On 18 October 2012 17:34, Ben Laurie <[email protected]> wrote: > On 9 October 2012 14:19, Henry Story <[email protected]> wrote: > > Still in my conversations I have found that many people in security > spaces > > just don't seem to be able to put the issues in context, and can get > sidetracked > > into not wanting any linkability at all. Not sure how to fix that. > > You persist in missing the point, which is why you can't fix it. The > point is that we want unlinkability to be possible. Protocols that do > not permit it or make it difficult are problematic. I have certainly > never said that you should always be unlinked, that would be stupid > (in fact, I once wrote a paper about how unpleasant it would be). > > As I once wrote, anonymity should be the substrate. Once you have > that, you can the build on it to be linked when you choose to be, and > not linked when you choose not to be. If it is not the substrate, then > you do not have this choice. > > What are the criteria for anonymity to be considered an acceptable substrate?
1. For example if I dont send my certificate, no one can ever link me. Is that good enough? 2. I suggested a shared anonymous identity (either an individual or group) eg at http://webid.info/#anon . What that solve the problem. 3. Are we looking for more crypto style proofs, such as chaumian blinding, anonymous veto, OpenPGP style subkeys or one time shared secrets? I understand what you are suggesting, but on what criteria would a suggested solution be measured?
