There's been some discussion of what request headers, if any,
XMLHttpRequest should disallow for setREquestHeader.
I think we really need a clear idea of what we are trying to do by
restricting headers. I propose that the following are valid reasons
to forbid setting a header:
1) It would allow for a possible security hole.
2) It would allow a client to cause the UA to violate the http RFC
(besides just requirements on syntax, obviously those are possible
with any header).
3) It could seriously interfere with correct operation of the network
layer (specifically, it could break in-progress or future requests,
or cause improper responses to be added to the fache.
I would tentatively say the following are not valid reasons to
restrict a header:
4) It could result in content that the UA might not be able to parse
as text or as XML (this can happen anyway with no custom headers).
5) It could result in a response that the UA can't parse at the
network level (unless we think this could cause problems so serious
that category #3 applies).
6) It would not match expectations for information that is commonly
present (but in a way that is not a security issue or a violation of
the http standard).
If we agree with this, then I think the standard should list the 3
criteria for restricting headers above, and give a justification for
any header that is restricted.
Applying these rules, I think the following http headers should be
restricted:
* Connection (2, 3) - could break other requests on same persistent
connection; MUST be 'close' in UAs that don't support persistent
connections
* Date (2) - only allowed to be correct date
* Keep-Alive (2, 3) - could break requests on same connection or
confuse UAs that don't actually support keep-alive
* Trailer (2) - only allowed with chunked transfer-encoding, some
header field names not allowed, must accurately reflect presence of
trailer
* Transfer-Encoding (2, 3) - property of whole message, no way this
could properly be set by the XHR client
* Upgrade (1, 2, 3) - could allow escape to SSL, violating cross-site
scripting security rules, could be used to violate RFC by specifying
protocol UA does not understand, the latter could actually interfere
with correct client operation
* Expect (2, maybe 3) - client MUST not send an Expect header if it
does not intend to send a request body
* Host (1) - could be used to subvert cross-site sripting rules on
servers that use virtual hosting
* Referer (possibly 1, 2) - the RFC does not appear to allow this to
be set to anything but the resource that originated the request (and
in some cases requires it to not be sent). Could be a security
violation if a site depends on Referer always being either correct or
absent.
* TE (3) - seems like requesting an unknown transfer encoding or
trailers for clients that don't understand trailers
The following are suspicious. I wasn't able to figure out a specific
problem but they seem like they might have the potential for security
holes, breaking the protocol, or breaking the client's network stack:
Via
Accept-Encoding
From
Max-Forwards
Proxy-Authorization
The following seem OK to me:
Cache-Control
Pragma
Warning
Accept
Accept-Charset
Accept-Language
Authorization
If-Match
If-Modified-Since
If-None-Match
If-Range
If-Unmodified-Since
Range
User-Agent
Cookie
Cookie2
Relative to the current spec, this removes restrictions on the
following:
- Accept-Charset
- Accept-Encoding
- If-Modified-Since
- If-None-Match
- If-Range
- Range
And adds restrictions on the following:
- Date
- Trailer
- Transfer-Encoding
- Upgrade
- Expect
- Referer
- TE
Regards,
Maciej