I thought from your note that this was opening up a new attack vector but that was acceptable because the functionality that results in the vector is so desirable. Cheers, Dave
________________________________
From: Jon Ferraiolo [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, January 15, 2008 9:46 AM
To: David Orchard
Cc: Anne van Kesteren; WAF WG (public);
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: ISSUE 19: Requirements and Usage Scenarios document
David,
Wouldn't it be simpler to just say "no new attack vectors"
rather than attempt to find wording that says "aren't already
similar..."? If it's a new attack vector, I don't think it matters
whether it is similar to something that already exists.
Jon
"David Orchard" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
"David Orchard" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent by:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
01/15/2008 08:44 AM
To
"Anne van Kesteren" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Jon Ferraiolo/Menlo
Park/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
cc
"WAF WG (public)" <[email protected]>
Subject
RE: ISSUE 19: Requirements and Usage Scenarios document
Anne,
If Cookies would be sent as part of more requests because of
deployment
of the Access Control spec, then isn't this spec opening a new
attack
vector? I understand your point that cookies are already sent
under
img, script and form, but this is something newer and in
addition to
those. I think one of the rough requirements we have is no new
attack
vectors. Now maybe that requirement ought to be something like
"no new
attack vectors that aren't already similar to current attack
vectors
such as cookies under img, script and form".
Cheers,
Dave
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Anne
> van Kesteren
> Sent: Tuesday, January 15, 2008 7:53 AM
> To: Jon Ferraiolo
> Cc: WAF WG (public)
> Subject: Re: ISSUE 19: Requirements and Usage Scenarios
document
>
>
> On Tue, 15 Jan 2008 15:20:46 +0100, Jon Ferraiolo
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
> > I described a CSRF scenario in
> >
> http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-appformats/2008Jan/
0072.html.
> > Search for the word "attack". My example attack vector
depends on
> > cookies being sent as part of the cross-site request and
> assumes that
> > the simplicity of using Access Control would result is
widespread
> > adoption by a new generation of unsophisticated web service
> developers
> > who will open up their APIs to mashup applications without
> > understanding the consequences.
> > Note that the big CSRF worry here is that cookies are sent
with the
> > requests.
>
> Cookies are already sent for <img>, <script>, and <form>
> requests. Nothing new. If people mindless opt in we have
> might have a problem (though it's really the people that opt
> in that do), but I would expect that dalmationlovers.invalid
> & co are using some off the shelf software.
>
>
> --
> Anne van Kesteren
> <http://annevankesteren.nl/>
> <http://www.opera.com/>
>
>
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