On Tue, Apr 12, 2016 at 01:38:09PM +0200, Maciej Fijalkowski wrote: > Jon, let me reiterate. You asked people to break it (that's the title > of the thread) and they did so almost immediately. Then you patched > the thing and asked them to break it again and they did. Now the > faulty assumption here is that this procedure, repeated enough times > will produce a secure environment - this is not how security works,
That is not an accurate summary of what has happened so far, nor am I making that assumption. You are misunderstanding the purpose of the experiment - I am not sure how, as I have tried to be quite clear. The question is: with a minimal (or empty) set of builtins, and a restriction on ast.Name and ast.Attribute nodes, can exec/eval be made 'safe' so they cannot execute code outside the sandbox. The answer appears to be "yes", if the restriction is "^f?_". (If you additionally inject external objects to the namespace then they need to be proxied and mro() prevented.) > You can't do that just by asking on the mailing list and whacking > all the examples. If anyone had managed to find any more examples of holes in the original featureset after the first couple then I would agree with you, but they haven't. > As others pointed out, this particular approach (with maybe > different details) has been tried again and again and again This simply isn't true either. As far as I can see, only RestrictedPython has tried anything remotely similar, and to the best of my ability to determine, that project is not considerd a failure. _______________________________________________ Python-Dev mailing list Python-Dev@python.org https://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/python-dev Unsubscribe: https://mail.python.org/mailman/options/python-dev/archive%40mail-archive.com
