+ qemu-stable

Hi Peter,

On 05/11/26 8:57 pm, Peter Maydell wrote:
On Wed, 28 Oct 2026 at 05:21, Harsh Prateek Bora <[email protected]> wrote:

From: Chinmay Rath <[email protected]>

vscsi_send_adapter_info() used the guest-supplied common.length
field directly as the size argument to spapr_vio_dma_write().
Since common.length is controlled by the guest, a value larger
than sizeof(struct mad_adapter_info_data) (148 bytes) caused
dma_memory_write() to read past the end of the stack-allocated info
struct, leaking arbitrary host stack contents into guest memory.

Fix this by clamping the write length to sizeof(info), then using
spapr_vio_dma_set() to zero-fill any remaining bytes the guest
requested beyond that size. This mirrors the existing pattern in
vscsi_send_capabilities().

Closes: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/4626
Reported-by: Guthrie McAfee Armstrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chinmay Rath <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Gautam Menghani <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Gautam Menghani <[email protected]>
Link: 
https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Harsh Prateek Bora <[email protected]>

Shouldn't this be Cc: [email protected] ?

Yes, should have been marked for stable. I have CCed it now though.>
Given that spapr-vscsi is supposed to be covered by the "virtualization
use case", have we deliberately decided we didn't want to give this
a CVE, or did that step in the process get missed ?

I think it got missed, can we still request for a CVE to be assigned on the gitlab issue?

regards,
Harsh


thanks
-- PMM


Reply via email to