On 18/11/16 14:02, Gervase Markham via Public wrote:
On 18/11/16 13:48, Doug Beattie wrote:
* Do you propose that CAs
create new CA certificates every time a new EKU needs to be supported
in an end entity certificate?

If we are going to avoid having SHA-1-issuing intermediates out there
which can also issue server certs, then they are all going to need to be
EKU-constrained, and so this particular bullet is going to be necessary.

Please reconsider the EKU requirement in CA certificates (SHA-1 and
SHA-256).  It's too bad we can't say: AnyEKU except id-kp-serverAuth
or id-kp-codeSigning

I can see the issue you are raising, but I wonder if there is a middle
ground between the current position and "anything in any combination as
long as no serverAuth". Particularly as, if Erwann is right, the
pathlen=0 constraint can be bypassed. I'm particularly concerned about
email, that being the other thing Mozilla's root store now cares about.

What EKUs are commonly combined in an EE cert with
id-kp-emailProtection, other than id-kp-clientAuth?

crt.sh currently has 302 CA certificates that contain the id-kp-clientAuth EKU OID and that are trusted by Microsoft and/or Mozilla and/or Apple.

Here's a summary of the EKU OIDs contained in those 302 intermediate certs:

 count |    x509_extkeyusages     |            purpose
-------+--------------------------+--------------------------------
   302 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4        | id-kp-emailProtection
   284 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2        | id-kp-clientAuth
   104 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1        | id-kp-serverAuth
    60 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9        | id-kp-OCSPSigning
    40 | 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.5     | szOID_KP_CA_EXCHANGE
    37 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3        | id-kp-codeSigning
    32 | 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2   | szOID_KP_SMARTCARD_LOGON
    29 | 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.4   | szOID_EFS_CRYPTO
    28 | 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.6     | szOID_KP_KEY_RECOVERY_AGENT
    26 | 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1   | szOID_ENROLLMENT_AGENT
    25 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.8        | id-kp-timeStamping
    20 | 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.4.1 | szOID_EFS_RECOVERY
    20 | 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.11  | szOID_KP_KEY_RECOVERY
    20 | 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.19    | szOID_DS_EMAIL_REPLICATION
    17 | 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12  | szOID_KP_DOCUMENT_SIGNING
    16 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.7        | id-kp-ipsecUser
    15 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.5        | id-kp-ipsecEndSystem
    15 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.6        | id-kp-ipsecTunnel
     8 | 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.1   | szOID_KP_CTL_USAGE_SIGNING
     6 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.8.2.2        | IP security IKE intermediate
     5 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.14       | id-kp-eapOverLAN
     4 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.17       | id-kp-ipsecIKE
     3 | 1.3.6.1.5.2.3.5          | id-pkinit-KPKdc
     3 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.10       | id-kp-dvcs
     3 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.11       | id-kp-sbgpCertAAServerAuth
     3 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.13       | id-kp-eapOverPPP
     3 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.15       | id-kp-scvpServer
     3 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.16       | id-kp-scvpClient
     3 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.20       | id-kp-sipDomain
     2 | 1.3.6.1.4.1.16082.2.3.5  | ? Bechtel Corporation
     2 | 1.3.6.1.4.1.16082.2.3.6  | ? Bechtel Corporation
     2 | 2.16.840.1.114027.40.3   | ? Entrust Technologies
     2 | 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.9   | szOID_ROOT_LIST_SIGNER
     1 | 1.3.6.1.4.1.29452.1.1    | ? DigitalPersona, Inc.
     1 | 1.2.840.113583.1.1.5     | Adobe Authentic Document
     1 | 2.16.840.1.114027.40.11  | ? Entrust Technologies
     1 | 2.16.840.114027.40.4     | ? Entrust Technologies
     1 | 2.16.840.1.114027.40.4   | ? Entrust Technologies

Useful links:
https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/kb/287547
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-housley-pkix-oids-03
https://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers/enterprise-numbers

--
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

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