I think Mads addressed your question about Method 1 and the domain cabforum.org – yes, GoDaddy is the “owner” of that domain in WhoIs, and could get an OV cert with Go Daddy Operating Company, LLC in the O field if it wanted (assuming it can otherwise pass the OV vetting process). That’s because the Forum is not a corporate entity, so we couldn’t register the domain in the name of the CA/Browser Forum. (In essence, GoDaddy is holding the certificate in trust for the Forum members – thanks, Daymion).
On your suggestion: As a side note, do you think it would be helpful to put something in the BRs to basically say “you still have to validate everything in a certificate; if these BRs appear to allow a process which is not an effective validation, or some choices in your implementation of the process makes it ineffective, you must do whatever additional process is necessary to ensure an effective validation”? An overall “don’t be stupid” rule. That might be a very good idea. We already have a requirement for EV certs at EVGL Sec. 11.13 that a CA must perform final cross-correlation and due diligence on an EV cert applicant’s file to “review all of the information and documentation assembled in support of the EV Certificate application and look for discrepancies or other details requiring further explanation.” In addition, under that section “The CA MUST refrain from issuing an EV Certificate until the entire corpus of information and documentation assembled in support of the EV Certificate Request is such that issuance of the EV Certificate will not communicate factual information that the CA knows, or the exercise of due diligence should discover from the assembled information and documentation, to be inaccurate,. If satisfactory explanation and/or additional documentation are not received within a reasonable time, the CA MUST decline the EV Certificate Request and SHOULD notify the Applicant accordingly.” Of course, the EV verification process is a manual process, while many of the domain verification processes in the BRs are totally automated and not as easily subject to final cross-correlation and due diligence before issuing the cert. But we could put language like you suggest in the BRs to emphasize to CAs that it may not be enough to do the bare minimum in following a verification process if you have reason to know the process you are implementing will not achieve the goal of the BR requirement. From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, January 19, 2018 3:55 PM To: Kirk Hall <[email protected]> Cc: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <[email protected]>; Mads Egil Henriksveen <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] [EXTERNAL] Verification of Domain Contact and Domain Authorization Document On Jan 19, 2018, at 12:16 PM, Kirk Hall <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Sorry for the misquotation – I left off “*** directly with the Domain Name Registrar,” which is generally what we have been discussing – a WhoIs lookup to see who owns the domain. That wasn’t my objection—it was to the words “by verifying that”. But do you see my point that “validating the Applicant as the Domain Contact” (current language) could simply be confirming a hacker in both roles, but would not be validating the Registrant information as to the organization that owns the domain? Which would not be sufficient to include the Registrant Organization name in the O field of an OV or EV cert. That’s why we made the change, which makes Method 1 more secure in our opinion. Are some CAs validating by saying that, for example, someone has control of cabforum.org<http://cabforum.org> and so based only on that and the whois information they can be issued a certificate with O=Go Daddy? That would be unfortunate. As a side note, do you think it would be helpful to put something in the BRs to basically say “you still have to validate everything in a certificate; if these BRs appear to allow a process which is not an effective validation, or some choices in your implementation of the process makes it ineffective, you must do whatever additional process is necessary to ensure an effective validation”? An overall “don’t be stupid” rule. Again, Method 1 was the original validation method starting in the 1990s, and I think it’s proven its worth over the years. Processes often work great until someone works out how to abuse them, and then they don’t, sadly. From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, January 19, 2018 11:52 AM To: Kirk Hall <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Cc: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>; Mads Egil Henriksveen <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] [EXTERNAL] Verification of Domain Contact and Domain Authorization Document On Jan 19, 2018, at 11:23 AM, Kirk Hall <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: First, I think everyone knows what CAs are supposed to do under Method 1 I’m fairly sure this is not the case… , and the lack of misissuance reports means CAs are doing it right. Here’s how Method 1 starts now: “Conforming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by validating the Applicant as the Domain Contact by verifying that: ***” You can see why I think CAs might not know what they’re supposed to do, because the above quote is not the actual words from the the Baseline Requirements! Right now, in BR 1.5.4, Method 1 starts with these words: Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by validating the Applicant is the Domain Contact directly with the Domain Name Registrar. This method may only be used if: Your version prescribes a method. The actual current requirements specify an objective and don’t specify a method. Now, I’m not against prescribing a method, but the method prescribed does need to achieve the original objective, and I think the proposed method is inadequate to do that…
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