The P3P folks would disagree with your characterisation of uptake
(e.g., <http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/icec06.pdf>). I'm staying out
of it :)
On 2007/07/04, at 12:45 PM, Jonas Sicking wrote:
Ah, that makes sence. Though given the very poor uptake of p3p I
don't think that parity with it is very important. I'd prefer to do
what is safest and easiest to use.
/ Jonas
Mark Nottingham wrote:
IIRC (and I could be remembering wrongly), it was done this way to
align with how p3p.xml, etc. work, so there wouldn't be multiple,
almost-the-same-but-conflicting standards out there.
Cheers,
On 2007/07/04, at 10:35 AM, Jonas Sicking wrote:
Hi All,
Currently the spec says that a rule like "*.example.com" does not
match a request from example.com. The result is that if you want
to give access to anything coming from example.com, including any
subdomains, you'll have to write a rule like:
Content-Access-Control: allow <*.example.com>, <example.com>
And similarly, if you want to deny requests from evil.com you
have to do:
Content-Access-Control: deny <*.evil.com>, <evil.com>
I think it would be better if *.example.com also matched
example.com.
Pros:
In many cases you can write simpler rules since I'd imagine it's
more likely that you want to deny or grant access to both a
domain and its subdomains, than that you just want one of the two.
There's no longer a risk that someone will think that
*.example.com does match example.com.
Cons:
There's a risk that someone will think that *.example.com does
not match example.com.
I actually think that the consequences of misunderstanding is
smaller in the latter case. Lets example the possible
misunderstandings under the two algorithms:
== Current algorithm, *.example.com does not match example.com ==
Author uses the rule
Content-Access-Control: allow <*.example.com>
and thinks this grants access to example.com
The consequences aren't very bad, the only thing that will happen
is that when the site example.com is used things will not work.
This is easily detectable and fixed
Author uses the rule
Content-Access-Control: deny <*.example.com>
and thinks this denies access to example.com
The consequences are bad. Access is not denied to example.com
even though that was intended.
== Proposed algorithm, *.example.com does match example.com ==
Author uses the rule
Content-Access-Control: allow <*.example.com>
and thinks this does not grant access to example.com
The consequences are somewhat bad, access is granted to
example.com even though that was not intended. However, it is
likely that however runs example.com could simply set up
foo.example.com and use that to get access. In general I can't
think of a real-world example where you'd trust the subdomains of
a site, but not the top domain.
Author uses the rule
Content-Access-Control: deny <*.example.com>
and thinks this does not deny access to example.com
The consequences aren't very bad, the only thing that will happen
is that when the site example.com is used things will not work.
This is easily detectable and fixed.
/ Jonas
--
Mark Nottingham [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--
Mark Nottingham [EMAIL PROTECTED]
