On Sun, Jul 08, 2012 at 09:36:33PM +0000, Christian Weisgerber wrote:
> Christian Weisgerber <na...@mips.inka.de> wrote:
> 
> > It's time to drop MD5 from the distinfo checksums.  MD5 cannot
> > guarantee the integrity of a distfile.  It is broken, people are
> > finding collisions and have used this for practical attacks.
> > 
> > Espie has previously suggested that having several different hash
> > functions might improve overall security.  In this paper,
> > http://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/archive/2004/CRYPTO/1472/1472.pdf
> > Antoine Joux argues otherwise.  The concatenation of two iterated
> > hash functions is not stronger than its strongest component.
> 
> There has been some further disjointed discussion on this that I
> would like to put into a common forum here.  Matthew Dempsky has
> suggested to drop the RIPEMD-160 and SHA-1 hashes as well.  And:
> 
> Matthew Dempsky <matt...@dempsky.org>:
> 
> | On Sun, Jul 8, 2012 at 2:09 AM, Stuart Henderson <st...@openbsd.org> wrote:
> | > I do think it's useful to have two hashes from different families though,
> | > I've just been looking at the bsd.port.mk code that runs checksums, 
> thinking
> | > of making it check *all* of PREFERRED_CIPHERS rather than just the first
> | > matching one. For that, iirc SHA-1 is a different family to SHA-256 so
> | > I think using those two together would be ok.
> | 
> | Yeah, my understanding is SHA-1 and SHA-256 are different families
> | too, so if we really want two separate families of hashes I think
> | that's okay.  I'm just not sure that really buys much.  NIST has
> | already been discouraging SHA-1's use since 2005
> | (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/statement.html; "Federal agencies
> | must stop relying on digital signatures that are generated using SHA-1
> | by the end of 2010").  I think SHA-256 would have to be pretty
> | catastrophically broken for its security to drop below SHA-1 in
> | security, and any attack that breaks SHA-256 overnight would probably
> | significantly affect SHA-1 too.
> 
> FWIW, I agree with Matthew.

Oh well, but we keep the framework that can generate multiple hashes if
need be...

Reply via email to