On Wed, 28 Oct 2026 at 13:51, Fabiano Rosas <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Peter Maydell <[email protected]> writes:
> > Thanks. I think we could maybe make the text clearer. Here's my
> > suggestion, that splits out the cases into a set of bullet points:
> >
> > * **migration/snapshots**. The user must deploy QEMU following the
> >   design principles described in the Architecture section to ensure
> >   that the migration stream is secure. Plain manipulation of the stream
> >   is not considered to be an attack vector. This means that:
> >   * Migration failures and snapshot load failures are part of normal
> >     operation; these are not bugs as long as the source virtual machine
> >     or savevm file are still functional
> >   * Aborts, crashes or misbehaviour of the destination QEMU due to
> >     an externally manipulated migration stream are bugs, but not
> >     security issues
> >   * A crash of the destination QEMU that can be triggered by a guest
> >     manipulating a device on the source QEMU before a migration may
> >     be a security issue, if it meets the other criteria we document
> >     for security issues
> >
> > How does that sound?
> >
>
> Looks good, thanks. I'll send a patch.

Thanks. You should check whether I have the nested-bulleted list rst
syntax correct there, I just hand-wrote it in the email client :-)

> > I think we should also:
> >
> >  * add a subsection to the "Sensitive configurations" part of this
> >    document at the bottom, that makes it clear that the user needs
> >    to be careful about the migration stream and loadvm files
> >    (to parallel the one that says "it's your job to lock down
> >    monitor access")
> >  * update the part at the to of the document that includes in
> >    its list of untrusted entities "Network protocols (e.g. NBD,
> >    live migration)" as this suggests the opposite of what the
> >    later text says. I guess just delete "live migration" ?
> >
>
> Yes, this one has been coming up frequently. The point was to keep
> developers thinking about migration stream validation. But it's
> misleading, better to remove it.
>
> > We also have 15 or so existing bugs that are labelled "confidential"
> > but which are "crafted migration stream can exploit the destination
> > QEMU". Unless you object I'll mark all those as non-confidential
> > non-security issues.
> >
>
> Ack

OK, I'll do that at some point this week.

-- PMM

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