In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Laurent Pointal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> .
>> .
>> .
>>>>> there's the security issue that really worries me. . . I have to be
>>>>> able to limit what the interpreter can execute. I can't have my users
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>>> I Agree with F.Bayer, when reading OP post, I immediatly think about Lua.
>>
>> Does Lua have an appropriate security model--a sandbox or such?
>> Fond though I am of Lua, such would be news to me.
>
>I dont think of a security model like in Java, but in the possibility to
>limit the accessible libraries for interpreted code.
>
> http://www.lua.org/manual/5.1/manual.html#5
>
>If OP just need some computation logic, he could limit external world
>communication libraries (these libraries must be loaded by the C host
>program before being usable by scripts).
>Need to look more precisely to the minimum library set to load and to
>available functions in this set. Maybe it is possible to remove some
>undesired functions from Lua symbol tables just after loading libraries.
>
>
>[note: I have still not used Lua, but I look at it for futur use in a
>current development where an embedded Python would be too heavy and make
>problems relative to the GIL - but I'm still a Python fan in other use
>cases]
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I agree that Lua has a nice collection of primitives, and
there certainly is scope for security-related programming.
There isn't a body of work or precedent for polished results
in this area, though, ...
Good luck with the future use you anticipate.
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