Victor Duchovni:
> On Fri, Nov 05, 2010 at 11:03:34AM -0400, Wietse Venema wrote:
> 
> > The current manpage text reads:
> > 
> >        reject_rbl_client rbl_domain=d.d.d.d
> >     ...
> >        permit_dnswl_client dnswl_domain=d.d.d.d
> >               Accept the request when the reversed client network  address  
> > is
> >               listed  with  the  A record "d.d.d.d" under dnswl_domain.  If 
> > no
> >               "=d.d.d.d" is specified, accept the request  when  the  
> > reversed
> >               client  network  address  is  listed  with  any  A  record 
> > under
> >               dnswl_domain.
> >               For safety, permit_dnswl_client  is  silently  ignored  when  
> > it
> >               would   override   reject_unauth_destination.    The  result  
> > is
> >               DEFER_IF_REJECT when whitelist lookup fails.   This  feature  
> > is
> >               available in Postfix 2.8 and later.
> >     ...
> >        reject_rhsbl_client rbl_domain=d.d.d.d
> >     ...
> >        permit_rhswl_client rhswl_domain=d.d.d.d
> >               Accept the request when the client hostname is listed with 
> > the A
> >               record "d.d.d.d" under rhswl_domain.  If no "=d.d.d.d" is 
> > speci-
> >               fied, accept the request when the client hostname is listed 
> > with
> >               any A record under rhswl_domain.
> >               For safety, permit_rhswl_client  is  silently  ignored  when  
> > it
> >               would   override   reject_unauth_destination.    The  result  
> > is
> >               DEFER_IF_REJECT when whitelist lookup fails.   This  feature  
> > is
> >               available in Postfix 2.8 and later.
> 
> Looks good.
> 
> Should we mention that these should only be used to reduce FPs from
> blacklists that follow, and that are expected to not list legitimate
> clients. Thus any temporary DNS lookup error would likely result an an
> additional lookup that incurrs a low risk or rejection, but does *imply*
> rejection. DNS-based positive access rules are fragile with respect
> to the semantics of temporary lookup failures, and must not be used to
> permit some while denying all.

I agree that whitelisting on client names is fragile (whether one
uses a static whitelist map or DNS lookups), because the client
name lookup will sometimes fail due to some temporary error. The
DEFER_IF_REJECT result cited above handles only whitelist lookup
problems; it is easy enough to hard-code the same in permit_*wl_client
for temporary client name lookup problems, but I see no easy way
to automatically fall back to DEFER_IF_REJECT for all name-based
mechanisms.

> There will at some point be interest in DNSWL support for verified DKIM
> "d=" domains. For now that's out of scope (milters, pre-queue filters, ...)
> I've recently starting using the OpenDKIM library, ... it is fairly easy
> to support. If there is ever interest in directly supporting DKIM in the
> Postfix SMTP server, I'm game to talk design.

I'm not yet in a hurry to build those 3-4 letter alphabet soup
protocols into Postfix.

> Due to the DNS lookup latency inherent in incoming DKIM checks, doing
> DKIM in post-queue content-filters is somewhat unattractive, as typically
> one wants low-latency, modest concurrency in a post-queue filter.

This is where before-queue filtersand Milters are in a better
position. I expect that there will be pressure to move away from
after-queue filters, despite the limitations of the before-queue
approach.

        Wietse

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