Balazs Scheidler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > There is one more thing I'd like to add to the requirements list: When
> > doing authentication with spki keys, it's not necessary to transmit
> > the public key as part of the protocol. It is enough to send the hash
> > of the corresponding sexp.
>
> But sometimes it is necessary to have the whole publickey with certificates,
> since privilege delegation cannot be done otherwise. Suppose you have an
> SPKI acl giving permission for an individual to log in, and also to delegate
> this privilege. The one who received this privilege has to send the whole
> SPKI sequence, having the certificate of the original individual.
You can send the hash instead of the full key for any key that you
expect the server to already have. But not otherwise, of course.
I was thinking that the server would store all authorized keys, but in
fact, that is not necessary. The hash must be stored in the
appropriate acl, but the full key could be provided either by the
serverside key database, or in the client's userauth request, as
desired. If the key is provided both ways, they could be compared for
sanity checking (and to get famous for finding a possible hash
collision ;).
> PS: I'll try to be a bit more constructive tomorrow, but I got to get some
> sleep now. :)
Good night. ;)
/Niels
