Stefan Hajnoczi <stefa...@redhat.com> writes: > On Thu, Oct 30, 2014 at 10:07:26AM +0100, Markus Armbruster wrote: >> Stefan Hajnoczi <stefa...@gmail.com> writes: >> >> > On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 02:54:32PM +0100, Markus Armbruster wrote: >> >> Kevin Wolf <kw...@redhat.com> writes: >> >> >> >> > Am 28.10.2014 um 17:03 hat Markus Armbruster geschrieben: >> >> > Instead, let me try once more to sell my old proposal [1] from the >> >> > thread you mentioned: >> >> > >> >> >> What if we let the raw driver know that it was probed and then it >> >> >> enables a check that returns -EIO for any write on the first 2k if that >> >> >> write would make the image look like a different format? >> >> > >> >> > Attacks the problem where it arises instead of trying to detect the >> >> > outcome of it, and works in whatever way it is nested in the BDS graph >> >> > and whatever way is used to address the image file. >> > >> > I think this is too clever. It's another thing to debug if a guest >> > starts hitting EIO. >> > >> > My opinion on probing is: it's ugly but let's leave it for QEMU 3.0 at >> > which point we implement Markus solution with exit(1). >> >> I regard my patch as a necessary preliminary step for that. Warn now, >> change behavior a couple of releases later. When exactly is debatable. >> >> > In the meantime the CVE has been known for a long time so vulnerable >> > users (VM hosting, cloud, etc) have the information they need. Many are >> > automatically protected by libvirt. >> >> The warning hopefully helps libvirt developers with keeping libvirt >> users fully protected. > > I'm happy with this approach (haven't reviewed the patches in detail > yet).
PATCH 1/2 is fully baked, but it's also trivial, and got plenty of review already. PATCH 2/2 isn't baked, yet, and I think I know what needs to be done. I guess your review cycles are better spent elsewhere.