I'm afraid that hasn't been considered, as release of any of the data set would require legal review.
Something I could audit and then run locally would be ideal. I've started such a tool at https://github.com/jcjones/aia-chaser (and just made it mostly work, I think), but it will take a little more time before I can process the data with it. Review is welcome. On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 10:12 AM, Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]> wrote: > Considering that SSLLabs offers such a tool, has Mozilla considered > reaching out to them to exercise a scan of the subset of hosts you're > interested in, and sharing that data? > > On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 1:08 PM, J.C. Jones <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Ryan, >> >> As mentioned in the bug discussion, it's not to be taken that 5.88% is >> gospel, rather that it's 1) a very noisy indication of the effect fetching >> would have on total errors, and 2) a call for interested community members >> to help us do more with the data. >> >> More sophisticated analysis is absolutely welcome; we have both the >> certificate dataset and the hostname dataset which we can operate on. If >> someone were interested in writing a tool that, given a host, would >> determine whether AIA fetching would avoid a connection error, I'd be happy >> to run it and provide the results to the community. >> >> (Note to implementers, we'd need to probably provide Moz's trusted roots >> as a configuration item, too) >> >> Cheers, >> >> J.C. >> Crypto Engineering >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 9:08 AM, Ryan Sleevi via Public < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> That is most unfortunate. >>> >>> It doesn't look like the code in https://gist.github.com/moz >>> keeler/29754494dcdb3b169483595283f29923 fully accounts for the value of >>> AIA with respect to finding alternative paths on such connections. That is, >>> it seems like it undercounts for situations such as: >>> >>> Leaf -> Intermediate 1 -> Intermediate 2 -> Old CA >>> -> Intermediate 1 -> Intermediate 2' -> New CA >>> -> Intermediate 1' -> New CA >>> >>> >>> The analysis Mozilla performed only appeared to examine the end-entity >>> certificate, as noted in https://bugzilla.mozilla.or >>> g/show_bug.cgi?id=399324#c80 . However, Chrome's experience with AIA is >>> that it is most useful for covering the root key rollover and intermediate >>> rollover scenarios. I can think of a number of CA members who have >>> exercised this code path, but such data was excluded from your analysis. >>> >>> I appreciate you looking into this matter, though, and for ensuring the >>> data and tools were publicly available in order to perform such an analysis. >>> >>> An alternative methodology to examine would be to examine the supplied >>> chains from the subset of servers (or user error reports) for which you're >>> interested in, and determine whether there exists a path to a known Mozilla >>> trust anchor. For example, you could use the CCADB disclosures, crt.sh >>> dataset (which handedly already groups by ca_id), or directly from >>> Certificate Transparency log servers. For such situations where the server >>> did not supply a path that immediately resolved, but one or more paths was >>> known to Mozilla, you could examine whether or not the AIA identity >>> provided by the common elements in that path (even if the only common >>> element was the leaf) would have provided one or more intermediates known >>> to be valid. >>> >>> I do hope you reconsider, because it does appear that the testing >>> methodology was flawed. >>> >>> On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 10:51 AM, Gervase Markham via Public < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Participants may be interested in some recent research we did on AIA >>>> chasing: >>>> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=399324#c80 >>>> >>>> The upshot is that Firefox has no plans to implement this feature. >>>> >>>> Gerv >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Public mailing list >>>> [email protected] >>>> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public >>>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Public mailing list >>> [email protected] >>> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public >>> >>> >> >
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