Hendrik van Rooyen wrote: > "Stephan Kuhagen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > >> The problem with linux kernel limits are, that they won't work really good >> on MacOSX and Windows... OTOH the idea is the right one, but the effect can >> be achieved inside of Python. Since Python does byte compile the code and >> the interpreter evaluates each byte code token in one evaluation step. The >> interpreter could be extended for such usecases to count and limit the >> number of evaluation steps allowed for untrusted script or methods in >> untrusted script as well as to limit the recursion depth or memory to be >> allocated. All those limits are managed by the interpreter for script code >> and hence can be limited for untrusted code by the interpreter. This also >> does not really make DoS impossible (what about C extensions? - maybe >> restricting "import"?). - As I said before in this thread, making a sandbox >> really secure is a hard job, and may need some serious changes in the >> Python interpreter, but AFAIK from Tcl, it is possible - and would be nice >> to have. > > I seem to recall previous discussion on this group about a thing called the > bastion module, > and that it was deprecated. Not sure if it has any relevance. > Anyone with an interest in secure Python should take a look at what Brett Cannon is doing in his postgraduate work. There have been some discussions on the python-dev list.
regards Steve -- Steve Holden +44 150 684 7255 +1 800 494 3119 Holden Web LLC/Ltd http://www.holdenweb.com Skype: holdenweb http://holdenweb.blogspot.com Recent Ramblings http://del.icio.us/steve.holden -- http://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/python-list
