http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/smokers-corner-mad-in-the-middle-580

Mad in the middle 
By Nadeem F. Paracha 
Sunday, 15 Aug, 2010 
 
After the end of the Afghan war, both the puritanical and populist versions of 
the faith have regenerated themselves as a lot more reactionary, emitting 
deluded and anti-intellectual, fascist battle cries. These have not only found 
support among the most desperate sections of society, but, unfortunately, also 
among the now intellectually bankrupt urban middle-class of Pakistan. - Photo 
by AFP 

The political and social aspects of Islam in Pakistan can be seen as existing 
in and emerging from three distinct clusters of thought. These clusters 
represent the three variations of political and social Islam that have evolved 
in this country: i.e. modern, popular and conservative.

The modern aspect of Islamic thought in Pakistan has its roots in the Aligarh 
Movement - the 19-century effort launched by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. His analysis 
convinced him that the Muslims of India had failed to come to grips with the 
new zeitgeist emerging from the rise of western colonialism - a power driven by 
breakthroughs in modern scientific thought and economics, and pragmatic 
politics based on rational and dispassionate self-interest.

Ahmed strived to reinterpret the teachings of Islam so they could be brought in 
harmony with modern science and philosophy, helping the educated Muslims to 
continue holding on to their religion but through a rational and enlightened 
view of life. Though accused of heresy by conservative scholars of the time, 
Ahmed managed to lay the foundations of a modern college in Aligarh in an 
attempt to draw young Muslims away from traditional madressahs.

The Aligarh College soon spawned what came to be known as the 'Aligarh 
generation' - groups of young educated Muslims who would go on to lay the 
initial foundations of the Pakistan Movement. However, a majority of Muslims, 
in what became Pakistan, remained entrenched in the region's popular variations 
of Islam. 

This was the so-called Barelvi Islam that became the mainstay belief of a 
majority of Muslims in the subcontinent. As a movement, it was the reassuring 
enshrinement of the traditional beliefs and rituals that prevailed among 
Muslims due to the long periods of interaction between Sufism and other 
religions of undivided India.

Barelvi Islam became the folk religion of the rural peasants, the urban 
proletariat and the semi-urban, petty-bourgeoisie. It incorporated the 
anti-clergy elements of Sufism, and fused these with the concept of overt 
religious reverence of divine concepts and people, and highly accommodating 
forms of worship that were criticised by puritans as being undesirably 
'innovative.' 

The result was a Muslim society that was repulsed by the dogma of puritanical 
strains; some were open to the idea of modern reinterpretation of Islamic law. 
This strain was generally permissive in its sociology and non-political in 
essence. However, as the popular variation of Islam in Pakistan peaked in the 
1970s, the modern variation (tied to the Aligarh thought) started to erode 
(even though both were quite compatible). 

Things started changing at the state level when, after the 1971 East Pakistan 
debacle, a move was seen afoot in the army towards conservative variations of 
Islam, especially those advocated by the scholar and Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) 
chief, Abul Ala Maududi. The JI was an early advocate of what came to be known 
as 'political' Islam - a modern, political theory that set forward historical 
and theological arguments for an evolutionary reinstatement of Islamic state 
(or a modern-day caliphate), run on the dictates of Sharia.

But it wasn't until the arrival of the Ziaul Haq dictatorship and the 
anti-Soviet 'Afghan Jihad' that political Islam managed to find state approval. 
Furthermore, as both the US and Saudi Arabia pumped in millions of dollars in 
aid so that Zia could construct an effective jihad against the Soviet 
occupation forces in Afghanistan, the more puritanical strains of Islam (such 
as the Deobandi and Wahabi) too began finding official sanction.

Conscious of the hold Barelvi Islam had in Pakistan, the Zia regime also 
attempted to penetrate and regulate Sindh's and Punjab's popular shrine 
culture, trying to align Barelvi thought with the clergy and jihad-oriented 
strains of the faith that he was advocating. The results were devastating. 

The corruption emerging from the large amounts of financial aid and state 
patronage that politically-motivated and puritanical versions of the faith were 
able to enjoy in Pakistan during the 'Afghan jihad' not only helped the 
puritanical thought overwhelm the lingering strains of 'modernist Islam' in 
society, large sections of the moderate populist version of the religion too 
went through mutation. Today this phenomenon is not only the militant mainstay 
of various Islamist organisations (such as the Taliban), but also a rude social 
discourse. 

It has been attracting a large number of the urban middle-class as well, most 
of who now seem completely divorced from their early moorings toward modern 
variations of the faith. Also tainted by this discourse were sections of the 
moderate populist strains of the religion that have eventually grown their own 
intransigent and highly militant tentacles. For example, for every 
Wahabi/Deobandi-backed Sipah-i-Sahaba there is now a Barelvi-backed Sunni 
Tehreek or a Shia-backed Sipah-i-Muhammad. 

After the end of the Afghan war, both the puritanical and populist versions of 
the faith have regenerated themselves as a lot more reactionary, emitting 
deluded and anti-intellectual, fascist battle cries. These have not only found 
support among the most desperate sections of society, but, unfortunately, also 
among the now intellectually bankrupt urban middle-class of Pakistan. 





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