On 2006/04/13, at 5:06 PM, Ian Hickson wrote:
The right way to do this is with OPTIONS, but there's very poor Web
server support for it.
OPTIONS is one of those features that was very nice in theory but
is dead
in practice. We can't realistically rely on it.
I know :(
This proposal has some nice attributes, but it's very complex.
I think it is simpler (a lot simpler) than a system based on a known
location, with its own file format, etc. This is especially the
case given
that we need <?access-control?> anyway -- my proposal is just an
additional set of rules for how to restrict XMLHttpRequest in a way
that
relies on that separate spec, and is describable in a few paragraphs.
Well, this proposal makes some trade-offs, relative to a known
location / site-wide policy. It enforces a one-to-one resource-to-
policy relationship, which allows the scenarios you mention (e.g.,
many authors on one server, administrative access issues) but it
incurs considerable overhead for sites that *do* have homogenous
policies and/or a single administrator; each distinct unsafe request
will require a separate policy request, and the policy will need to
be co-ordinated across a potentially large number of resources.
That will in turn encourage such sites to offer very coarse-grained
resources, overload content negotation, misuse GET or play other
tricks to avoid the extra round trips, which is a step in the wrong
direction IMO.
What about allowing in-content / in-header policy for safe methods,
and going to a well-known location for unsafe methods?
If it were me, I'd be inclined to put a known location in the WD
(say,
/w3c/access-control) in order to get the TAG -- or anybody else --
motivated to come up with a better solution.
That's a very dangerous way of designing specs. You are most likely
to end
up having implementations of your straw man.
Perhaps. I'm concerned about proliferating models and means of
attachment of Web metadata; this, the content labels work, Web
description, etc. It would be good if every WG didn't invent a
different way of doing this. The well-known location cat is already
out of the bag; this is a new and unknown beast.
By that time the side effects have already happened on the server
side.
Many CGI tools (unfortunately) treat GET query args and POST
bodies as
equivalent, so there will be situations where it's possible to
craft an
attack against a server whereby a GET has side effects.
This is out of scope for this proposal since it is already possible
to do
both GET and POST submissions to arbitrary URIs without any protection
whatsoever.
OK (assuming you're referring to script tags and the like). As stated
before, I'm not sure the existence of one hole justifies the
intentional opening of other holes.
The XMLHttpRequest cross-site protection only needs to protect
against two things:
1. Actually reading the data that is returned, and
2. Sending of request entity body payloads that are MIME types
other than
text/plain, multipart/form-data, application/x-www-form-
urlencoded,
and application/x-www-form+xml.
The second is only to protect against hypothetical servers that are
actually checking the Content-Type of submissions. In practice I doubt
it'll make the slightest difference.
Not following you; why should other media types be prohibited? E.g.,
why can't I POST or PUT some JSON or RDF to another site, if it wants
to let me?
My proposal actually protects more than that, it protects against
reading
the returned data and _any_ entity payloads. This is overkill, but
makes
the model simpler. (The extra roundtrip is only required for the
second of
these, which is probably overkill. We could probably drop it.)
Again, not following you; I thought the point of the second round
trip was to avoid any undesired state changes / side effects on the
server. If you're saying that it's OK for XHR to do an exploratory
POST, PUT or DELETE against a server to see if the results have
access-control information in them, I can't agree.
3) "Domain:" doesn't seem like the greatest name for something that
includes more than a DNS domain name, but I guess we can pretend it
means "security domain" or something.
I am not in any way attached to any of the names, I don't mind
better
names, e.g. if we want Security-Domain: or whatever.
I personally like Referer-Domain, as it is similar to the existing
Referer header (in fact, duplicitous, but whatever).
Referer has path information, which is a privacy problem; Referer-
Domain
would only include the domain, to get around this. (And the scheme, to
allow for checks against DNS spoofing, but that's a minor detail.)
Could you go into that a bit more deeply? The site with control over
the cross-site request is the same party that controls how the
Referer is constructed (by controlling how their URIs are laid out),
so what's the exact concern here? How is this different from a normal
link between sites?
There's also a bit of asymmetry here with the goals you stated
earlier; you wanted to allow people who didn't control a whole site
to set access control, but Domain doesn't allow the target of that
XHR request to identify the resource accessing it beyond the site
it's on.
Cheers,
--
Mark Nottingham
[EMAIL PROTECTED]