http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/06/22/006.html
Wednesday, June 22, 2005. Issue 3192. Page 10.
Aa Aa Aa
>From Values to True Dialogue
By Andrew Kuchins
In the past year or so, we have increasingly heard the argument that a growing
clash between "values" and "interests" is leading to policy dilemmas for
Europeans and Americans when dealing with Russia. According to this argument,
the erosion of democratic institutions and re-assertion of state control over
strategic economic sectors raises questions about Russia's commitment to
becoming a market democracy closely aligned with Western interests. Many
critics of Russian behavior assert that Russia's aggressive meddling in the
internal affairs of its neighbors reflects neo-imperial tendencies that do not
equate with acceptable modern Western "values" or norms of international
behavior.
Yet the formulation of the problem as a conflict of values is not helpful and
is even counterproductive. The term "values" has become a code word for
describing what we perceive to be Russia's domestic deficiencies in democracy,
rule of law and transparent market competition. These deficiencies are real,
but to cast them as reflecting departures from Western values diminishes the
effectiveness of our trying to convince Russian officials and policymakers that
they exist.
Why does the West promote democracy and democratic institutions in the first
place? Out of moral convictions about universal suffrage? Call me a cynic, but
I do not think so. We practice and promote democracy because it works better
and it serves our interests. How does it work better?
First, in a system with working democratic institutions, you are likely to have
a more effective policymaking process, though it may look rather messy. Policy
is likely to be more carefully vetted and alternative views taken into
consideration through an independent parliament and press. What appears to be
increasing dysfunction in Russian policymaking can be partially attributed to
the weakening of other institutions like the State Duma, Federation Council,
regional governors and independent national television.
Second, there seems be quite a strong correlation between democratic states and
the unlikelihood that they will go to war with other democracies. It is not an
iron-clad law -- such things don't exist in social science -- but there is
preponderant evidence supporting this hypothesis.
Third, as the experience of political and economic transition has suggested
over the last 15 years, there is a rather high correlation between countries
with stronger democratic institutions and economic growth that does not
disproportionately favor the few elites.
U.S. policy toward Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union has always
been premised on the view that a successful transformation to a market
democracy makes the likelihood of a major threat to U.S. security interests
unlikely. In my view, this is about interests, not values.
When Western politicians and diplomats talk to Russians, they face a PR problem
when they couch a policy dilemma as a clash between values and interests.
Nobody likes to be informed that their values are inferior -- even, and
especially if, it is true. Westerners come off sounding extremely
condescending, especially when everything at home is not in order. When U.S.
President George W. Bush took this tack with President Vladimir Putin, he got
lectures about Florida voting machines and how Yukos is Enron. Such discussion
does not go anywhere.
In sum, Europeans and Americans promote democracy and open markets not only
because we strongly believe that these forms of political-economic organization
will lead to greater prosperity and better governance and more benign foreign
policy, but also because we are likely to have more influence through
political, economic and security ties. We do this because it is in our
interests in a variety of ways.
And sometimes, in some of those ways, our interests will bump up against those
of Russia. The most obvious example of this came in Ukraine late last year. The
Russian government, rightly or wrongly, decided that a Yushchenko victory was
not in their interests. They decided, rightly or wrongly, that a Yanukovych
victory would result in greater Russian influence in Ukraine. Talking about
this and other phenomena principally in terms of a "values gap" creates a lot
of heat but sheds little light -- in other words, it creates considerable
controversy, polarizes positions and makes it more difficult to bridge the gap
in interests.
When we look at Russia, we too often think that pushing for human rights and
democracy must come at the expense of economic and security interests. This is
probably not the case. Is Russian government cooperation on nonproliferation
and counterterrorism dependent on or closely correlated to the U.S. policy of
democracy promotion? Probably not, since Russians work with the West on these
issues because they view it as in their interest. There are limits, of course.
If the West were to openly declare that its principle policy interest in Russia
was to promote revolution, this would obviously be counterproductive.
Let me make two broader historical points in conclusion. The first relates to
accusations of Russia's newly aggressive neo-imperialism. It is true that
Russian behavior in Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus and Central Asia often runs
counter to the interests of the United States, Europe and the governments of
some of the states in question. But to jump to the conclusion that this is
evidence of Russian neo-imperialism distorts history. Russia today continues to
deal with a long historical trend of geo-political decline. The expansion of
Western influence into territories previously under the direct or indirect
dominion of Moscow continues -- with NATO and EU expansion being only the most
obvious developments. This does not excuse Moscow for pursuing policies that
should not be excused. Rather, it provides a better framework for understanding
and talking with our Russian counterparts.
The last point also relates to historical perspective. This whole debate about
values and interests has intensified during Putin's leadership, especially over
the last two years in the wake of the erosion of already weak democratic
institutions and the Yukos affair. If we compare Russia today with the Russia
of 2000, there has been some backsliding -- but I would caution against
overstatement. For instance, in the 1996 presidential election, "administrative
resources" were probably more important for Boris Yeltsin's victory -- given
that in January 1996 his popularity rating was less than 5 percent -- than for
Putin's victories in either 2000 or 2004.
But more importantly, if we take a longer historical view -- for example, going
back 20 years to the onset of perestroika -- then our conclusion is very
different. There has been extraordinary progress toward a more pluralistic and
democratic Russia. There have indeed been some setbacks in recent years, but it
would be rather simplistic to believe that long-term historical trends develop
in a linear fashion. Remember Lenin's saying about two steps forward and one
step back. We are in the midst of the one step back.
When and how Russia will again make two steps forward is difficult to predict,
but I am confident that, sooner or later, it will.
Andrew Kuchins, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, contributed this
comment to The Moscow Times.
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
***************************************************************************
Berdikusi dg Santun & Elegan, dg Semangat Persahabatan. Menuju Indonesia yg
Lebih Baik, in Commonality & Shared Destiny. www.ppi-india.org
***************************************************************************
__________________________________________________________________________
Mohon Perhatian:
1. Harap tdk. memposting/reply yg menyinggung SARA (kecuali sbg otokritik)
2. Pesan yg akan direply harap dihapus, kecuali yg akan dikomentari.
3. Lihat arsip sebelumnya, www.ppi-india.da.ru;
4. Satu email perhari: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
5. No-email/web only: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
6. kembali menerima email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Yahoo! Groups Links
<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ppiindia/
<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
