A faulty/malicious guest can try to exhaust host memory. Cap the buffer size to 500 MiB.
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3587 Reviewed-by: Jim MacArthur <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manos Pitsidianakis <[email protected]> --- hw/audio/virtio-snd.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/hw/audio/virtio-snd.c b/hw/audio/virtio-snd.c index a7d749f24f..a6036d5b75 100644 --- a/hw/audio/virtio-snd.c +++ b/hw/audio/virtio-snd.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include "qemu/osdep.h" #include "qemu/iov.h" +#include "qemu/units.h" #include "qemu/log.h" #include "qemu/error-report.h" #include "system/runstate.h" @@ -24,6 +25,8 @@ #include "qapi/error.h" #include "hw/audio/virtio-snd.h" +#define MAX_BUFFER_MIB 500 + #define VIRTIO_SOUND_JACK_DEFAULT 0 #define VIRTIO_SOUND_STREAM_DEFAULT 2 #define VIRTIO_SOUND_CHMAP_DEFAULT 0 @@ -368,6 +371,14 @@ uint32_t virtio_snd_set_pcm_params(VirtIOSound *s, & ~(stream->info.features)); return cpu_to_le32(VIRTIO_SND_S_BAD_MSG); } + if (le32_to_cpu(params->buffer_bytes) > MAX_BUFFER_MIB * MiB) { + error_report("%s: given buffer_bytes value %"PRIu32" " + "is too big: over %d MiB", + VIRTIO_DEVICE(s)->name, + le32_to_cpu(params->buffer_bytes), + MAX_BUFFER_MIB); + return cpu_to_le32(VIRTIO_SND_S_BAD_MSG); + } st_params = virtio_snd_pcm_get_params(s, stream_id); @@ -1037,6 +1048,8 @@ static void virtio_snd_handle_tx_xfer(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq) } stream = &vsnd->streams[stream_id]; + size = MIN(stream->params.buffer_bytes, size); + if (stream->info.direction != VIRTIO_SND_D_OUTPUT) { goto tx_err; } -- γαῖα πυρί μιχθήτω
