briefing**** http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13208/jihad-2020-assessing-al-qaida-s-20-year-plan **** ** ** **** ** ** Since the Arab uprisings erupted two and a half years ago, the global jihadi **** movement has metastasized to a variety of new locales across the Arab world, **** most recently in Syria, Libya, Sinai and Tunisia. While these upheavals**** surprised many in the region, *al-Qaida had predicted such events unfolding* *in a 20-year strategic plan (2000-2020) that came to light in 2005.* That** ** blueprint has gone according to plan so far, albeit more because of outside* *** and structural forces than the efforts of jihadis themselves. As a result,** ** the movement was well-positioned to take advantage of the new developments.* *** ** ** In his book "Al-Zarqawi: Al-Qaida's Second Generation," Fouad Hussein**** details al-Qaida's 20-year plan, which has seven phases, with 2013**** representing the beginning of the fifth. Here is how al-Qaida, which leaked* *** the plan to Hussein, envisioned each of them playing out:**** ** ** First phase: "The Awakening," 2000-2003. The aim of the 9/11 attacks was to* *** provoke the U.S. into declaring war on the Muslim world and thereby "awaken" **** Muslims. Al-Qaida also hoped the attacks would help broadcast its message to **** a global audience. When doing field research in Tunisia this past February,* *** I heard members of the jihadi group Ansar al-Sharia echo this sentiment.**** "Many became more educated in this field," one of them told me, referring to **** this period. "Even if we lost sympathizers, we gained new supporters."**** ** ** Second Phase: "Opening Eyes," 2003-2006. In this period, al-Qaida hoped to** ** transform itself from an organization into a broader movement as well as**** spread its base to other Arab countries. Iraq would be the center of the**** jihad to prepare cadres for future arenas.**** ** ** There are signs that this phase also bore fruit. The jihadi group Jama'at*** * Tawhid wa-l-Jihad became al-Qaida in the Land of the Two Rivers (Iraq) in*** * 2004. Two years later, a group of escaped Yemeni prisoners created al-Qaida* *** in Yemen, which subsequently became al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula when** ** it merged with the Saudi branch in 2009. In early 2007, the Algerian-based** ** jihadi organization the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat joined the** ** fold as well, pledging "bayah" (allegiance) to Osama bin Laden and changing* *** the organization's name to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.**** ** ** Third Phase: "Arising and Standing Up," 2007-2010. This phase-which was to** ** see a greater focus on the Levant, specifically in Syria but also including* *** attacks on Israel, Turkey and Jordan-was a complete failure. Some rockets*** * were launched at Israel but did little damage, even as the jihadis in Gaza** ** were heavily suppressed by Hamas. In Jordan, after the 2005 wedding bombing* *** in Amman, Jordanians soured on the jihadi cause, and many of the movement's* *** key members were imprisoned. Meanwhile, a sustained low-level terrorist**** campaign against the Assad regime in Syria was contained and defeated.**** ** ** Fourth Phase: 2010-2013. Al-Qaida predicted that this time period would see* *** the downfall of the Arab tyrant regimes as well as acts of cyberterrorism*** * against the U.S. economy.**** ** ** Though possibly lucky, al-Qaida was also quite prescient with regard to the* *** Arab regimes' inherent unsustainability. Jihadis played no role in the**** uprisings that brought down the regimes in Tunis, Cairo, Sanaa and Tripoli,* *** and which led to the ongoing war in Syria, but the movement has been able to **** take major advantage of the upheaval. Through a program of "dawa"**** (missionary work) in countries that have opened up, jihadi groups-including* *** the new Ansar al-Sharia organizations in North Africa-have been able to**** spread their message and broaden their base from a vanguard to a social**** movement.**** ** ** The jihadi movement has also shown it has learned from its failures in Iraq. **** In war zones like Syria, it has tried to garner support through the**** provision of social services. It has also tried to avoid alienating the**** Sunni population with excessive violence, instead focusing its target**** selection on military and security forces as well as non-Sunni Muslims.**** ** ** While off by one phase, by 2013 the global jihadi movement had opened up a** ** front in Syria, gaining a logistical base to facilitate operations in**** southern Turkey. It also established an ascendant jihadi presence in**** northern Sinai to project terror at Israel, and a resurgent al-Qaida**** organization in Iraq still maintains close ties with the Salafis in Jordan.* *** Therefore, the overall movement has set itself up well for the next few**** phases of its broader plan.**** ** ** Fifth Phase: 2013-2016. In the three years ahead, al-Qaida hoped to**** establish an Islamic state or caliphate, thanks to waning Western influence* *** in the Muslim world as well as a weakened Israel. U.S. and Western influence **** in the region has indeed been diminished, as illustrated by Washington's**** recent impotence to shape events in Egypt and Syria. That said, the U.S.**** still maintains a major military presence as well as ties to Arab countries. **** And due to the instability throughout the region, Israel has even more of a* *** qualitative military edge than previously.**** ** ** Sixth Phase: "Total Confrontation," 2016-2020. By this period, al-Qaida**** anticipated an all-out war with the unbelievers, leading to its seventh and* *** final phase in 2020, "Definitive Victory," which would result in defeat of** ** the unbelievers and the success of the caliphate.**** ** ** These last two phases appear somewhat fanciful, due to major obstacles**** remaining in al-Qaida's path forward. First, while the West is indeed facing **** economic difficulties and its influence has declined relatively, it is not** ** in an existential crisis, as al-Qaida anticipated. Neither is Israel.**** Second, jihadis' track record in governance is poor, especially once they*** * begin instituting their narrow interpretations of Shariah; high-profile**** failures include Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and Mali, due to extreme* *** brutality and the pursuit of social norms that are far more conservative**** than those of the local populations. Therefore, there will probably be**** backlashes against any new projects in Syria or elsewhere.**** ** ** Nevertheless, the continued instability in the broader region means that the **** jihadi movement, which is quite nimble and learns from its past experiences, **** will likely continue to find sympathizers. It is highly implausible that**** jihadis will achieve a "definitive victory" and establish a caliphate over** ** the entire Muslim population. But al-Qaida is not going to disappear anytime **** soon. Though the last stages of its strategic plan remain farfetched, the*** * group is a reality that will likely endure in the decades to come. **** ** ** Aaron Y. Zelin is the Richard Borow fellow at the Washington Institute for** ** Near East Policy.**** ** ** ==========================================**** (F)AIR USE NOTICE: All original content and/or articles and graphics in this **** message are copyrighted, unless specifically noted otherwise. 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