On 7/23/26 18:29, ConKite wrote: > This patch series implements a memory isolation mode in vhost-user. The > purpose of this mode is to provide the option of additional security by > eliminating direct access of guest memory by vhost-user devices. > At a high level this works by: > > 1. Adding qdev and qapi properties required to enable isolation mode for > various devices. > 2. Allocating an isolation memory region in an anonymous file and mapping it > to host memory. This isolation region will hold the bounce buffers and > vrings necessary to move data. > 3. Using a vhost-iova-tree to allocate and track the mapping between > guest regions and their corresponding bounce buffers in the isolation > memory. > 4. Creating shadow virtqueues to intercept request notifications. As > kick and call events are received by an svq, it copies buffer > contents and descriptors between isolation and guest memory before > notifying the backend or guest. > > Note: This project is currently in a partially functional state. For > example, in testing vhost-user-input and a keyboard, keystrokes may > register correctly or be double counted depending on the combination > of backend daemon and guest OS used. However, the desire is to make > this work public at this stage for comment on the overall
Nice! Does this approach work for a generic vhost-user device, as opposed to one that knows it is a block/network/etc device? Also, how much overhead is there compared to the normal case? -- Sincerely, Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
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