On Fri, 11 Sept 2026 at 15:42, Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> wrote: > > Historically most NICs are only interesting for non-virtualization > use cases and have not been written with malicious guests in mind. > > As a general rule either virtio-net or xen-net should be used in > all virtualized guests requiring a security boundary. > > There are a handful of exceptions resulting from historical usage > in the x86 world, to support virtualized guests lacking virtio > support. > > Thus the rtl8139, e1000, e1000e & IGB NICs are declared to provide > a security boundary.
You've said in several bugs (e.g. https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3872 ) that igb wasn't covered by the virtualization use case. I don't care either way, but I wanted to check since I've been marking igb bugs as non-confidential when triaging on the basis of that... thanks -- PMM
