Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lampre...@proxmox.com> --- ...55-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bound-write.patch | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++ Makefile | 1 + 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+) create mode 100644 CVE-2016-3955-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bound-write.patch
diff --git a/CVE-2016-3955-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bound-write.patch b/CVE-2016-3955-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bound-write.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d3f9fd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/CVE-2016-3955-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bound-write.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +From b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korcha...@gmail.com> +Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2016 18:00:29 +0000 +Subject: USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write + +Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer +usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a +packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As +part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for +urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted. +Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the +preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data. +Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory. + +Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korcha...@gmail.com> +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org> +--- + drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c +index facaaf0..e40da77 100644 +--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c +@@ -741,6 +741,17 @@ int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb) + if (!(size > 0)) + return 0; + ++ if (size > urb->transfer_buffer_length) { ++ /* should not happen, probably malicious packet */ ++ if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) { ++ usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP); ++ return 0; ++ } else { ++ usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP); ++ return -EPIPE; ++ } ++ } ++ + ret = usbip_recv(ud->tcp_socket, urb->transfer_buffer, size); + if (ret != size) { + dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "recv xbuf, %d\n", ret); +-- +cgit v0.12 + diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 6a26e8a..694c01a 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ ${KERNEL_SRC}/README ${KERNEL_CFG_ORG}: ${KERNELSRCTAR} #cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 <../add-empty-ndo_poll_controller-to-veth.patch cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 <../override_for_missing_acs_capabilities.patch #cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 <../vhost-net-extend-device-allocation-to-vmalloc.patch + cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 <../CVE-2016-3955-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bound-write.patch sed -i ${KERNEL_SRC}/Makefile -e 's/^EXTRAVERSION.*$$/EXTRAVERSION=${EXTRAVERSION}/' touch $@ -- 2.1.4 _______________________________________________ pve-devel mailing list pve-devel@pve.proxmox.com http://pve.proxmox.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/pve-devel