On 6/16/10 12:59 PM, David Rogers wrote:
[DAVID] I was actually referring to:
http://dev.w3.org/2009/dap/privacy-reqs/
(As mentioned in previous correspondence, I think securing an API and
privacy can be decoupled, but both are very relevant topics).
I've read that document and think that much of it is reasonable (the
first section matches the section in the licensing document, which I
thought was reasonable), but I strongly disagree with the explicit vs.
implicit reasoning here. You say:
"D evice APIs may also be defined such that consent must be explicit,
not implicit. Examples are a camera API that takes a photograph without
user involvement, or a messaging API that sends a message without the
user pressing "send." In these cases dialogs may be required."
A Camera API that takes a photograph without user involvement seems like
something that is risky to build into web content, and I'm not sure I
totally understand the use case behind it. Earlier email threads have
raised the issue of the policy-file based security model. While you say
dialogs 'may' be required, you also make a case for not overwhelming the
use with dialogs. This isn't as clear as it could be.
Bryan's email --
http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webapps/2010AprJun/1050.html
-- gives a good explanation of points where it may make sense to specify
additions to the API. Robin's email --
http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webapps/2010AprJun/1055.html
-- proposes a layered approach in the File* context which makes sense,
namely layering into the existing File model additional features that
cross the current sandbox.
and yes I don't want to
pre-judge the outcome of the workshop but we all pretty much acknowledge
that there are privacy issues we need to deal with and that the design
of any the work we're doing here should take it into account (in the
same way as security). The whole basis of establishing the DAP working
group was to protect the consumer and improve on the current status quo.
Like you, I'm not precious about where things live, but I just want to
make sure that if the file related APIs go into webapps that we can
continue in that spirit, not just forget all that - otherwise there is
no point and you won't see take-up of the API in the long-term because
it would be too risky. As I said before, there is no value in creating a
schism here, it would create more problems for W3C as a community and is
absolutely needless.
I think privacy is important. I think security is important. I think
wherever work is done, both should be respected.
2) Also, please can you outline the security model that you will
propose
if it does transfer to WebApps - would it allow for management of
access
to the file system by policy (in the BONDI manner or by Google
Powerbox
or Mozilla's separate policy scheme)?
If so, the security model (which needs
more work and shouldn't be considered final by any means) probably
shouldn't be based on policy schemes like BONDI's policy language. I'm
not sure yet what to make of PowerBox, but I'm personally not
considering it in this regard. There isn't a separate Mozilla policy
scheme, but the same-origin scheme for scripts and the separation of
chrome content and web content is applicable here.
[DAVID] So I'll take that as an agreement that we need to address the
security model properly before we can progress. Can we work together to
achieve this?
Certainly. If you have concerns about security (or privacy) in any
WebApps API, you should share these on the listserv.
3) Would your proposed API require prompts to the user and explicit
user
acceptance of some sort?
*Which* proposed API? The File API (covering FileReader) already uses
the existing selection mechanism via input elements, and is shipping in
Firefox 3.6.3. This does have explicit user acceptance, but this model
has already been around in the web for interacting with file systems.
We should secure this model further in lieu of proposing a new one. So,
earlier proposals for spawning a script-only FileDialog were abandoned.
[DAVID] Yes agreed, so this is where OMTP and Google are coming from -
we need to deal with this issue head-on. How would you propose to deal
with file writing if you need explicit user acceptance - bombard the
user with prompts? It doesn't and can't work and is an out-of-date
mechanism that has been abused for years via social engineering and
technical means. Users end up having to download applications to do this
sort of stuff now for picture uploading etc. Let's try and tackle it
together and come up with a decent solution, but first we need to agree
that these issues will be properly taken into consideration if file
writing moves over from DAP.
The user shouldn't be bombarded with prompts, nor should user
notification be bypassed. You've identified an important issue, which
is also an issue in Eric's specification:
http://dev.w3.org/2009/dap/file-system/file-writer.html#obtaining-file-writers
The existing mechanisms ("Save As" or "input selection" along with
additional "saveas" semantics) are considered here. I'd consider this
work in progress, and there is more than enough room for constructive
discussions on how to secure the experience.
-- A*
