On Wed, Jun 10, 2026 at 12:10:04PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > On Wed, Jun 10, 2026 at 07:06:38AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > On Wed, Jun 10, 2026 at 12:02:43PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > > On Wed, Jun 10, 2026 at 06:18:39AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > > > On Thu, Jun 04, 2026 at 05:50:48PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > > > > It is no longer viable to handle the incredible volumes of > > > > > AI assisted security disclosures via email, nor are extended > > > > > embargos practical or useful. > > > > > > > > > > Remove all information about the current security process and > > > > > instruct reporters to use 'confidential' issues. In contrast > > > > > to the old highly restrictive "need to know" approach, the > > > > > new approach makes all security issues visible to all QEMU > > > > > maintainers immediately. > > > > > > > > > > The focus is on making issues public as soon as possible with > > > > > a viable patch. Co-ordinated disclosure will no longer be > > > > > attempted and nor will requests to embargoes be accepted. > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> > > > > > --- > > > > > contribute/report-a-bug.md | 9 +- > > > > > contribute/security-process.md | 280 > > > > > ++++++++++++++------------------- > > > > > 2 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 170 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/contribute/report-a-bug.md b/contribute/report-a-bug.md > > > > > index fd3bc6b..b506f9f 100644 > > > > > --- a/contribute/report-a-bug.md > > > > > +++ b/contribute/report-a-bug.md > > > > > @@ -11,6 +11,11 @@ on GitLab, taking into account the following > > > > > guidance. > > > > > requested pieces of information that are relevant to the > > > > > discovered bug. > > > > > > > > > > +* Bugs which are suspected, or known, to have security implications > > > > > + **must** be marked as "*confidential*" prior to submitting the > > > > > + disclosure. Consult the [security process](../security-process) > > > > > + for further guidance on security issue handling. > > > > > + > > > > > > > > Do we want to do like linux does, and make AI found issues public, > > > > on the assumption that bad guys can find them just as easily? > > > > > > I'm pretty sympathetic to the idea that AI discovered issues > > > are "effectively public", but IMHO that's not quite the same > > > as "actually public". > > > > > > While people can re-discover things, that doesn't mean we should > > > do the job for them by publicising everything immediately. > > > > > > To me, the main implications of the "effectively public" view > > > point are > > > > > > * Minimizing time-to-fix is the core priority > > > * Process needs to be low cost minimal external dependencies > > > > > > Delaying disclosure to suit arbitrary downstream vendor's or user's > > > update schedules is not helpful. The only delays to publication should > > > be to allow a maintainer to get a patch prepared, nothing beyond that. > > > "Low" severity bugs can be public immediately regardless of a patch. > > > > > > With regards, > > > Daniel > > > > > > Ok so you are saying the process will be: > > - patch posted on public list -> maintainer makes the bug public? > > Yes, I even wrote that in this patch :-) > > + * At the time the proposed patches are sent to qemu-devel, the > + maintainers should remove the "*confidential*" marker from the > + GitLab issue. >
Right, you did. > > and if the issue is coming with a patch? > > If the reporter provides a patch, the maintainer merely needs to > review it. If happy, either the reporter or maintainer can send > it to qemu-devel immediately. > > With regards, > Daniel Presumably with a Fixes tag.
