On Fri, 2 Oct 2026 at 11:22, Thomas Huth <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On 01/10/2026 21.47, Peter Maydell wrote:
> > The OHCI USB controller requires software to set up an Endpoint
> > Descriptor data structure.  This specifies (among other things) both
> > an EndpointNumber telling the controller which USB endpoint to talk
> > to, and a Format (F) bit which is 1 for Isochronous transfers and 0
> > for General transfers.
> >
> > The specification requires that software matches the F bit with the
> > endpoint it's setting up the descriptor for, so that Control, Bulk
> > and Interrupt endpoints use F=0, and Isochronous endpoints use F=1.
> > It doesn't require the controller to check whether software gets this
> > right.
> >
> > The spec isn't totally clear about what happens if software creates
> > an ED with a mismatch, but I believe that the controller just trusts
> > the F bit, and tries to talk to the endpoint with the wrong sequence
> > of USB tokens (notably, isochronous transactions have no handshaking
> > and the others do). This probably results in the transfer failing.
> >
> > In hcd-ehci.c we check for the "iso transfer to non-iso endpoint" and
> > make it fail, but we don't do this in hcd-ohci.c.  The result is that
> > a guest that deliberately sets up this situation can cause us to hit
> > the assertion added in commit 7b1eba96aeca, where the endpoint is not
> > isochronous and returns USB_RET_ASYNC to an iso TD handling function
> > that isn't prepared to deal with that.
> >
> > Add checks for both "iso transfer to non-iso endpoint" and "non-iso
> > transfer to iso endpoint" and make those TDs fail rather than blindly
> > sending them to the endpoint.
> >
> > Cc: [email protected]
> > Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3729
> Looks like this issue got assigned with a CVE number, so please add:
>
> CVE: CVE-2026-7180

I guess we might as well, but honestly I don't think this is CVE worthy,
and I can't find any record of what that CVE number is supposed to cover
from a websearch.

This is in OHCI, which I thought was agreed to be outside
the security envelope, and in any case it's only an assertion failure.

The use-after-free that was the original subject of the bug report
has already been fixed by 7b1eba96aeca (which downgraded it to
"fails assertion").

thanks
-- PMM

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