In M. Totten's article he says, "We sort of won the war in Iraq, but it cost billions of dollars, thousands of lives, and Baghdad is still a violent, dysfunctional mess." I have some trick questions: To which thousands of lives is he referring? How long has Baghdad been a violent, dysfunctional mess?
On Wednesday, November 13, 2013 12:21:08 PM UTC-8, Travis wrote: > > > > > > > > > > *http://tinyurl.com/o33vsay <http://tinyurl.com/o33vsay>* > > > > > No Exit: Why the US Can’t Leave the Middle East > > Michael J. Totten<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/users/michael-j-totten> > > [image: > http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/sites/default/files/styles/full_view/public/field/image/11.4.13.waj_.totten.jpg] > > America is in a bad mood. > > In the midst of the worst economy since the 1970s, we’re on the verge of > losing the war in Afghanistan, the longest we’ve ever fought, against > stupefyingly primitive foes. > > We sort of won the war in Iraq, but it cost billions of dollars, thousands > of lives, and Baghdad is still a violent, dysfunctional mess. > > The overhyped Arab Spring has been cancelled in Egypt. Liberating Libya > led to the assassination of our ambassador. Syria is disintegrating into > total war with bad guys on both sides and the US dithering on the > sidelines, worried more about saving face at this point than having any > significant effect on the facts on the ground. > > A majority of American voters in both parties have had it. They’re just > flat-out not interested in spending any more money or lives to help out. > Even many foreign policy professionals are fed up. We get blamed for every > one of the Middle East’s problems, including those it inflicts on itself. > How gratifying it would be just to walk away, dust off our hands, and say > you’re on your own. > > But we can’t. > > > > Actually, in Egypt maybe we can. And maybe we should. > > Hosni Mubarak was a terrible leader and a lukewarm ally at best, but until > the Egyptian army arrested him in 2011, Cairo had been part of the > American-backed security architecture in North Africa and the Eastern > Mediterranean ever since his predecessor, Anwar Sadat, junked Egypt’s > alliance with the Soviet Union. > > The election of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in the wake of the Arab > Spring, though, moved Egypt into the “frenemy” column. It’s still there > under the military rule of General Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, the new head of > state in all but name since the army removed Mohamed Morsi. > > Sisi is no less hostile to Washington than Morsi was. As Lee Smith put it > shortly after the second coup in three years, Egypt’s new *jefe* “sees > the United States as little more than a prop, a rag with which he burnishes > his reputation as a strongman, a village mayor puffing his chest and > boasting that he is unafraid to stand up to the Americans.” > > Sisi knows his country and what it takes to appeal to the masses. The > whole population—left, right, and center—is as hostile toward the United > States as it ever was. Never mind that Americans backed the anti-Mubarak > uprising. Never mind that Washington sought good relations with Egypt’s > first freely elected government in thousands of years. Never mind that the > Obama administration refuses to call the army’s coup what it plainly was in > order to keep Egypt’s aid money flowing. None of that matters. The United > States and its Zionist sidekick remain at the molten center of Egypt’s > phantasmagorical demonology. > > Bribing Egypt with billions of annual aid dollars to maintain its peace > treaty with Israel and to keep a lid on radical Islam makes even less sense > today than it did when Morsi and the Brotherhood were in charge. Morsi > needed that money to prevent Egyptians from starving to death. He had a > major incentive to cooperate—or else. > > But now that the Brothers are out of the picture, partly at the behest of > the Saudis, Riyadh says it will happily make up the difference if > Washington turns off the aid spigot. > > Turn it off then, already. Our money buys nothing from Sisi if he can > replace it that easily. If he gets the same cash infusion whether or not he > listens to the White House, why should he listen to the White House? He > isn’t our friend. He’s only one step away from burning an American flag at > a rally. He’s plenty motivated for his own reasons to keep radical > Islamists in check since they’re out to destroy him. And his army is the > one Egyptian institution that’s not at all interested in armed conflict > with Israel because it would suffer more egregiously than anything or > anyone else. > > We’re either paying him out of sheer habit or because Washington thinks it > might still get something back from its investment. Maybe it will, but it > probably won’t. > > Either way, Sisi instantly proved himself more violent and ruthless than > Mubarak when he gave the order to gun down hundreds of unarmed civilians. > The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood “retaliated” by burning dozens of > churches, murdering Christians at random, and shooting policemen does not > make what he did okay. He was, for a few days at least, no better than > Bashar al-Assad. Giving him money and guns will make us no friends but > plenty of enemies, especially when his regime proves itself no more capable > of halting Egypt’s freefall than the last one. > > Max Boot at the Council on Foreign Relations put it this way in the *Los > Angeles Times*: “It is no coincidence that both Osama bin Laden and > [al-Qaeda deputy Ayman al-] Zawahiri hailed from US-allied nations that > repressed their own citizens. Both men were drawn to the conclusion that > the way to free their homelands was to attack their rulers’ patron. It is > reasonable to expect that a new generation of Islamists in Egypt, now being > taught that the peaceful path to power is no longer open, will turn to > violence and that, as long as Washington is seen on the side of the > generals, some of their violence will be directed our way.” > > Even if the Egyptian army faces the kind of full-blown Islamist insurgency > that ripped through Algeria in the 1990s—which is unlikely, but > possible—Cairo will still get all the help it needs from the Gulf, not > because the Saudis oppose radical Islam, but because they view the Muslim > Brotherhood as the biggest long-term threat to their rule. > > The case for walking away from Egypt and dusting our hands off is sound. > > > > Libya, however, is another matter entirely. > > Having learned in Iraq that occupying Arab lands is bad for everyone’s > health, the US helped free Libya of Muammar el-Qaddafi without suffering > even one single casualty. We did it all from the skies. The ground was > thick with indigenous rebels, so no American ground troops were required. > Qaddafi had no friends to come to his rescue and he stood no chance with > his feeble and outdated hardware. > > But then we lost Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three others during > the long Libyan aftermath, when a terrorist group tied to al-Qaeda attacked > the US consulate in Benghazi. It happened on the same day—not > coincidentally, on September 11th—that mobs of fanatical Salafists waving > al-Qaeda flags rioted and set fires all over the region, using a ludicrous > anti-Muhammad video uploaded to YouTube by a crackpot Egyptian “filmmaker” > no one had ever heard of before as a pretext. > > For reasons that still don’t make any sense, American officials falsely > claimed the Benghazi incident was the result of yet another protest riot > gone out of control. But there was no protest or riot in Benghazi related > to that video, contrary to Washington’s initial clumsy and mendacious > public statements. > > Unlike in Egypt and even Tunisia, nobody in Libya protested against the > United States for “allowing” a so-called blasphemous video to be uploaded > to YouTube. The only demonstrations in Libya that week were *against*radical > Islamists, against the terrorists that murdered Ambassador Stevens. > The citizen groundswell against Benghazi’s Islamist militia was so intense > that its members had to flee into the desert. > > Libya is a traditional and conservative place, but that does not mean it’s > Islamist. Two out of three Egyptians voted for Islamist parties in the > post-Mubarak parliamentary elections, but in Libya, the National Forces > Alliance, a moderate centrist party, won the most seats in 2012. The > Justice and Construction Party—the political vehicle for Libya’s Muslim > Brotherhood—only won ten percent of the vote. The Brotherhood isn’t quite > as irrelevant in Libya as, say, the Green Party is in the United States, > but it’s close. > > Libya’s people are not just by and large against the Islamists. They are > perhaps friendlier to the West in general and the United States in > particular than anyone else in the Arab world. > > It makes sense if you think about it. Under no theory can the United > States be held responsible for Qaddafi’s crimes and repression. He was a > self-declared enemy of America on the day he took power, and he’d still be > tormenting his hapless citizens like a sadistic mad scientist if Americans > hadn’t provided air support for the rebels. He received no money, no > weapons, no training, no diplomatic cover—nothing—from the United States. > > Every bad thing Libyans ever heard about Americans came from the internal > propaganda organs of the man who kicked them in the face every day for > forty-two years. At least some of their geopolitical views resemble those > of Eastern Europeans under the communists—*if the Americans are the > enemies of our tyrannical government, how bad can they be?* They are as > pro-American as we could ever expect Arab Muslims to be. > > Libya under Qaddafi had far too much government. Now it does not have > enough. The previous regime was one of the most repressive on earth, and > when it went down, most institutions—including the army—went with it. The > state and its security forces are therefore too weak. They’re being rebuilt > from scratch and won’t be finished for years. > > There is no reason in the world for the US not to associate with or help > Prime Minister Ali Zeidan and his colleagues. On the contrary, if the > government can’t establish a monopoly on the use of force in the lawless > parts of the country, Libya could end up an incubator of terrorism like > Somalia, Yemen, or Mali, despite the fact that most of its people want > nothing to do with it. > > > > Syria is the last country we can afford to ignore right now, even though > large numbers in both parties—for perfectly logical reasons—are averse to > doing anything more than shuddering at a distance. > > But what happens there is our business because it affects us. Syria isn’t > Belize. It matters who runs that country, and it matters a lot. > > Bashar al-Assad’s regime is the biggest state sponsor of international > terrorism in the Arab world, and it’s aligned with the Islamic Republic > regime in Iran, the biggest state sponsor of international terrorism in the > entire world. Obviously, then, it’s in our interest to see him defeated. > > One of his principal enemies on the home front, though, is the > al-Qaeda–linked Nusra Front. Obviously it’s not in our interest to see > these bin Ladenists replace Assad. > > The Free Syrian Army is disgruntled at the lackluster assistance the > United States has provided, but that’s partly because it has been fighting > against Assad alongside the Nusra Front, and also because many of its own > commanders are also Islamists, even if they’re moderate compared with > al-Qaeda. The tactical alliance between the two groups is fracturing, and > it won’t outlast Assad by even a week, but it’s enough to make Washington > reluctant and skeptical. > > Americans have always been willing to sacrifice money and lives for allies > and friends, but allies and friends who are powerful enough inside Syria to > affect outcomes are thin on the ground. Early in the game, the > administration could have tried to arm, fund, and train a politically > moderate fighting force inside Syria, but that will be a lot more difficult > now that the Turks and the Gulf Arabs are backing their own proxies who > don’t share our interests or values. > > So there are those who say *let them kill each other* because, as Daniel > Pipes argues, it “keeps them focused locally” and “prevents either one from > emerging victorious.” It brings to mind Henry Kissinger’s famous quip about > the Iran-Iraq war. “It’s too bad they can’t both lose.” > > The operative word in Kissinger’s sentence is “can’t.” Opposing sides > don’t zero each other out. That’s not how wars work, or end. Wars end when > somebody wins. > > The worst-case scenario from an American point of view is that they > *both*win. That’s an actual possibility. Syria could fracture into pieces. In > a > way, it already has. An Alawite rump state backed by Iran, Hezbollah, and > Russia existing alongside a Sunnistan ruled by Islamists could very well > emerge as a semi-permanent reality of Middle Eastern geography. At the very > least, the United States needs a policy that reduces the likelihood of that > most horrible outcome. > > A few months ago, I asked the Lebanese MP Samy Gemayel what he thought > about Washington’s confusion in Syria. “Before you can know what to do,” he > said, “you have to know what you want.” One way or another, we should want > both Assad and al-Qaeda to lose. But they aren’t going to lose > simultaneously. They’ll need to lose consecutively. One of them first has > to win. > > So fight and defeat Bashar al-Assad, or support someone who will do it > instead. Then fight and defeat the Nusra Front, or support someone who will > do it instead. > > Or face the fact that one or both are going to win. If the Nusra Front > wins, we’ll have an Afghanistan on the Mediterranean. And if Assad wins, he > could end up under an Iranian nuclear weapons umbrella. > > > > Some parts of the world are like Las Vegas. What happens there, stays > there. Sub-Saharan Africa is the primary example. Hardly anyone outside > that region has even noticed that the various wars in Congo have killed > millions of people since the late 1990s, and even fewer have cared. > > The Middle East isn’t like that. Until cars and trucks can be powered by > solar, wind, or nuclear energy, the entire world depends on the free flow > of oil from the Persian Gulf region. That requires American security > guarantees, which require our presence. And until radical Islamist > organizations utterly lose their local appeal, we’ll have little choice but > to intervene periodically for reasons that have nothing to do with > economics or resources. For the time being, aggravating though it may be, > Americans and Arabs are stuck with each other. We can take a bit of a > breather, but retirement is decades away. > > *Michael J. Totten is a contributing editor at World Affairs and the > author of four books, including Where the West Ends and The Road to Fatima > Gate.* > > > > > __._,_.___ > > > > > > > __,_._,___ > > > -- -- Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups. For options & help see http://groups.google.com/group/PoliticalForum * Visit our other community at http://www.PoliticalForum.com/ * It's active and moderated. Register and vote in our polls. * Read the latest breaking news, and more. --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "PoliticalForum" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
