Hi Pierrick,
On 2025/10/16 15:04, Pierrick Bouvier wrote:
On 10/15/25 11:37 PM, Tao Tang wrote:
Hi Pierrick:
On 2025/10/15 08:02, Pierrick Bouvier wrote:
Hi Tao,
On 10/12/25 8:15 AM, Tao Tang wrote:
The Arm SMMUv3 architecture uses a SEC_SID (Secure StreamID) to select
the programming interface. To support future extensions like RME,
which
defines four security states (Non-secure, Secure, Realm, and Root),
the
QEMU model must cleanly separate these contexts for all operations.
This commit leverages the generic iommu_index to represent this
security context. The core IOMMU layer now uses the SMMU's
.attrs_to_index
callback to map a transaction's ARMSecuritySpace attribute to the
corresponding iommu_index.
This index is then passed down to smmuv3_translate and used throughout
the model to select the correct register bank and processing logic.
This
makes the iommu_index the clear QEMU equivalent of the architectural
SEC_SID, cleanly separating the contexts for all subsequent lookups.
Signed-off-by: Tao Tang <[email protected]>
---
hw/arm/smmuv3.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/hw/arm/smmuv3.c b/hw/arm/smmuv3.c
index c9c742c80b..b44859540f 100644
--- a/hw/arm/smmuv3.c
+++ b/hw/arm/smmuv3.c
@@ -1080,6 +1080,38 @@ static void smmuv3_fixup_event(SMMUEventInfo
*event, hwaddr iova)
}
}
+static SMMUSecSID smmuv3_attrs_to_sec_sid(MemTxAttrs attrs)
+{
+ switch (attrs.space) {
+ case ARMSS_Secure:
+ return SMMU_SEC_SID_S;
+ case ARMSS_NonSecure:
+ default:
+ return SMMU_SEC_SID_NS;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * ARM IOMMU index mapping (implements SEC_SID from ARM SMMU):
+ * iommu_idx = 0: Non-secure transactions
+ * iommu_idx = 1: Secure transactions
+ *
+ * The iommu_idx parameter effectively implements the SEC_SID
+ * (Security Stream ID) attribute from the ARM SMMU architecture
specification,
+ * which allows the SMMU to differentiate between different security
state
+ * transactions at the hardware level.
+ */
+static int smmuv3_attrs_to_index(IOMMUMemoryRegion *iommu,
MemTxAttrs attrs)
+{
+ return (int)smmuv3_attrs_to_sec_sid(attrs);
+}
+
+static int smmuv3_num_indexes(IOMMUMemoryRegion *iommu)
+{
+ /* Support 2 IOMMU indexes for now: NS/S */
+ return SMMU_SEC_SID_NUM;
+}
+
/* Entry point to SMMU, does everything. */
static IOMMUTLBEntry smmuv3_translate(IOMMUMemoryRegion *mr, hwaddr
addr,
IOMMUAccessFlags flag, int
iommu_idx)
@@ -1087,7 +1119,7 @@ static IOMMUTLBEntry
smmuv3_translate(IOMMUMemoryRegion *mr, hwaddr addr,
SMMUDevice *sdev = container_of(mr, SMMUDevice, iommu);
SMMUv3State *s = sdev->smmu;
uint32_t sid = smmu_get_sid(sdev);
- SMMUSecSID sec_sid = SMMU_SEC_SID_NS;
+ SMMUSecSID sec_sid = iommu_idx;
SMMUv3RegBank *bank = smmuv3_bank(s, sec_sid);
SMMUEventInfo event = {.type = SMMU_EVT_NONE,
.sid = sid,
@@ -2540,6 +2572,8 @@ static void
smmuv3_iommu_memory_region_class_init(ObjectClass *klass,
imrc->translate = smmuv3_translate;
imrc->notify_flag_changed = smmuv3_notify_flag_changed;
+ imrc->attrs_to_index = smmuv3_attrs_to_index;
+ imrc->num_indexes = smmuv3_num_indexes;
}
static const TypeInfo smmuv3_type_info = {
I noticed that this commit breaks boot of a simple Linux kernel. It
was already the case with v2, and it seems there is a deeper issue.
Virtio drive initialization hangs up with:
[ 9.421906] virtio_blk virtio2: [vda] 20971520 512-byte logical
blocks (10.7 GB/10.0 GiB)
smmuv3_translate_disable smmuv3-iommu-memory-region-24-3 sid=0x18
bypass (smmu disabled) iova:0xfffff040 is_write=1
You can reproduce that with any kernel/rootfs, but if you want a
simple recipe (you need podman and qemu-user-static):
$ git clone https://github.com/pbo-linaro/qemu-linux-stack
$ cd qemu-linux-stack
$ ./build_kernel.sh
$ ./build_rootfs.sh
$ /path/to/qemu-system-aarch64 \
-nographic -M virt,iommu=smmuv3 -cpu max -kernel out/Image.gz \
-append "root=/dev/vda rw" out/host.ext4 -trace 'smmuv3*'
Looking more closely,
we reach SMMU_TRANS_DISABLE, because iommu_idx associated is 1.
This values comes from smmuv3_attrs_to_sec_sid, by reading
attrs.space, which is ArmSS_Secure.
The problem is that it's impossible to have anything Secure given that
all the code above runs in NonSecure world.
After investigation, the original value read from attrs.space has not
been set anywhere, and is just the default zero-initialized value
coming from pci_msi_trigger. It happens that it defaults to SEC_SID_S,
which probably matches your use case with hafnium, but it's an happy
accident.
Looking at the SMMU spec, I understand that SEC_SID is configured for
each stream, and can change dynamically.
On the opposite, a StreamID is fixed and derived from PCI bus and slot
for a given device.
Thus, I think we are missing some logic here.
I'm still trying to understand where the SEC_SID should come from
initially.
"The association between a device and the Security state of the
programming interface is a system-defined property."
Does it mean we should be able to set a QEMU property for any device?
Does anyone familiar with this has some idea?
As well, we should check the SEC_SID found based on
SMMU_S_IDR1.SECURE_IMPL.
3.10.1 StreamID Security state (SEC_SID)
If SMMU_S_IDR1.SECURE_IMPL == 0, then incoming transactions have a
StreamID, and either:
• A SEC_SID identifier with a value of 0.
• No SEC_SID identifer, and SEC_SID is implicitly treated as 0.
If SMMU_S_IDR1.SECURE_IMPL == 1, incoming transactions have a
StreamID, and a SEC_SID identifier.
Regards,
Pierrick
Thank you very much for your detailed review and in-depth analysis, and
for pointing out this critical issue that breaks the Linux boot.
To be transparent, my initial approach was indeed tailored to my
specific test case, where I was effectively hardcoding the device's
StreamID to represent it's a so-called Secure device in my self testing.
This clearly isn't a general solution.
It's definitely not a bad approach, and it's a good way to exercise
the secure path. It would have been caught by some of QEMU functional
tests anyway, so it's not a big deal.
A solution would be to define the secure attribute as a property of
the PCI device, and query that to identify sec_sid accordingly.
As you'll see in 3.10.1 StreamID Security state (SEC_SID), "Whether a
stream is under Secure control or not is a different property to the
target PA space of a transaction.", so we definitely should *not* do
any funky stuff depending on which address is accessed.
Thank you for the encouraging and very constructive feedback.
Your proposed solution—to define the security attribute as a property on
the PCIDevice—is the perfect way forward to resolve Secure device issue.
Perhaps we can implement this functionality in V4 as shown in the
following code snippet?
1) define sec_sid in include/hw/pci/pci_device.h:
struct PCIDevice {
DeviceState qdev;
......
/* Add SEC_SID property for SMMU security context */
uint8_t sec_sid; /* 0 = Non-secure, 1 = Secure*/
......
}
2) then add sec-sid field in the Property of PCI in hw/pci/pci.c:
static const Property pci_props[] = {
......
/* SEC_SID property: 0=NS, 1=S */
DEFINE_PROP_UINT8("sec-sid", PCIDevice, sec_sid, 0),
......
};
3) get sec-sid in smmu_find_add_as(hw/arm/smmu-common.c):
static AddressSpace *smmu_find_add_as(PCIBus *bus, void *opaque, int devfn)
{
SMMUState *s = opaque;
SMMUPciBus *sbus = g_hash_table_lookup(s->smmu_pcibus_by_busptr, bus);
SMMUDevice *sdev;
static unsigned int index;
......
sdev = sbus->pbdev[devfn];
if (!sdev) {
PCIDevice *pcidev;
pcidev = pci_find_device(bus, pci_bus_num(bus), devfn);
if (pcidev) {
/* Get sec_sid which is originally from QEMU options.
* For example:
* qemu-system-aarch64 \
* -drive if=none,file=/nvme.img,format=raw,id=nvme0 \
* -device nvme,drive=nvme0,serial=deadbeef,sec-sid=1
*
* This NVMe device will have sec_sid = 1.
*/
sdev->sec_sid = pcidev->sec_sid;
} else {
/* Default to Non-secure if device not found */
sdev->sec_sid = 0;
}
......
}
The SEC_SID of device will be passed from QEMU options to PCIDevice and
then SMMUDevice. This would allow the SMMU model to perform the
necessary checks against both the security context of the DMA access and
the SMMU_S_IDR1.SECURE_IMPL capability bit.
Is this a reasonable implementation approach? I would greatly appreciate
any feedback.
By curiosity, which kind of secure device are you using? Is it one of
the device available upstream, or a specific one you have in your fork?
I just use IGB NIC for test with Hafnium + OP-TEE software stack.
You've raised a crucial architectural point that I hadn't fully
considered: how a standard "Normal World" PCIe device should be properly
associated with the "Secure World". To be honest, I didn't have a clear
answer for this, so your feedback is a perfect opportunity for me to dig
in and understand this area correctly.
It took time for us to reach that question also.
Our current understanding is that SEC_SID == Realm is identified by
bits on pci side (part of TDISP protocol), and that secure devices are
indeed hardcoded somewhere.
We asked this question to some Arm folks working on this area, to
confirm Secure devices are supposed to be defined this way.
Thank you also for sharing the invaluable context from your team's
internal discussions and your outreach to the Arm experts. This
clarification directly inspired my new proposal as described above.
I will proceed with this plan for the v4 patch set. Thanks again for
your mentorship and for helping to clarify the correct path forward.
Best regards,
Tao
