Kirill A. Korinsky wrote:
On Tue, 20 Oct 2026 08:57:00 +0200,
David Uhden Collado <[email protected]> wrote:
OpenBSD does not currently provide a supported Codex sandbox backend.
pledge/unveil cannot reliably enforce these restrictions across
arbitrary subprocesses created through execve.
The first patch rejects managed sandbox profiles during configuration
and session creation.
The second rejects unsupported restrictions at command execution,
including managed network policies that cannot be enforced by a
proxy alone.
Both are necessary to cover the different execution paths.
Explicit danger-full-access execution remains available, as does
the option of running Codex inside external isolation.
I had re-read your explanation and diffs a few times and I still does not
understand that actually have you suggested.
Can you stop using your LLM and write with extreamly simple sentence that
you did and why?
Codex uses its sandbox by default, but on OpenBSD the sandbox doesn't
work at all. In other words, it provides no actual isolation. Disabling
it explicitly prevents users from being misled into thinking they're
protected when they're not, and makes it clear that they need to use
something like --yolo to run Codex without sandbox restrictions on OpenBSD.
