http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/no-need-for-cloaking-effect-with-indonesian-ties/2006/11/16/1163266709779.html
No need for cloaking effect with Indonesian ties Duncan Campbell November 17, 2006 INDONESIA is of vital strategic importance to Australia. That much is generally agreed. How we should deal with that reality is not. In making another security arrangement - a second attempt - with Indonesia, the Howard Government has erred. Indonesia scrapped the first security arrangement when we stepped into the East Timor crisis. That first arrangement became the monument to Paul Keating's boast that his was an irreplaceable relationship with a previous Indonesian president, Soeharto. Subsequently, we have co-operated to counter terrorism and to augment our mutual capabilities to do so, to combat drug and people trafficking, and to respect our sovereign rights. What, then, will we gain in the new agreement, and what is in it for Indonesia? The new text contains no less than four references to territorial integrity and separatism, which are preoccupations uniquely of Indonesia. There is no reference to human rights. But there is a gratuitous reference to non-interference in the internal affairs of the other. If we had to resort to it again, as we did in East Timor, this second agreement would already have gone out the window like its predecessor. Yes, there's a lot on counter-terrorism, but then again existing levels of co-operation are high and productive, without the addition of the agreement. The UN Security Council does not score a mention but then the Indonesians are understandably concerned with the possibility of insurrection and insecurity particularly in and around Ambon and West Papua. On the other hand, if one were asked to identify where, in the arc of instability to our north, our interests might in the foreseeable future be most painfully engaged, it probably would be in Indonesian West Papua. What, then, are we signing up for? Some species of underlying non-aggression pact, a part of which now clearly involves our immutable commitment to Indonesian domination of the Papuans, no matter what? The new agreement will likely introduce more tension and resentment into our bilateral relationship with Indonesia than provide relief at what is bound to become a pressure point. Do John Howard and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono have to share a security blanket just because Keating and Soeharto did? Until the demise of Soeharto and the electoral defeat of Keating, we sought to over-attain in and with Indonesia, looking always to achieve more than we should ever have aimed for or attempted. It has been an infantile failing and remains to be remedied. The late treaty between Keating and Soeharto was part of it. Our relations with Indonesia need to be measured not by some notion of their magnitude but by how effectively we join bilaterally in anticipating friction of a serious nature. The ingredient essential to success will be early detection of problems and preparedness to take them on, even when that means accepting, as it will, some immediate aggravation to prevent the aggregation of damage to a point where relations are seriously, perhaps even permanently, harmed. Our overall relations with Indonesia are so much more important than the Papuan part of them, which is not the same thing as saying the fate of the Papuans is not our concern. We must not let West Papua be handled as we handled East Timor. If we try to evade this issue, if we legislate it off the bilateral agenda as the new security agreement will do, we will end up backing ourselves into a corner. The last thing we should be doing is making West Papua a no-go zone in our relations with Indonesia and in our bilateral discussion of local sources of instability. The Howard Government began its dealings with Indonesia with an air of studied indifference designed to show a clear differentiation with the regional diplomacy of the Keating government. By the time of the Boxing Day tsunami in 2004, the Prime Minister was looking more infatuated than indifferent. In the meantime, he had finally bitten on the bullet in East Timor. Our exposure to Indonesian-grown terrorism was yet to be fully manifested, and the potential divisiveness of our differing legal systems yet to be felt politically in the two countries. Measured over the 10 years of the Howard Government, a combination of miscalculation and mischance has produced an unsettling oscillation in our relations with Indonesia. The tendency has grown to handle problems through prime minister-to-president contact. But with summitry there must be heavy publicity, politically stage-managed for two sets of domestic consumption and if things go wrong, it is difficult to remit the mess to another level. Howard has been lured, like Keating, into mistaken reliance on personal contact with a president. Now he has also duplicated the pursuit of a security pact, which is more likely to become hostage to difficulties in our dealings with Indonesia than to help in handling them. The essential ingredient to successful Australian-Indonesian relations is to succeed in exposing the development of Indonesian West Papua to improved international scrutiny, and we are turning away from that prospect. Duncan Campbell is a former deputy secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] Post message: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subscribe : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe : [EMAIL PROTECTED] List owner : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Homepage : http://proletar.8m.com/ Yahoo! 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