On Fri, 13 Nov 2026 at 20:19, Akihiko Odaki <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 2026/11/12 13:02, Peter Maydell wrote: > > In net_checksum_calculate() we are careless about handling of the IP > > header length, in a way which can allow it to become negative for a > > suitably crafted packet. This bypasses the attempt to check that > > it's big enough, because in comparisons like > > if (ip_len < sizeof(tcp_header)) > > ip_len is converted to size_t and we do this as an unsigned > > comparison, so negative values of ip_len pass the check. > > > > This results in net_checksum_tcpudp() attempting to checksum nearly > > 64K of memory (because it takes the length as a uint16_t), which will > > typically be a read off the end of a buffer resulting in a segfault. > > If the attacker is able to set up a situation where the read doesn't > > fault, it's possible for some callers that the 2-byte store of the > > updated checksum is an out-of-bounds write. > > > > This code is used by at least xen-nic, virtio-net, and the COLOj > > filter-rewriter, all of which are in QEMU's security "virtualization > > use case", though the write is probably only exploitable for the > > filter-rewriter; otherwise it's just a theoretical "information leak > > to guest" of a 2-byte checksum of 64K of host RAM. > > > > Improve the checking of lengths in this function: > > * assert that the caller provided us a positive buffer length > > The new assertion is reachable through eTSEC. It assumes callers always > supply a nonnegative length. However, eTSEC accumulates descriptor > lengths without a frame-size cap, then passes the unsigned length to > this signed parameter in process_tx_fcb(). An aggregate exceeding 2 GiB > can therefore abort QEMU. > > A natural way to fix it would be to change the type to an unsigned one > that can contain that large length, which would also eliminate the need > for the assertion.
Rats. The reason I didn't change the type was I was hoping to avoid having to look at all the callsites and whether the type change would make a difference to them :-) The eTSEC behaviour seems like a bug in that device to me (of the kind that I put the assertion in there to catch): if it has no frame size cap then presumably the guest can also get it to overflow its own uint32_t tx_buffer_len ... thanks -- PMM
