The Atlantic
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/-/280419/

The Forest Mafia: How Scammers Steal Millions Through Carbon Markets

When the product is invisible, the cons are endless

RYAN JACOBS | OCT 11 2013

When the balding Australian first stepped off the riverboat and into the
isolated pocket of northeastern Peru's Amazon jungle in 2010, he had what
seemed like a noble, if quixotic, business plan. 

An ambitious real estate developer, David Nilsson hoped to ink joint venture
agreements with the regional government of Loreto province and the leaders
of the indigenous Matses community to preserve vast thickets of the tribe's
remote rainforest. Under a global carbon-trading program, he wished to sell
shares of the forest's carbon credits to businesses that hope to mitigate,
or offset, their air pollution. 

Located a six-day ride from the frontier city of Iquitos, the jungle's
vegetation, soils, and looming trees store an immense amount of carbon
dioxide - roughly one ton, the equivalent of one UN-backed carbon credit,
per tree. 

In an ideal scenario, this is how it's supposed to work: A community in a
developing country works with an NGO or developer to design a plan to
protect a large swathe of forest and thus prevent the release of the harmful
chemical compound into the atmosphere, in accordance with the United
Nations' program called REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
forest Degradation). Then, it can get the emissions reductions certified by
a third-party auditor and sell the resulting carbon credits to corporations
in developed countries interested in reducing their own carbon footprints.
(Deforestation accounts for roughly 17 percent of all global greenhouse gas
emissions.) 

Nilsson's Hong Kong-based company, Sustainable Carbon Resources Limited,
planned to help the indigenous community set up the Peruvian carbon credit
project in exchange for sharing the profits once they were sold. If
Nilsson's plan worked, in theory the forest would be spared from loggers,
his company would net some profit, and the indigenous community would
receive millions of dollars in funding for education and medical care from
investors and corporations interested in expanding sustainability and social
responsibility efforts. 

Nilsson recruited Dan Pantone, an Iquitos-based American ecologist with
close contacts in the Matses community, as a guide to show him around the
jungle, and, more importantly, introduce him to the right decision-makers. 

"[Nilsson] told me, 'You're going to be a millionaire in a year,'" Pantone
said of his earliest phone conversation. "He said he was going to help the
indigenous people." 

Early on, Nilsson didn't seem particularly interested in hammering out the
details of a potential forest project. "He didn't talk about REDD; he just
wanted the contact," Pantone said of Nilsson's early conversations with
Angel Dunu Maya, a Matses chief. "Once he had the contact, he had everything
he wanted from me." In meetings with Peruvian lawyers, Nilsson was also
advised about the difficulty of proving the risk of emissions, as REDD
requires, in such an isolated area that was already designated as a reserve
by the federal government. He also faced other, more obvious challenges.
"The government asked him to show his sources of income, and he was unable
to do that," Pantone added. "So that was a dead-end for him." 

Nilsson flew back to Australia for Christmas, but he was not deterred. In
February 2011, he reappeared in the jungle wearing what would become his
signature, Crockodile Dundee-style Akubra cowboy hat. 

Unable to broker a deal with regional government officials, he met with
Matses leadership in Iquitos in March and presented a PowerPoint that
detailed the incredible profits he claimed the tribe would receive. He was
granted permission for a meeting in Matses territory, where the community
would decide whether or not to sign the contract he had presented. According
to Indian Country Today [1], a news service that caters to a Native American
readership, the leaders were told that the agreement had to be written in
English because "the World Bank and the UN only recognize the English
language." The contract, according to the indigenous rights organization
Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest
(AIDESEP), which advises the Matses and other tribes, gave "considerable
control and powers to [Sustainable Carbon Resources Limited] for an
indefinite period. Effectively this would reduce the Matses to the role of
forest 'gatekeepers' rather than playing an active part in the
administration or co-management of the Project." 

By this point, Pantone's relationship with Nilsson had soured, and his
suspicions had boiled over into a full-fledged investigation into his past.
In late March, Pantone was able to reach two of Nilsson's former associates,
who claimed that they and indigenous communities in the Philippines had been
victims of his deceit. Cecille Villanueva, who worked at an Australia-based
energy consultancy company called Ienergy, sent the following to Pantone in
an email: 

  --We have known him to be deceitful, but also careful in covering himself
from possible legal repercussions. But his character certainly shows a trail
of ... false claims to further his financial objectives, which in the past
involved illegally selling land and running with the monies of vulnerable
people. We hope this does not happen to the Matses.--

She was referencing spurious land deals Nilsson had allegedly made with
residents of the small South Pacific island nation Nauru. In the 1990s,
according to transcripts of meetings in the Queensland Parliament, Nilsson
had sold six rural lots in a coastal area development for $70,000 each.
However, the lots did not exist and the investors in Nauru never received
anything. 

In addition, Nilsson's supposed carbon-credit firm began looking more and
more like a shell company. It didn't have a functioning website or a
physical office, according to a report from The Sydney Morning Herald [2]. 

After Pantone and the Matses shared theses details with AIDESEP and the
Peruvian human rights monitor Defensoria del Pueblo, as well as the local
newspaper, critics quickly labeled Nilsson a "carbon cowboy," and his plans
began to unravel. 

According to reporting by GlobalPost's Simeon Tegel [3], Defensoria del
Pueblo instructed the Matses against signing a contract they couldn't read.
After learning this, Nilsson stormed into the group's office. 

"He shouted. He insulted us, and we told him to leave," Lizbeth Castro, the
director of the office, told GlobalPost [3]. "He said he was going to sue us
and this would not stand. We told him, no problem, sue us. But we will keep
on doing our work." 

In April, the Matses general assembly rejected the project. 

But Nilsson continued to search for ways to get it off the ground, setting
up meetings with another impoverished indigenous group, the Yaguas. He also
dropped the Sustainable Carbon Resources Limited moniker and began operating
under a new entity [3] called Amazon Holdings. 

By October 2011, he had convinced Javier Fasenando, the president of a Yagua
federation, to sign a deal that would allegedly provide profits to the
community "in return for rights to the 'wood' on their land." 

According to GlobalPost [3]: 

  --Fasenando said that he understood the terms of the agreement. "Those who
criticize it come from other communities," he said. "They are envious." 
 
  But at the end of our interview in Spanish, Fasenando struggled to confirm
even the spelling of his own name. Other indigenous leaders confirmed to
GlobalPost that he is unable to read or write. 
 
  Fasenando also was unable to tell me where FEPYRA's copy of the agreement
was. 
 
  Nilsson declined to provide a copy of the contract to GlobalPost, saying
that he needed written permission from the Yagua communities involved in the
deal.--

Then, in an undercover operation led by investigative journalists with 60
Minutes Australia [4] that aired in July 2012, Nilsson explained the real
extent of his plan for the carbon deal to a producer posing as a potential
investor as they sat over a huge map of the territory. 

  --DAVID NILSSON: It's going to be billions. 
 
  PRODUCER: Beg your pardon? 
 
  DAVID NILSSON: Billions. I just, I'm scared to quote it, because it's
fucking huge, put it that way. 
 
  ... 
 
  DAVID NILSSON: My contracts are 200-year contracts, etched in stone, so
when the carbon's gone, people can come through and harvest the rainforest
there. We'd have a forest management plan they can reforest, they can plant
palm oil, they can cut all the timber. No one can stop them. No one can stop
them. 
 
  PRODUCER: But by doing this carbon plan, you're stopping that happening? 
 
  DAVID NILSSON: Yeah, but the carbon plan only goes for 25 years. The
contracts still run and there's enough timber there to supply the world down
there. China will love it.--

The project would profit not only from carbon credits, but also from felling
the very forest it was allegedly protecting. Once the lead investigator,
Liam Bartlett, revealed himself, Nilsson simply said that it wasn't a scam,
and declared the interview over. 

More than a year later, Nilsson refuses to discuss the details. Reached for
comment by The Atlantic twice on his cell phone, he hung up after we
identified ourselves. He did not respond to questions sent to his email
address. 

He has also attempted to smear anyone who questioned his schemes. He filed
charges against Pantone for fraud in Peru (Pantone was eventually cleared of
any wrongdoing) and later set up a defamatory website that accuses him of
horrific crimes. Nilsson also filed criminal charges against a Matses leader
for fraud. 

Chris Lang, a long-time environmental advocate who was one of the first to
report on Nilsson's scams on his website redd-monitor.org [5], received an
email from his service provider, Bluehost, in August of 2011 that forced him
to delete [6] "all images and references to the name" of Nilsson. The
company "had received a 'report of Terms of Service Violations,'" which,
under its policies, includes divulging private information about
third-parties without their consent. 

After the 60 Minutes investigation, Nilsson attempted to impugn the
credibility of the Australian journalists Stephen Rice [7] and Liam
Bartlett. 

In an email to The Atlantic, Rice explained: 

  --Nilsson is demanding that I be sent to jail for entering Peru illegally
on a tourist visa. In fact, I was there on a legitimate journalist visa... 
 
  Most of [the online attacks against me and others are] just semi-literate
rubbish, with laughable sources as "evidence," but there's no doubt Nilsson
is pushing to have criminal charges laid against Liam Bartlett and I in Peru
to make it difficult for us to return. 
 
  He's lodged a 72-page complaint against me with the Australian journalists
Association alleging I breached the journalist's code of ethics and another
against our television network (Channel Nine) with ACMA, the Australian
broadcasting regulator. None of that is of any concern - our story was
entirely accurate - but the complaints reveal the manipulation Nilsson
employs.--

Though there is a warrant for Nilsson's arrest in Peru (for defamation,
which is a criminal offense there), no international law enforcement
organizations have yet investigated him for his alleged crimes. The Yagua
have not received any money from him, according to Al Jazeera [8]. It's
unclear whether he's still peddling carbon projects to potential investors. 

*** 

Though Nilsson's cons were extreme, international law enforcement
authorities and environmental advocates say that the carbon markets are
extremely vulnerable to financial fraudsters like him, especially when it
comes to forest projects. Their shell games can also be hard to spot. As
William Magrath, the World Bank's lead natural resource economist for rural
development in Asia, once put it in a pun in a memo to his colleagues: "It's
a jungle out there." In a meeting he attended with Interpol officials a few
years ago, Magrath recalled, one man leaned back in his chair and called
carbon "a con man's dream." The product is invisible, poorly understood, and
regulation is extremely limited. 

Despite the risks, carbon is the "world's fastest growing commodities
market" valued at about $176 billion in 2011, according to the World Bank.
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the highest volume
compliance market, accounts for $148 billion of that. Countries in Europe
legally require top polluters to remain under certain government-issued
emissions allowances, but companies who emit less can trade those credits to
those who need more. Beyond those allowances, companies can purchase carbon
credits, or offsets, which are linked to emissions reductions projects, like
factory retrofits or other energy efficiency projects. If the U.S. decided
to establish its own cap-and-trade market, the value of the trades could
reach as high as $2 to $3 trillion. Credits from forest projects, like
Nilsson's would have been, have not yet been approved for the compliance
markets, but they are actively sold on a second kind of market for voluntary
buyers interested in offsets. 

Unlike the mandatory compliance credits, voluntary offsets aren't required,
but they essentially allow big companies to claim they're more sustainable
because they're financially supporting environmental projects, like forest
conservation. Though much, much smaller, the $576 million voluntary offsets
market, which includes credits from REDD projects, will likely expand as the
formal compliance market grows. Many of the sales in this market are linked
to corporate social responsibility efforts and are often meant to offset
airline travel, large conferences and events, and manufacturing. A remote
forest community, surrounded by carbon-storing trees, might offer their
credits to say, a major retailer who wants an annual report that boasts a
"green-friendly" initiative, or the like. 

But without legally "binding targets" or formal regulatory bodies designed
to verify the credits, voluntary offsets are also the area that's ripest for
exploitation. Already, many projects that don't meet the UN's environmental
requirements end up eventually being sold on the voluntary carbon market,
according to a June report from Interpol. Other projects offer carbon
credits that are inflated in number based on misleading methodologies, do
not exist on anything but paper, or, like Nilsson's, may serve as a front
for other illicit activities. 

As the only international law enforcement agency "with a trans-boundary
mandate, with designed units addressing both environmental and financial
crimes," Interpol is one of the only agencies fully equipped to parse the
data and identify carbon fraud at both the project and market levels. About
a year ago, it began expanding and developing its intelligence on the
emerging markets so that it could eventually advise and assist its 190
member countries in dismantling scams as new ones came online. 

Its recent report intended to put its member countries "on notice about the
potential pitfalls" of the trading systems, according to Davyth Stewart, a
criminal intelligence officer with Interpol's environmental crime unit. It
highlighted the types of financial fraud the EU-ETS has already become
accustomed to in hopes of forestalling similar schemes abroad. "The
experience we've had with Europe was that it was often the case of chasing
their tail," Stewart said. "You know, constantly on the backfoot, and having
to plug holes that were being exploited. By the time they get around to
discovering the fraud, a number of billions of dollars have already gone
missing." 

*** 

--
A diagram of how a typical "missing trader fraud" works 
http://tinyurl.com/ld4t6rx
Europol
--

On Tuesday, June 2, 2009, carbon traders on the Paris-based BlueNext
exchange noticed "a terrifically high level of activity" on their system,
according to Chris Perryman, Europol's project manager for organized and
economic crimes. A record total of 19.8 million credits swept across the
market, a volume "160 percent higher than ... average daily trading volume
for the first five months of the year (7.4 million)," according to a recent
article [9] by Queensland University of Technology professors Peter Martin
and Reece Walters in the International Journal for Crime, Justice, and
Social Democracy. The next day, activity plummeted to 2.5 million trades.
The brokers communicated their concerns about the transactions to the
government, and French police shut down the market to investigate the
possibility of fraud. 

The crime that the authorities uncovered was a simple and elegant
manipulation of the European value-added tax (VAT) system, called "missing
trader fraud," according to Europol. The strategy had been used in various
scams since the 1990s, particularly with small, high-value products like
computer chips and mobile phones, according to Perryman. In the European
Union, when products and commodities are sold across borders, the buyers are
not required to pay taxes to the seller, but they are when those purchases
occur within one member state. In the case of the "missing trader" scheme, a
seller uses shell brokers to sell the carbon credits and pocket the taxes
from the buyer, and then disappears. 

But the intangible quality of carbon credits dramatically simplified the
process. The criminals no longer had to fake transactions by shipping empty
containers or forging documents. "Just by sitting and selling goods behind
your desk, on your computer, you would suddenly have these ... transactions
which would allow you to sell goods without VAT across a border and then
sell goods with VAT in your own country. And nobody was there to verify it."


After the BlueNext exchange investigation, authorities concluded that "up to
90% of all carbon trading in some countries was a result of these fraudulent
activities. This fraud was estimated to have resulted in losses to several
governments of around 5 billion euros in just over 18 months," according to
the Interpol report. The fraud also destroyed market confidence, further
compounding the economic loss. According to Perryman, organized criminal
syndicates have used the cash they earned from this type of carbon trading
to fund other illicit activities in Europe, including cigarette smuggling,
drug smuggling, and human trafficking. France and other European countries
have since changed their trading rules to remove VAT from carbon
transactions. 

*** 

But VAT was only one of many financial scams. 

According to Interpol, the lack of cross-checking or regulations between
different international markets and exchanges has also allowed carbon
credits from emissions reductions projects to be used on the same market to
offset emissions more than once, eliminating the net environmental benefit
the credits are supposed to provide. 

Additionally, hackers have also compromised weak computer security systems
to steal credits. In January 2011, Europol and Interpol thwarted an attempt
[10] by Romanian web bandits to sell $38.5 million worth of stolen carbon
credits to buyers in the United Kingdom, Austria, and the Netherlands,
according to the Wall Street Journal. They had hijacked foreign servers,
"using them as robots to penetrate trading systems' security and accessing
member accounts through corporate systems that weren't well guarded." 

In another case, hackers broke into [11] the Czech Republic's electronic
carbon registry, run by the state-owned energy firm OTE. A bomb threat was
called into the OTE's Prague offices as the criminals offloaded the stolen
credits, $37.7 million worth, to foreign accounts on registries in Estonia
and elsewhere. "Police speculate that the bomb scare provided a diversion so
that employees wouldn't see phantom cursors moving across unattended screens
or other telltale signs of a breach," according toEcosytem Marketplace's
report [11]. 

Hackers have also set up fake carbon registry websites that have
successfully lured companies and brokers to provide their account login
details, according to Interpol's Stewart. This technique, known as
"phishing," poses an ongoing risk as new registries are established with
unfamiliar requirements in emerging markets. "It becomes easier,
particularly when you've got new investors investing, and markets are new,
for people not to really realize that the website that looks legitimate and
has the nice logos on it is not actually a legitimate one," he said.
"Because the registries and the websites don't yet have enough of a broad
reputation." 

Since the EU has introduced new VAT rules and a single unified registry,
much of the fraud has been eliminated from Europe's market. But Perryman is
still monitoring the system for high-value money laundering. Because
millions of credits can be traded in one transaction, they can serve as an
easy front for concealing the movement of illicit cash earned from other
criminal activities. 

*** 

Assuming the credits are real, the financial schemes merely result in
economic losses. But manipulations also occur on the project side, as well,
and that type of fraud can undermine the very emissions savings and
environmental good that companies and investors are supposedly paying for.
The value of the credits can be superficially inflated, or entirely
invented, as Nilsson's case illustrates. Even when developers are required
to hire outside auditors to verify the emissions reductions, some of the
projects are still not doing what they advertise. 

In an ideal world, developers set up efficiency projects that demonstrate
clear reductions in emissions. Auditors review project claims, visit the
site, verify they are real, and approve them under the UN's Clean
Development Mechanism as Ceritified Emissions Reductions (CERs). Once they
are approved and registered with the United Nations Framework on Climate
Change, they can be traded over the compliance markets to offset the
pollution of large emitters and meet legally mandated caps. In the case of
forest projects, auditors are measuring something that's much more difficult
to quantify. Instead of determining that a factory is no longer producing a
toxic spew, auditors must evaluate whether the project is adequately
protecting an at-risk forest, measure how much carbon is exactly stored
within it, and then certify the emissions savings under the Voluntary Carbon
Standard. That way, investors can buy offsets knowing the claims have been
reviewed. 

But the margin of error for determining the environmental benefits of such
projects varies widely. It lies somewhere between 10 percent for cement and
fertilizer projects and 100 percent for agriculture-oriented projects,
according to a 2010 piece in Harper's [12]. Reporter Mark Schapiro also
detailed the cozy relationships and revolving doors that two prominent
auditors - which have verified roughly two thirds of the UN-approved
emissions savings [12] - share with carbon project developers, who provide
payments to the companies that are charged with guaranteeing the veracity of
their projects. 

The resulting audits are not particularly reliable. When the UN conducted
spot checks of carbon auditors Det Norske Veritas and SGS in 2008 and 2009,
the investigation revealed that both firms certified projects without
visiting them, according to the Interpol report. Both were temporarily
suspended from audits. In some cases, the auditors were ill-qualified to
complete the work, lacking either training or "proper technical skills" for
the projects to which they were assigned. Of course, these reviews only
occurred in-house and not on the ground, Interpol and Harper's note. "With
the number of projects taking place in remote areas of the world, there will
continue to be limits in the United Nations [sic] ability to properly police
those projects," Interpol writes. In addition, according to the 2007
estimates a UN official reported in the Interpol study, 15 to 20 percent of
Clean Development Mechanism projects granted carbon credits did not
adequately prove that that the emissions savings were directly linked to
outside investment. Though these findings were for projects on the
compliance market, the likelihood of passing off false data on the voluntary
market is even greater. 

Interpol's Stewart explained that even savvy investors don't really
understand the process behind how the credits are generated, which makes it
more difficult to detect when something is amiss. "It's not like a bag of
rice or other commodities that can, at some point, be easily verified," he
said. "Here, you'll have projects that are operating in very remote parts of
the world, difficult to access. It becomes very difficult even for an
independent auditor who goes, who can make it all the way out to that remote
village or that remote town to verify that the project exists - and that
they're doing what they say they're doing." Carbon cowboys who set their
sights on forest conservation can flourish quite easily because the product
they sell, according to Tom Bewick, a Rainforest Foundation project manger
who does work on the ground in Peru and Panama, is "an abstract commodity of
nothing happening." 

In the voluntary market, it's really the investor's responsibility to make
the determination whether the operators they're dealing with are legitimate
or not. Because they're making a feel-good purchase, many times, it seems,
they don't evaluate the sellers with much scrutiny. "Anyone can set up a
project and sell voluntary carbon credits to anyone who will buy them,"
Chris Lang, of redd-monitor.org, wrote in an email. "The price can be
whatever they can get away with. A large number of companies have been
selling carbon credits as investments to members of the public - targeting
pensioners. Some people have lost their life savings to this scam." 

In one such case, City of London police arrested Ian Macdonald and David
Downes at London's Heathrow airport after a three-year trans-Atlantic
investigation revealed [13] that the pair had sold $9 million in fake or
worthless carbon credits and shares to investors in the U.K. They had
recruited cronies to use the phone lists from real companies to cold-call
and convince their mostly elderly victims to sign up. "Some victims were
contacted again months later and told companies they had invested in were
the subjects of hostile takeovers and that they needed to buy more shares to
protect their original investment. Individual losses ran as high as
$600,000," a press release announcing the convictions read. The duo, which
deposited the cash in American and Canadian bank accounts, lived
ostentatiously. "We know they traveled the world," Detective Constable
Claire Armson-Smith told British journalists. [14] "Traveled business class.
They had nice cars. Jaguars. Porsches. Nice clothes. Rolex watches." 

Another Australian, Brett Goldsworthy, who operates the company
Shift2Neutral [15][16], has set up what he claimed were huge forest carbon
credit projects that helped Australian PGA and the Sydney Turf Club events
go carbon neutral. But, again, according to reporting by the The Sydney
Morning Herald in 2011 [17], the carbon projects, which Goldsworthy claimed
were based in the Philippines, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Malaysia,
were not not actually happening. Instead, Shift2Neutral, which claimed to
have produced more than $1 billion worth of carbon offsets, had no employees
besides Goldsworthy and was operating out of a small office in a Westleigh,
Australia, shopping center. ''I realized there was something strange about
Brett when we were negotiating with the tribes in the Philippines and he
said he had a boatload of commandos waiting offshore in case he needed a
'hot extraction,''' Robert Hick, an investor who never received any
compensation or returns from Goldsworthy, told the Herald [17]. A website
for Shift2Neutral is still active and has a list of press releases [18] that
outline its projects. 

*** 

--
Predictions of future deforestation from a Conservation International
project description. 
http://cdn.theatlantic.com/newsroom/img/posts/futurepredictions.PNG
Conservation International
--

Even forestry projects that receive certifications through independent
auditors are surprisingly easy to manipulate, according to experts. In vast
thickets of jungle, like the ones Nilsson was after, maps of the land are
usually either poorly labeled or inaccurate, according to Stewart.
Boundaries between forest parcels can often be in dispute. When a developer
claims the rights to a particular section of forest, flaws in titling
records may make it very difficult to prove fraud. 

Corrupt officials and tribal leaders may also claim the authority to make a
deal they can't approve, according to Rainforest Foundation's Bewick, who
also worked as a legitimate carbon credit developer in Colombia a few years
ago. "They're just as likely to be part of the deal if they get something,"
he said. "The people that get screwed are the forest communities." 

Even when there are clear collective titles over sparsely populated swathes
of forest, there's still room for manipulation. 

"For a well-intentioned developer, such as we were, the collective title
implies collective management and common pool resource distribution, which I
would argue lends itself to great chance of sustainability," Bewick wrote
later in an email. "For a fraudster, it can be an opportunity to manipulate
the executive leadership into signing over the carbon rights to a massive
land area. So, yes, a lot less people to deal with or defraud." 

The UN's guidelines for REDD projects are also easy to game. Developers are
required to define an "imaginary" emissions baseline, or the rate at which
logging and other forces would degrade the environment in the event that the
proposed project didn't go into effect. "In essence, the purpose of this
offset policy is to ensure that greenhouse gas reductions are 'in addition
to what would have happened anyway,'" Martin and Walters wrote in the
International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy article. While
this might be easier to prove on a factory retrofit, by, for example, using
an emissions device to measure how much carbon dioxide is released before
modifications, determining how nature and markets will act on a forest in
the future is a guessing game subject to significant corruption. "One can
imagine situations where local collusion might occur in relation to future
land use and, in establishing a baseline, propose ... degradation activities
that may never have been undertaken in reality," the authors continue. If
developers imagined a scenario where half the forest was logged, for
example, the carbon credits would be worth more and the returns on the
market would be much higher, even if that amount of logging was unlikely. 

When Nilsson was initially considering his carbon projects, the proposed
baseline was already an area he planned on fudging. In an email dated
September 21, 2010, he asked Pantone: 

  --Are there any records of deforestation aerial or satellite photos
showing the deforestation logging over the last 10 to 30 years this will
give us an idea when the existing timber will be deleted thus endangering
the Matses land and way of life[?]-- 

Pantone replied two days later, offering the most accurate assessment of the
difficulties in proving deforestation: 

  --There has been very little deforestation of Matses titled lands, with
most being centered around the recently abandoned town of Buenas Lomas
Antigua (the population moved to Buenas Lomas Nueva). I will send you links
to the satellite images and other maps when I return from my trip next
week.--

Despite this information, Nilsson wrote back the same day: 

  --I note that there is very little deforestation on the Matses land Dan[.]
[A]s long as we can demonstrate the rate of deforestation in Peru and how it
can affect the Matses land in time [sic]. 
 
  ...we will have some work to do on this so the Matses land qualifies for a
carbon credit project. Between all of us that is 1 American 2 Aussies 1
Irishwomen and team of experts I do not think it will not [sic] be a big
problem.--

Determining the amount of carbon actually stored in a forest may be more
straightforward than predicting the future, but it, too, has several gaping
holes where crooked operators can creep in. Satellite imagery, according to
Stewart, does not, for instance, provide details on the different species of
trees or how much carbon is stored in the soil. To do that, scientists hired
by developers on the ground must survey the landscape. Due to the expense
and difficulty in locating a parcel of forest in these remote areas,
auditors rarely make the trip to evaluate their interpretations. 

Even if an auditor manages to visit the trees, it becomes a complex and
monumental undertaking, according to Stewart. The results often involve
calculations with a set of assumptions that vary based on the particular
methodology the ecologist employs. "It can be relatively easy for a bribe to
be paid ... to the auditor to choose one methodology over another," Stewart
said. "If you didn't know about the bribe, and you were just looking at the
end result, it would be very difficult to just to notice that." 

In 2010, a British company's overestimation [19] of the amount of carbon
stored in the forests of Liberia would have exposed the country to $2.2
billion of financial risk, an amount higher than its annual GDP. 

*** 

Many of the conmen of the voluntary carbon market can expect to run free
without oversight on the ground or law enforcement follow-ups. "Because it's
not a mandatory market, there often isn't the same regulator oversight, and
so some of these carbon cowboys aren't necessarily being pursued by the law
in the way they necessarily should be," Stewart said. And coming up with a
case is difficult because it's hard to prove much beyond a simple breach of
contract, even though the ultimate damage can devastate the environment and
financially ruin communities. 

The isolation and lack of infrastructure on the ground in most of these
far-flung REDD forest areas make them extremely vulnerable to audacious
operators, who can then market the projects to unknowing investors abroad.
In fact, the weak rule of law seems to be something that the cowboys depend
upon. "If you're a burglar and you're wandering around the streets, and
you've got every window with [a] neighborhood watch [sign]," Perryman said,
"and then you go three blocks away and it doesn't exist, that's where you
break in." 

Iquitos provided the perfect setting for Nilsson's con. One of Nilsson's
translators there, an American who wished to remain anonymous, told The
Atlantic he wasn't going to defend his former employer, and that, given the
undercover video from 60 minutes, his behavior seemed "pretty bad." But all
the lawlessness, corruption, and counter-narratives made it difficult to
decipher the truth in a city where there was an "extremely fine line between
a savvy businessman and a conman," he said. In other words, it was somewhere
where someone like Nilsson could thrive. "It's the frontier," the translator
said. "A lot of [foreigners] go there because they ran out of roads
somewhere else. It's a cesspool, but it's a beautiful place." 

According to a report from Global Witness [20] in 2011, in Cameroon one
guard "must police hundreds of thousands of hectares of forest and several
well-financed European logging companies, yet he has no vehicle, no radio,
and his shoes are several sizes too small." As Martin and Reece note, the
typical location of a REDD project does not have the economic resources,
regulations, or government to defend against scammers. 

There is something especially insidious about these fake forest carbon
credits. Investors and corporations who buy voluntary credits believe they
are buying into something grander than, say, the efficiency improvements of
a single factory in China. They believe they're funding not only the
preservation of trees, but also the wellbeing of local forest communities.
Unwittingly, they might be financing the destruction of both."Forests are
not just a reservoir of carbon," Stewart said. "They're also ecosystems.
They provide biodiversity. They provide habitat. They provide livelihoods
for local people." 

Few investors would expect money designated for forest preservation to be
funneled to an illegal logging operation, but in an unregulated system with
fraudsters like Nilsson, it's entirely possible. “When you retrofit out a
factory or you change the smokestacks and you change the machinery and you
double-glaze the windows, you know that there's going to be long-lasting
benefits," Stewart said. "Whereas with forests, they're constantly under
pressure for being cleared and for being logged. So the level of oversight
is currently inadequate, I think, and not only does it need to be improved,
it needs to be ... sustainable and long-term." 

The voluntary market has provided a preview of what could happen if forest
carbon credits ever hit the higher-stakes compliance carbon market. Though
the EU-ETS has officially put off that possibility until at least 2020,
California's fledgling cap-and-trade system could approve foreign forest
credits sooner. Carbon credits sourced to forest management projects located
within the lower 48 states [21] can already be used to meet compliance
emissions standards there. Village communities in the forest of Chiapas,
Mexico, wrote a letter [22] to California Governor Jerry Brown and other
officials opposing a recent project [23] that California was considering for
inclusion under the program, asking that forest offsets not be approved for
use on the market. They criticized the technical expert that helped set up
the plan, writing that she "was more focused on approving the REDD+ scheme
to assure business interests than guaranteeing the protection of
biodiversity, forests, and indigenous and peasant farmers' territories and
rights." 

Both Interpol and Europol said they expect that if forest credits do become
eligible for trading on the compliance market, the same swindlers who
profited off tax schemes and other loopholes will find ways to manipulate
the forest projects as well. 

"It's a bit of a murky world really," Europol's Perryman said. "It's a shame
because obviously the whole idea from the politicians and legislators was to
promote a cleaner world, and that has just been completely sunk. The good
ideas and good intentions have been scuppered by the activities of
fraudsters." 

Links:

[1] http://tinyurl.com/n4cevmq
[2] http://tinyurl.com/kl5aoaa
[3] http://tinyurl.com/p8k483w
[4] http://sixtyminutes.ninemsn.com.au/stories/8495029/the-carbon-cowboy
[5] http://www.redd-monitor.org/
[6] http://www.redd-monitor.org/2011/08/10/a-carbon-cowboy-internet-censorsh
[7] http://sixtyminutes.ninemsn.com/meettheteam/264630/stephen-rice
[8] http://tinyurl.com/owe9nr3
[9] https://www.crimejusticejournal.com/article/view/95
[10] http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=59344124
[11] http://tinyurl.com/m7dchch
[12] http://citizensclimatelobby.org/files/Conning-the-Climate.pdf
[13] http://tinyurl.com/d6jzju6
[14] http://www.itv.com/presscentre/ep1week32/fraud-squad
[15] http://www.shift2neutral.com/index.php
[16] https://www.shift2neutral.com/index.php
[17] http://www.smh.com.au/environment/20110407-1d6a4.html
[18] https://www.shift2neutral.com/news.php
[19] http://gu.com/p/2ttaq/tw
[20] http://www.globalwitness.org/library/forest-carbon-cash-and-crime
[21] http://www.environmentalleader.com/2013/09/18/california-to-issue-first
[22] http://tinyurl.com/m3mzgc7
[23] http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/05/20135613232989660.html




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